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Editorial
Criminal evidence; JSB specimen directions
The Judicial Studies Board plays an extremely important role in training and
supporting the judiciary, not least in criminal justice matters which are so prone
to hasty legislative change. A familiar aspect of the Board’s work, and one which
impacts tangibly on all Crown Court trials, is the provision of specimen directions.
Their development and use have been criticised by many, as for example with
typical flair by Dr Munday, ‘‘Exemplum Habemus’’ (2006) J Crim. Law 27.
The directions have recently been criticised by the Lord Chief Justice in his
Kalisher Lecture ‘‘Trusting the Jury’’ (2007) (www.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/speeches/
lcj trusting juries 231007.pdf ) echoing his views when presiding in Campbell [2007]
EWCA Crim 1472. In his lecture, Lord Phillips voiced concern ‘‘at the number
of directions that are given to juries that, at the end of the day, are no more than
matters of common sense’’ and announced that ‘‘Lord Justice Latham is leading
a working party to see whether some of these cannot be dispensed with, or at
least simplified’’. Since many of these directions are given in the Crown Court in
England and Wales every working day, their reform is of considerable importance.
His Lordship’s desire to prevent unnecessary direction of jurors is of course
welcome. As a matter of principle jurors ought to be given directions only where
they will be of assistance and only then in a form in which they can be readily
understood and applied. Over-directing juries has long been a concern (see E.J.
Griew, ‘‘Summing up the Law’’ [1989] Crim. L.R. 768) and it certainly seems that
some current directions are unnecessary, revealing nothing to jurors which would
not already have occurred to them. Equally, it is doubtful whether some of the
directions are as clear as they might be or whether they assist jurors. However, before
pressing ahead with revision and possible removal of some directions we must be
confident of how if at all they are defective, what purposes they serve and what juries
need from them. All too often we have been prepared to make false assumptions
about jurors and their decision making (see, recently C. Thomas [2008] Crim. L.R.
Issue 6 and W. Young, ‘‘Summing Up to Jurors in Criminal Cases’’ [2003] Crim.
L.R. 665). If we are serious about crafting optimal jury directions we should invest
time and money in appropriate empirical studies. This extends not just to what
areas of law require directions, but the form they should take to ensure maximum
effectiveness. There have, for example, been repeated calls for greater use of written
directions: see N. Madge, ‘‘Summing Up: A Judge’s Perspective’’ [2006] Crim.
L.R. 817; R. Auld, Criminal Courts’ Review (2001), Ch.5 para.50.
In reforming the specimens, a further dimension must be borne in mind: although
primarily for the benefit of the jury their benefit to judges is undeniable. Judges’
need for specimens is perhaps greater than ever as criminal legislation becomes
increasingly complex and technical. (Anyone doubting that should cast an eye over
the labyrinthine Pt 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007). As legislative complexity
increases so does the risk of error in directing the jury, and consequently speci-
men directions assume greater significance. When regard is had to the hundreds
of Recorders sitting in criminal trials, for many of whom their own practice lies
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outside criminal law, the value of specimens is manifest. However, the specimen
directions have always been intended to provide guidance rather than a mantra to
be recited unthinkingly. Much of the Lord Chief Justices’ criticism may be borne of
a well-founded concern—that the directions are being recited too readily without
any attempt to create bespoke directions tailored to the needs of individual cases.
As the law becomes more technical, the temptation to recite presumably increases,
especially for part-time judges. If the judges’ needs are to be adequately met, the
exercise of reforming the specimens becomes even more difficult.
A further reason for caution in revision of specimen directions is because they
serve not only to assist jurors and judges, but to protect defendants and improve
efficiency and consistency in the criminal justice process. How often has reliance
on the form of words in the specimens on something as important as the burden of
proof prevented a judge making a slip, particularly on something so routine? Many
defendants will have been saved from wrongful conviction and the Court of Appeal
spared another unnecessary appeal because of careful adherence to the directions
on any number of subjects. In Art.6 terms they also go some way to making up for
the absence of juries delivering reasons.
There is a further, more controversial dimension to Lord Phillips’ criticism.
Behind his suggestion that the specimen directions need reform, is the broader
issue about whether we should be more willing to trust the jury to deal with the
evidence they receive. His Lordship draws support for his preference for greater
trust from the dramatic legislative changes in the law of evidence over the last
decade or so. It is true that these led to the jury being permitted, for example, to
draw inferences from silence, hear more hearsay and have revealed an accused’s
bad character. However, it should be noted that Parliament legislated to permit
these potentially prejudicial forms of evidence to be received, knowing that the
jury would be given appropriate judicial direction. Moreover, these examples could
be used against His Lordship’s position. It might be argued that the greater the
volume of (prejudicial) evidence which legislation makes potentially admissible,
the greater is the obligation on the trial judge to guide the jury on how they may
approach it. In particular, for example, it could be said that it is only because
of the judicial guidance on adverse inferences that the legislation has not created
unfairness and wrongful convictions. With hearsay and bad character it may be
too early to say how jurors are coping, and research into jurors’ experiences
of such evidence under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is desirable, particularly
as to evidence of an accused’s bad character. Declaring a wider trust in juries
and jettisoning the specimen direction on such an important form of prejudicial
evidence, as suggested in Campbell [2007] EWCA Crim 1472 may, it is respectfully
submitted, be premature. Life is made more rather than less difficult for judges
by decisions such as Campbell, where the specimen direction on bad character was
rejected. It is obvious that judges cannot simply say nothing to the jury regarding
the bad character evidence which has been adduced. But if they cannot rely
on specimen directions, what are they to say? Trial judges will turn to personal
invention leading to inconsistency, uncertainty and more appeals.
The specimen directions may well be in need of a major overhaul and in some
cases deletion, but that should be conducted against a backdrop of reliable research.
David Ormerod
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Causing Death by Driving and Other
Offences: A Question of Balance
By Michael Hirst*
Professor of Criminal Justice, De Montfort University
Causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving; Causing death by
dangerous driving; Causing death by driving; Sentence length; Sentencing
guidelines
Summary: This article examines road traffic homicide offences and argues that current
sentencing practice in relation to them has become disproportionately punitive and
severe, at least in cases where death results from a simple human error, rather than
from wilfully culpable driving.
Introduction
There is a widespread belief that motorists who cause fatal accidents are treated
leniently by the courts. The red-top tabloids, pressure groups and local newspapers,
in particular, have campaigned long and hard for greater severity in the punishment
of ‘‘killer drivers’’, often by focusing on individual cases in which it is claimed that
justice was not done. A common complaint is that such motorists ought to face
charges of manslaughter, instead of the less serious offence of causing death by
dangerous driving (CDDD) under the Road Traffic Act 1988 s.1.
Such complaints may once have had some validity. The s.1 offence once attracted
much lower penalties than it does today,1 and is derived from an offence first created
as a ‘‘soft option’’ because juries were considered reluctant to convict motorists of
anything as serious as manslaughter.2
A study of modern sentencing guidelines and decisions of the Court of Appeal
reveals a very different picture, however. A series of increases in both maximum and
guideline penalties for death by driving offences means that motorists convicted
of such offences are now punished more severely than most other involuntary
killers. Cases of manslaughter by gross negligence (other than road traffic cases)
typically attract lower sentences, which have changed little in recent years. Even
when we turn to constructive manslaughter, where longer sentences are sometimes
imposed, many cases involving deliberate, savage and unprovoked physical violence,
*My thanks to Gavin Dingwall for his helpful comments on a first draft of this article.
1 The maximum penalty has been increased from 5 to 10 years and then to 14 years’
imprisonment, in addition to obligatory disqualification.
2 In a debate on what was to become the Road Traffic Act 1956 s.1, Lord Goddard said:
‘‘Juries hate the word ‘manslaughter’. They see in front of them . . . 15 years, or something of
that sort. They associate manslaughter with murder trials . . .’’, Hansard, HL Vol.191, col.86
(1955).
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serious enough to have attracted an initial charge of murder, nevertheless result in
sentences significantly lower than those deemed appropriate in CDDD cases where
no deliberate criminality is involved.
Inevitably, some drivers who kill are not prosecuted and of those that are
prosecuted some face ‘‘downgraded charges’’, such as careless driving.3 Evidential
uncertainties, particularly in connection with proof of fault, are often the reason,
and no doubt some guilty drivers escape justice. This is not of course a problem
unique to such offences, but has been addressed in the Road Safety Act 2006 by
the creation of new homicide offences (notably one of causing death by careless
driving (CDCD)). Sentences of imprisonment and obligatory disqualification will
thereby become available in fatal accident cases even where there is no evidence of
seriously culpable driving, but only of what Lord Diplock once referred to as:
‘‘. . . the kind of inattention or misjudgment to which the ordinarily careful
motorist is occasionally subject without it necessarily involving any moral
turpitude . . .’’4
Nor should it be supposed that imprisonment for the new CDCD offence will
be reserved only for exceptionally bad cases. On the contrary, the indications are
that courts and judges will be expected to impose it in all but the least serious of
cases involving the lowest levels of culpability.5 As the Road Safety Minister, Fiona
McTaggart, explained when the proposed offences were first unveiled:
‘‘We’re on the side of the victim: we’re making sure that people who kill on
the road can get proper prison sentences. We’re making sure that if someone
kills when they’re driving carelessly - even if they didn’t mean to - then they
can be sent to prison.’’6
Whilst the punishment of motorists who kill is now severe, the same cannot be said
of sentences imposed for many serious but non-fatal traffic offences, for which the
penalties have not been raised in recent years. By fixating on fatal offences, we have
created a regime in which a motorist who makes one fatal error or misjudgement
following a lifetime of exemplary driving can expect to be treated more severely (and
in some cases many times more severely) than a serial traffic offender whose latest
deliberate, prolonged and viciously irresponsible escapade miraculously leaves only
damaged vehicles and traumatised road users in his wake. This makes no sense
from a deterrence or road safety perspective. Human error cannot effectively be
controlled or deterred by punishment.
It is now generally accepted that even the unintended consequences of offending
behaviour should be taken into account when determining the seriousness of an
offence. Conduct that kills will thus attract heavier penalties than identical conduct
3 See S. Cunningham, ‘‘The Unique Nature of Prosecutions in Cases of Fatal Road Traffic
Collisions’’ [2005] Crim. L.R. 834.
4 Lawrence [1982] A.C. 510 at 525. This is essentially the test now codified in the Road
Traffic Act 1988 s.3ZA: driving which falls below the standard expected of a competent and
careful driver.
5 This is what is now proposed by the Sentencing Guidelines Council: see below.
6 BBC radio interview, October 31, 2005.
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that does not.7 In the case of one who kills as a result of deliberate or reckless
misconduct, one might justify this on the basis that he must bear the chance conse-
quences of such misconduct,8 but this does not make imprisonment an appropriate
penalty for tragic error or misjudgement. The Sentencing Guidelines Council
(SGC) states that ‘‘harm must always be judged in the light of culpability’’ and:
‘‘[T]he culpability of the offender in the particular circumstances of an
individual case should be the initial factor in determining the seriousness of
an offence.’’9
Regrettably, however, luck or chance plays a stronger role in shaping the sentences
imposed on road traffic offenders.
Road traffic homicide offences
Murder and constructive manslaughter
Motorists who kill when using their vehicles as weapons may face charges of murder
or constructive manslaughter, as in Brown,10 in which the defendant (hereafter,
D) attempted to commit suicide by ramming another car, but succeeded only
in killing the other driver. He received a 10-year sentence after pleading guilty
to manslaughter. Although Andrews v DPP11 makes it clear that negligent or
reckless driving does not in itself constitute an ‘‘unlawful and dangerous act’’ for
manslaughter purposes, deliberate and dangerous road traffic violations should on
principle suffice. For example, a motorist who kills when racing another on a public
road must be guilty of manslaughter, because this is not merely a case of a lawful
activity improperly performed. It is a deliberate and dangerous offence causing
death. In practice, however, prosecutors are usually happy to settle for a charge of
CDDD in such cases.12
Negligent manslaughter and causing death by dangerous driving
In the context of road traffic offences, which include offences committed by drivers
in public places, such as car parks, there is little practical difference between the
elements that must be proved on a charge of negligent ‘‘motor’’ manslaughter and
those that must be proved on a charge of CDDD. Manslaughter requires proof of
7 As Martin Wasik notes in ‘‘Form and Function in the Law of Involuntary Manslaughter’’
[1994] Crim. L.R. 883 at 891–892, this has not always been the position adopted by the
courts. See, e.g. O’Neill (1967) 51 Cr. App. R. 241.
8 See T. Honore, ‘‘Responsibility and Luck’’ (1988) 104 L.Q.R. 530; A. Ashworth, ‘‘Taking
the Consequences’’ in Shute et al., Action and Value in the Criminal Law (1994). See also
S. Cunningham, ‘‘Punishing Drivers Who Kill’’ (2007) 27 L.S. 288 at 300; R. Henham,
‘‘Sentencing Policy and Serious Motoring Offenders’’ (1996) 60 J.C.L. 208.
9 SGC, Overarching Principles: Seriousness. Guideline, 5.
10 [2005] EWCA Crim 2868; [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 124. See also Bissell [2007] EWCA
Crim 2123 where the jury, in convicting D of manslaughter on a charge of murder, indicated
that they were divided as to whether D had used his lorry as a weapon or simply failed to see
the deceased. He was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment on the basis of gross negligence.
The fact that he drove off leaving her dying in the road was a major aggravating feature.
11 [1937] A.C. 576.
12 See, e.g. Hampson [2006] EWCA Crim 163; [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 82; Antoniou
[2004] EWCA Crim 2984. See also S. Cunningham, ‘‘The Reality of Vehicular Homicides’’
[2001] Crim. L.R. 679.
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gross negligence as to an obvious risk of death,13 whereas CDDD requires only
that death is caused by driving that falls far below what would be expected of a
competent and careful driver, and involves an obvious risk of injury or serious
damage to property.14 In practice, however, driving that involves an obvious risk
of injury or serious damage will also endanger life, so that distinction is largely
theoretical.15 Neither offence requires proof of wilful misconduct and it is no
defence in either case for an inexperienced driver to claim that he was doing his
incompetent best.16
Nor is there much difference in practice between the sentences that may be
imposed. Although the penalty for manslaughter is at large, sentences for the gross
negligence variety, even in road traffic cases, rarely match the 14-year maximum
that may be imposed in the worst CDDD cases; and many of the most shocking
road traffic homicide cases, including some in which a vehicle has been used as a
weapon, are prosecuted as CDDD.17
Other existing homicide offences
CDDD is supplemented by the offence of causing death by careless driving when
intoxicated, etc. (CDCDI) contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA) s.3A, and
two more homicide offences will be added when amendments made by the Road
Safety Act 2006 come into force. The s.3A offence carries the same maximum
penalty as CDDD, as does aggravated vehicle-taking (contrary to the Theft Act
1968 s.12A(4)) if the vehicle is then involved in a fatal accident. This last offence
is not strictly one of homicide, because D need not himself have caused the fatal
accident, and nor is it necessarily a road traffic offence, because the vehicle in
question need not at any time have been driven on a road or other public place.
It would suffice, for example, if D took a farm tractor without consent, and he,
or a companion, then overturned it in a field and killed the victim (hereafter, V).
Offences under s.12A are nevertheless subject to obligatory disqualification under
the Road Traffic Offences Act 1988 s.34.
The new offences
The first of the two new homicide offences added to the RTA 1988 by the Road
Safety Act 2006 is intended to bridge a perceived ‘‘justice gap’’ between CDDD
13 See Adomako [1995] 1 A.C. 171; Misra [2004] EWCA Crim 2375; [2005] 1 Cr. App.
R. 21.
14 See the RTA 1988 s.2A. There may also be dangerous driving where it would be obvious
to a competent and careful driver that driving the vehicle in its current state would be
dangerous, or if D happens to know of such a defect, even if it is not otherwise obvious.
15 See Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter. Law Com
No.237, 1996, para.2.20. See also Cunningham, ‘‘The Reality of Vehicular Homicides’’
[2001] Crim. L.R. 679 at 681–682.
16 There is a suggestion in Richardson [2006] EWCA Crim 3186; [2007] 2 All E.R. 601
at [28] that dangerous driving differs from careless driving because it involves recklessness
or conscious risk taking, rather than mere negligence, but clearly this need not be so. Wilful
misconduct or recklessness may increase D’s culpability, but that does not make it a necessary
ingredient of the offence.
17 See, e.g. Whitnall [2006] EWCA Crim 2292, in which D deliberately rammed another
car from behind at over 100mph.
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on the one hand and the minor summary offence of driving without due care
and attention (RTA 1988 s.3) on the other. The latter offence, even where it
involves a fatal accident, is punishable only by a fine together with endorsement
and discretionary disqualification.
Section 2B creates an offence of causing death by careless or inconsiderate
driving (CDCD). This will be triable either way and punishable by up to five years’
imprisonment (12 months18 on summary conviction) together with obligatory
disqualification. Section 3ZB creates an offence of causing death by driving when
disqualified, unlicensed or uninsured, and will attract a maximum sentence of
two years’ imprisonment, even where the manner of D’s driving cannot itself be
faulted.19
Criticism of the new offences
The new CDCD offence has been subjected to cogent criticism both in Parliament20
and elsewhere. In ‘‘Punishing Drivers Who Kill’’,21 Sally Cunningham argues that
it is objectionable in principle and will do nothing in practice to prevent fatal
accidents or deter offending. I respectfully agree with much of her analysis. In my
submission, however, the creation of the offence is not in itself objectionable. It
builds on the basic careless driving offence in exactly the same way that CDDD
builds on the basic dangerous driving offence and recognises the enormity of the
consequences.22 If disqualification were discretionary and imprisonment reserved
for exceptionally grave cases23 there would be little to complain about. What is
objectionable is the excessively punitive sentencing regime prescribed for the new
offence, in which substantial prison sentences may be imposed for tragic driving
errors that are not even grave enough to be categorised as ‘‘dangerous driving’’.
The new offence will doubtless muddy the waters in borderline cases that might
previously have been charged as CDDD. Rather than struggle to prove dangerous
driving in a fatal accident case where the precise level of fault (or its apportionment)
is not entirely clear, the CPS may be tempted to prosecute only for CDCD, or
accept a plea to that offence. Some offenders who might otherwise have been
convicted of CDDD may benefit from this.24 Others, who might previously have
18 This will however be limited to six months, until such time as the increased sentencing
powers of magistrates’ courts comes into force.
19 If tried summarily, the penalties are the same as for the new s.2B offence.
20 Lord Lyell, a former Attorney-General, was one of the most forceful opponents of
the new measures. Supporters included a number of MPs who had been moved by tragic
stories of children killed on the roads of their constituencies. Some, such as Peter Bone
MP (Hansard, HC (March 8, 2006)), appear to have supposed that drivers guilty only of
momentary inattention would never be prosecuted for such an offence.
21 (2007) 27 L.S. 288.
22 In Simmonds [1999] R.T.R. 257 the Court of Appeal recognised that the consequences
of careless driving may properly be taken into account in sentencing for that offence, rejecting
a contrary view formerly advanced in Krawec [1985] R.T.R. 1. See also King [2001] EWCA
Crim 709; [2001] Crim. L.R. 493.
23 Aggravating factors might include those identified in Cooksley and Richardson in
connection with CDDD, such as a bad driving record, disqualification or failing to stop
after the accident.
24 But not necessarily: as explained below, they cannot be confident of receiving a lighter
sentence under the guidelines recently proposed by the SGC.
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escaped with a minor conviction for careless driving under s.3,25 will feel the heat
of the new law.
The new s.3ZB offence has attracted less controversy, perhaps because it targets
those who deliberately break the law by ignoring disqualification orders or the need
to obtain insurance, etc. It may also snare the odd motorist who has simply forgotten
to renew his insurance (this being a matter of strict liability), but such offenders
are not its principal targets. Lack of sympathy for disqualified or uninsured drivers
should not however blind us to the fact that this new offence corrupts the usual
principles governing causation. It appears that D may be convicted of ‘‘causing’’
death without his actual driving being at fault. If D’s uninsured car is involved
in a collision with V’s motorcycle and V is killed, D will automatically be guilty,
even if the accident was entirely V’s fault.26 It is clear from the authorities27 that
D may still be ‘‘driving’’ even when his vehicle is stationary. It may be no defence,
therefore, that D was waiting patiently at traffic signals when V rode into the back
of his car.28
Sentencing guidelines and practice
Sentencing guidelines for CDDD were provided by the Court of Appeal in
Richardson,29 in which the guidelines previously laid down in Cooksley30 were
amended in line with recent statutory increases in the maximum sentences
available.31
The revised guidelines identify four sentencing bands, each based on a first time
offender and subject to a discount of up to one-third in the event of a prompt
guilty plea (although this may now be reduced in cases where evidence of guilt is
overwhelming):
1. If there are no aggravating circumstances, 12 months to 2 years’
imprisonment.
2. In cases of intermediate culpability, two to four-and-a-half years.
3. In cases of higher culpability, four-and-a-half to seven years.
4. In cases involving the most serious culpability, 7 to 14 years.
In each case, the prison sentence must be coupled with disqualification for a
minimum of two years, after which D must take an extended test before regaining
his licence.
Aggravating factors include not only conduct relating to the culpability of the
driving itself (such as drug abuse, racing, and ignoring warnings from passengers)
25 See, e.g. Squires [2007] EWCA Crim 2391.
26 This is already true of the offence under the Theft Act 1968 s.12A (see Clifford [2007]
EWCA Crim 2442) but that offence does not purport to hold D responsible for ‘‘causing’’
V’s death.
27 Skelton [1995] Crim. L.R. 635; Edkins v Knowles [1973] Q.B. 748.
28 Unless it can be argued that V would have died in any event: e.g. D’s car, driven by D’s
wife, breaks down and she pulls onto the side of the road. D who is disqualified, gets into the
driver’s seat and manages to restart it, at which moment V crashes into the back of the car
and is killed; but V would still have been killed even if D had remained in the passenger seat.
29 [2006] EWCA Crim 3186; [2007] 2 All E.R. 601.
30 [2003] EWCA Crim 996; [2003] 2 Cr. App. R. 18.
31 These were raised from 10 to 14 years by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.285, although
the Court of Appeal in Cooksley had opined that the 10-year maximum was quite enough.
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and subsequent misconduct (for example, hit and run cases), but also various
chance factors, such as multiple deaths resulting from the accident.
The guidelines recognise that there may be ‘‘truly exceptional’’ cases in which
immediate imprisonment might not be appropriate, but do not suggest examples.
The court in Richardson ‘‘could see no advantage in identifying such exceptional
situations, which by definition will only arise very rarely’’.32 At the other end
of the scale, the offences in question are all serious offences for the purpose of
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.224, which makes imprisonment or detention for
public protection under ss.225 or 226 an appropriate penalty in some such cases.
These judicial guidelines will eventually be supplanted by guidelines issued by
the SGC. A consultation document was published by the SGC as this article was
about to go to press.33 The SGC’s proposals differ from those of the Court of
Appeal in that they suggest three sentencing ‘‘bands’’ in place of the four bands
currently in use. The proposed new bands correspond quite closely with bands
two, three and four from the Richardson guidelines and include ‘‘starting points’’
within those bands of three, five and eight years’ imprisonment. The first band
would however disappear, on the basis that most marginal cases which currently
squeeze into that band will in future be prosecuted as CDCD. If, however, cases
of borderline culpability are still prosecuted as CDDD, judges will be directed to
sentence as for the ‘‘most serious’’ type of CDCD offence, which means of course
that there are still four bands after all.
In respect of the new CDCD offence,34 the SGC’s proposals closely follow
those previously floated by the Sentencing Advisory Panel.35 If implemented, there
would again be three bands, and a starting point within each band. Controversially
(but in my submission rightly) custodial sentences would not be imposed on those
whose fault element involves nothing more than momentary but tragic inattention.
Such offenders would instead be punished by a community order in addition to the
disqualification that is mandatory in all cases.36 More serious cases might however
merit imprisonment for up two years, with a proposed starting point of 36 weeks.
32 In Attorney-General’s Reference (No.74 of 2005) [2005] EWCA Crim 3120; [2006] 2 Cr.
App. R. (S.) 16, a suspended prison sentence was upheld by the Court of Appeal after the
trial judge had openly expressed ‘‘surprise and dismay’’ over the conviction itself. D’s taxi
struck and killed V, a drunken pedestrian who had deliberately stepped out into the road in
front of him. D’s principal fault (identified by CCTV images) was that his brake lights were
seen to operate just three quarters of a second later than experts would have expected in the
case of a fully alert driver. The Attorney-General had argued that a sentence of immediate
imprisonment was called for. D’s appeal against conviction was later dismissed in Modhvadia
[2006] EWCA Crim 1099. The court acknowledged that his driving may have been ‘‘at or
towards the lowest level of culpability for dangerous driving’’ but declined to interfere with
the jury’s verdict. It did not matter that the accident was primarily one of V’s own making.
As the Court of Appeal famously ruled in Hennigan (1971) 55 Cr. App. R. 262, D may be
guilty of causing death, even if he was only one-fifth to blame for it. See also Legrys [2007]
EWCA Crim 1605.
33 Causing Death by Driving, January 9, 2008.
34 As to sentencing for the CDCDI offence, see pp.13–14 of the SGC’s proposals.
35 Consultation on Death by Driving Offences, January 25, 2007. See also the Sentencing
Advisory Panel’s subsequent advice to the SGC, Driving Offences—Causing Death by Driving
(2008), pp.33–36.
36 One may question whether mandatory disqualification really is warranted in a case
involving a tragic error by a driver with a long and impeccable driving history, but in today’s
climate it probably cannot be opposed.
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The most serious cases of CDCD, involving driving that ‘‘falls not far short of
dangerous driving’’ would attract sentences of between 36 weeks and three years’
imprisonment, with a starting point of 15 months. This would also, in effect,
become the lowest of four sentencing bands for CDDD,37 but is potentially harsher
than the existing band of 12 months to 2 years, even though the fault level required
has been lowered to that of mere careless driving. This ‘‘double whammy’’ appears
to have passed unnoticed as pressure groups instead take the SGC to task for
‘‘going soft on killer drivers’’ by not requiring imprisonment in the least serious of
CDCD cases.
As for the new s.3ZB offence, in which there may be no dangerous or
careless driving at all, the SGC’s proposed guidelines link the assessment of
offender culpability to the nature of the prohibition on driving. In the absence of
aggravating factors, a mere lack of insurance would justify a community order,
whereas the starting point in respect of a disqualified driver would be 12 months’
imprisonment.38
Road traffic and other involuntary homicides
Sir Igor Judge P., giving the judgment of the court in Richardson, rightly warned
that:
‘‘. . . some proportion needs to be maintained between the levels of sentences
for these offences [i.e. road traffic homicides], and the sentences which are
thought appropriate for other crimes of violence resulting in death, such as,
for example, the sentences for manslaughter following a deliberate, but single
violent blow, and manslaughter arising from gross negligence, which is not
identical to but certainly not far removed from negligent conduct which falls
‘far below’ expected standards, which is, of course, the criminal ingredient for
dangerous driving.’’39
Unfortunately, nothing more was said of such comparisons in Richardson, and
they do not feature anywhere in the SGC’s consultation proposals. There is
no comparably wide-ranging judgment or SGC Guideline on sentencing for
involuntary manslaughter, and it is sometimes said that the huge range of
circumstances that may be encountered in such cases makes the provision of
general guidance almost impossible. Comparable cases can however be found, and
when comparisons are made it becomes clear that sentences imposed on motoring
offenders have become disproportionately severe.
Fatal ‘‘health and safety’’ infringements
Cases involving fatal work or business related accidents arising from a culpable
neglect of safety precautions are in many ways analogous to those in which death
is caused by negligence on the roads. Manslaughter charges are not always pressed
in such cases, but in the event of a conviction a typical sentence is 18 months’
imprisonment, even where there are a number of aggravating features, such as
persistent neglect of safety warnings and the deliberate prioritising of profit above
37 Causing Death by Driving, pp.12 and 16.
38 For more detail, see Causing Death by Driving, pp.17–18.
39 [2006] EWCA Crim 3186; [2007] 2 All E.R. 601 at [14].
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safety—factors that might indicate a starting point of three years in a comparable
CDDD case.
Attorney-General’s Reference (No.86 of 2006)40 provides an example. D was the
founder and managing director of a company which manufactured kitchen work
surfaces from stone and marble. An employee was killed when using a stone-cutting
machine. He had received inadequate training and essential safety features built
into the cutting machine had been deactivated in order to avoid delays and speed
up production. D was responsible for this. He told his works manager:
‘‘If we implemented health and safety to the letter of the law it would cost too
much. The company couldn’t afford it and it would close us down. We had
to think about production first.’’
The Court of Appeal quashed a suspended sentence as unduly lenient, given that
D had deliberately disregarded the safety of his employees and had paid little
regard to health and safety issues at work. A sentence of 15 months’ immediate
imprisonment was substituted.41
In contrast, a sentence in the region of 18 months would now be considered
appropriate for CDDD only in the absence of any significant aggravating features. In
Bailey,42 for example, D misjudged an overtaking manoeuvre, forcing an oncoming
car to brake; but because that car’s brakes were faulty its wheels locked and the
driver lost control, suffering fatal injuries. The Court of Appeal noted that D had
not been guilty of any deliberate course of dangerous or aggressive driving, was
of previous good character, and had an impeccable driving record. He had made
a momentary and uncharacteristic error of judgement, which was not the sole
cause of the accident. A sentence of two years’ imprisonment (with three years’
disqualification) was reduced to 18 months.
Multiple deaths are likely to result in higher penalties. In Topasna43 D, a bus
driver of previous good character, caused five deaths through a catastrophic blunder
in which he pressed hard on the accelerator instead of the brake pedal when driving
a new vehicle, and then froze helplessly as it lurched forwards. Expert evidence
identified this as a classic case of ‘‘pedal panic’’ in which a driver’s terror prevents
him from correcting his mistake. As the Court of Appeal observed, there was no
malice and no significant period of bad or irresponsible driving, nor were there
any of the usual aggravating factors of alcohol or excessive speed. Because of the
multiple deaths, however, a sentence of five years’ imprisonment (reduced from
seven-and-a-half years by virtue of his guilty plea) was upheld.
In comparison, Kite44 (a prosecution arising from the infamous Lyme Bay
disaster in which four young canoeists died) involved persistent and wilful neglect
of basic safety procedures. D, who ran an outward bound centre and organised
40 [2006] EWCA Crim 2570; [2007] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 101.
41 D had eventually pleaded guilty, but only after a trial at which the jury failed to agree.
See also Davies [2006] All E.R. (D) 201 (Nov); Dean [2002] EWCA Crim 2410 and Crow
[2001] EWCA Crim 2968; [2002] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 49. In Crow the Court of Appeal
‘‘exceptionally’’ suspended a sentence of 15 months, even though the sentencing judge had
identified a number of aggravating features, including a high degree of recklessness and failure
to heed explicit warnings.
42 [2007] All E.R. (D) 195 (Mar).
43 [2006] EWCA Crim 1969; [2007] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 76.
44 [1996] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 295.
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the fatal voyage, ignored explicit written warnings from his own staff as to the
risks he was taking, and was convicted (along with his company) of manslaughter,
but his sentence (after a contested trial) was reduced on appeal to just two years’
imprisonment.
The momentary error in Topasna scarcely seems to merit a sentence comparable
to that in Kite and certainly not one that was (in light of D’s guilty plea) nearly four
times more severe. But examples of heavier sentences for negligent manslaughter
can be found. In Rodgers,45 D and a colleague installed a used gas fire in a flat
that he rented out to two teenage boys. The appliance was wrongly installed and
could not vent through the flue provided. Both boys died from carbon monoxide
poisoning. This was not an isolated case, because D’s bodged gas fittings had
caused problems before. He was well aware of the applicable regulations requiring
such work to be done by professional gas fitters, but sought to save a few pounds
by doing the work himself. The Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of five years’
imprisonment, on a guilty plea. D’s co-defendant received three years. There is
however a difference between this case and Topasna, because it involved reckless
disregard of the tenants’ safety and the deliberate commission of a criminal offence.
Deaths caused by deliberate assaults
When CDDD cases are contrasted with cases of constructive manslaughter, there
is a more obvious imbalance in sentencing. A motorist who allows his attention
to be distracted from the road ahead is certainly at fault and if he causes a fatal
accident he must expect to be liable for it, but his culpability surely falls far below
that of one who kills in the course of a violent and unprovoked assault, particularly
where several blows are struck or where a weapon is used. In sentencing terms,
however, the courts appear to draw little distinction between such cases.
The starting point when sentencing in a manslaughter case involving a ‘‘single
blow of moderate force’’ has for many years hovered somewhere in the region
of 18 months, or 12 months in the event of a prompt guilty plea.46 This is the
same starting point as that now deemed appropriate in basic CDDD cases such
as Bailey, where there are no aggravating features. More serious assaults lead to
heavier sentences, but the recent steep increases in sentences for CDDD offences
have not been matched where constructive manslaughter is charged. Consider the
following cases.
In Sykes,47 D pushed V to the ground when V attempted to intervene in a
fight between D and her boyfriend. D then hit V about the head and kicked her
several times as she lay on the ground. V suffered three fractured ribs and internal
bleeding from which she died. D was charged with murder but a plea of guilty to
manslaughter was accepted. A sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment was approved
on appeal.
In Roberts,48 D was driving in Cambridge and having previously become lost he
was struggling to follow another car driven by a friend. The area was crowded and
groups of pedestrians sauntered in the street. D stopped his car in the middle of
45 [2004] EWCA Crim 3115; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 19.
46 Coleman [1992] 95 Cr. App. R. 159; Edwards [2001] EWCA Crim 862; [2001] 2 Cr.
App. R. (S.) 125; Binstead [2005] EWCA Crim 164; [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 62.
47 [2002] EWCA Crim 1271.
48 [2005] EWCA Crim 1303; [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 31.
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the road. V, who was crossing the road, made a remark which D misheard and
considered insulting. He got out of his car, pulled V aside and struck him ‘‘with
tremendous force’’, smashing V’s left maxilla and zygomatic bones with a single
punch. V fractured his skull as he fell to the ground. D made no effort to assist
him. He got back into his car and drove off, as V lay dying in the road. The
whole incident was recorded on CCTV, which disproved D’s original version of
the incident, according to which he had acted in self defence when V threatened
him with a bottle. As in Sykes, D faced a charge of murder, but his plea of guilty to
manslaughter was accepted and a sentence of five years’ imprisonment was initially
imposed. On appeal, Lord Woolf C.J. described D’s offence as ‘‘a bad case of its
type’’ and as ‘‘a gratuitous and unprovoked attack, in which D violently attacked a
wholly innocent victim’’. Despite this, D’s sentence was halved.
An even more serious case was Sutton49 in which D and his friends kidnapped V,
‘‘a decent inoffensive man’’ who was drunk at the time, tied him up, put him in the
boot of their car and threw him off a bridge into a river in the early hours of a cold
March morning. They drove off, without making any effort to ascertain whether
V was alive or dead. He died. As in Sykes and Roberts, a plea of manslaughter
was accepted on a charge of murder, and for this offence a sentence of five years’
imprisonment was upheld on appeal.50
One more example must suffice. In Parnham51 D beat his wife to death in
a ferocious attack with an iron bar, hitting her over 70 times and raining 44
blows on her head alone. He lied repeatedly to the police and when his attempt
to manufacture evidence of a break-in was disproved he falsely claimed to have
been acting in self defence. Charged with murder, but somehow convicted only of
constructive manslaughter (to which he had offered a plea of guilty), his original
sentence of six years was quashed as ‘‘manifestly excessive’’. A sentence of four
years was substituted.52
A striking feature common to all four cases, each of which involved an initial
charge of murder, is that the sentences imposed did not even come close to the
kind of sentence that is routinely imposed in bad cases of CDDD.
To find CDDD cases attracting comparable penalties, one need only look to
cases of ‘‘intermediate’’ or ‘‘higher’’ culpability. In Poel,53 D attempted to retune a
new radio in the cab of his HGV and reacted too slowly to the fact that traffic in
front of him on the motorway was stopping. He braked too late and although the
resulting impact would not ordinarily have been fatal, the driver of the van in front
was not wearing a seat belt and was killed when thrown forwards by the impact. D’s
original three-year sentence on a guilty plea was reduced to two years on appeal,
but this reflected a number of mitigating factors, including an impeccable 27-year
driving record, his own serious injuries and his honourable behaviour and remorse
after the accident.
49 [2006] EWCA Crim 421.
50 A further sentence was imposed for the kidnapping. Lesser penalties were imposed on
D’s associates. See, e.g. Mann [2006] EWCA Crim 2297 (four years).
51 [2003] EWCA Crim 416.
52 A six-year sentence was however upheld in Kime [1999] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 3, in which
D struck and killed an elderly man whom he thought had been laughing at him as he argued
with his girlfriend.
53 This was one of several appeals conjoined with Richardson [2006] EWCA Crim 3186;
[2007] 2 All E.R. 601.
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This sentence was perhaps lenient in comparison to that upheld in Payne,54
where D crashed into the vehicle ahead whilst using a mobile phone and received
a sentence of four years’ imprisonment, despite his guilty plea. The sentence in
Payne was identical to that imposed in Parnham.55 Each case involved a guilty plea
and a single death, but in terms of culpability there was, surely, no comparison.
Dangerous (but non-fatal) driving
Dangerous driving carries a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment (plus
disqualification, etc.), which has not been increased in line with the latest
increases for the ‘‘causing death’’ offences.56 The worst cases of deliberately
criminal, aggressive and dangerous driving do not necessarily kill anyone, but
those responsible, many of whom are serial offenders, and pose a serious risk of
reoffending, rarely receive sentences comparable with those imposed even in the
lowest sentencing band for CDDD.
The different philosophy that prevails in such cases is well illustrated by
Hammond,57 in which D lost control of his car at between 60 and 65mph on
a bend in a 30mph zone. It flew through the air for 30m, uprooting a palm tree,
smashing through a garden shed and some fencing, and came to rest upside down
in the car park of the garden centre. He then made his way home on foot. A
sentence of nine months’ imprisonment (after trial) was quashed on appeal and
replaced with a sentence that ensured his immediate release. In the view of the
Court of Appeal:
‘‘This was a particularly bad piece of driving . . . and there was a major
accident, albeit involving no other vehicle or injury to any person other than
[D]; but that was . . . wholly fortuitous; and there was substantial damage,
both to [D’s] vehicle and to neighbouring property. . . . Given the Recorder’s
view that the offence could only be met with a custodial sentence—although
it has to be said this was a very finely balanced decision—all that was needed
here was a short prison sentence both to punish [D] and to reflect the public
interest in deterring people from driving in this dangerous and irresponsible
manner which could have had quite disastrous consequences. A sentence
of three months would have achieved that purpose as easily as one of nine
months.’’
Hammond does not however illustrate the worst kind of dangerous driving offence.
In Watson,58 D deliberately drove his limousine at a traffic warden who (after
previously warning him) had issued him with a ticket. The warden jumped out of
54 [2007] EWCA Crim 157; [2007] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 45.
55 [2003] EWCA Crim 416.
56 A proposed increase to a maximum of five years was floated in 2000 and endorsed by the
Court of Appeal in Cooksley (per Lord Woolf C.J. at [10]) but was never enacted. The court
also opined that no increase was needed in the 10-year maximum then applicable to CDDD.
The government ignored both suggestions, and we now have a maximum penalty for CDDD
that is seven times higher than that for dangerous driving.
57 [2006] EWCA Crim 2595.
58 [2007] EWCA Crim 1595. See also Joseph [2001] EWCA Crim 1195; [2002] 1 Cr. App.
R. (S.) 20 in which D drove his car at a traffic warden, struck him and weaved down the road
at speed for 150yds in an attempt to dislodge the terrified warden from the bonnet of the
vehicle. A sentence of 15 months (after trial) was reduced to 10 months on appeal.
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the way, but D drove at him a second time, mounting the pavement in a determined
attempt to run his victim down. As Butterworth J. noted in the Court of Appeal, D’s
conduct was significantly aggravated by the fact that his victim was a public servant,
carrying out the duties required of him, but D’s 20-month sentence (imposed after
a contested trial) was nevertheless reduced to 12 months’ imprisonment.59
In Juneja60 a student tried to outrun the police at speeds of up to 90mph in an
untaxed car with no MOT certificate. He swerved and accelerated through city
traffic with three passengers in his car and smoke trailing from its tyres. Other
drivers were forced to brake and swerve to avoid him. He overtook a line of
cars and went through red traffic lights, ignoring police sirens and flashing lights.
He eventually overturned the car on a roundabout and crashed into a road sign.
Despite this deliberate and horrifically dangerous driving, he was spared a custodial
sentence and received a 12-month community penalty instead.61
A firmer stand was however taken in Slim.62 D, a disqualified driver with
numerous convictions for serious road traffic offences, took a car without the
owner’s consent. When a police patrol car activated its lights, he deliberately
reversed into it at about 30mph. He then accelerated away at speeds of up to
80mph on roads where the maximum speed limit was 30mph. He jumped several
red lights, drove the wrong way around a roundabout and made turns where he
was not permitted to do so. When cornered in a cul-de-sac, he rammed another
police car which was attempting to prevent his escape, injuring an officer. He
was eventually arrested and pleaded guilty to aggravated vehicle taking, dangerous
driving and driving whilst disqualified, for which a total sentence of 24 months (18
months for the dangerous driving) was reduced to 22 months on appeal.
Conclusion
Motor vehicles are dangerous things and deliberately bad, aggressive or
irresponsible driving, including drunken driving, merits serious punishment,
especially (but not only) where it causes death.63 Tragic mistakes or miscalculations
are another matter. In my submission, we need to reconsider whether a substantial
prison sentence can ever be appropriate in the absence of criminal intent or
recklessness. Dangerous incompetence may merit a long period of disqualification,
but that is another matter.
We should also reconsider the relationship between the penalties for road
traffic homicides and those imposed in comparable cases. As the law now stands,
doctors or air traffic controllers who make a fatal error in the course of their
59 See also Chivers [2005] EWCA Crim 2252; Perbez (Alam) [2006] EWCA Crim 2563.
More serious penalties may be imposed under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861
where serious injury is caused: see Attorney-General’s Reference (No.19 of 2007) [2007] EWCA
Crim 1312.
60 Unreported, December 1, 2006, Crown Court at Leicester. See also Holliday [2006]
EWCA Crim 2215, in which a six-month sentence imposed on similar facts was reduced to
three months.
61 This was not a case in which the Attorney-General could refer the sentence to the Court
of Appeal.
62 [2005] EWCA Crim 2734.
63 For a recent example of grossly irresponsible and ultimately lethal driving that fully
merited the heavy prison sentences imposed, see Barney [2007] EWCA Crim 3181.
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work may be convicted of an unlawful homicide only if their mistake was grossly,
criminally negligent, but they risk immediate imprisonment for any fatal error or
misjudgement when driving home from work. Moreover, the punishment they
would face if convicted of such an offence on the basis of a grave driving error may
easily be greater than what they might receive if they got out of the car and killed
another road user in an unprovoked road rage assault. As long as nobody is killed,
they may also be reasonably confident of a more lenient penalty if they lead the
police in a terrifying high speed chase on busy roads or narrowly fail to run over a
traffic warden who has issued them with a parking ticket.
In my submission, many of those who have campaigned so effectively for stricter
laws against ‘‘killer drivers’’ would be surprised and dismayed by such comparisons.
A major rethink is required.
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Summary: The article discusses the contemporary use of public nuisance injunctions
by local authorities in an attempt to ‘‘clean up’’ red light areas. In particular, it
considers the civil and criminal law interface in this context, and raises some concerns
regarding the utilisation of the public nuisance injunction to provide yet another
‘‘quick fix’’ to tackle a complex social problem. Overall, the article points to the
plethora of multi-agency partnerships at the local level and the resultant diverse and
often conflicting initiatives, and argues that the use of public nuisance injunctions
against sex workers does not make for a coordinated and coherent approach to tackle
on-street sex work.
Background
Since 1998 local authorities have been actively involved in crime prevention policy
making; a statutory responsibility to incorporate crime prevention into all policies
was imposed on them by s.17 of the Crime and Disorder Act (CDA). The Act also
provided for interagency work between the police and the local authority; crime
prevention strategies were to be produced jointly and both organisations were to
be entitled to apply jointly or individually for prohibitory anti-social behaviour
orders (ASBOs) through the civil courts against those who persistently behave
anti-socially in the community causing harassment, alarm or distress.1 The ASBO
had a deterrent value in the form of the threat of up to five years’ imprisonment
upon breach.2 However, while local authorities cautiously began to make use of the
new functions and powers afforded to them under the CDA,3 it was predominantly
police forces that applied for prohibitory ASBOs to exclude sex workers from
red-light areas.4
*The author is extremely grateful to Professor Peter Raynor for his thoughtful comments
on earlier drafts of this paper. The author is also indebted to Professor Ian Dennis for his
constructive comments and suggestions.
1 CDA 1998 s.1, as amended by the Police Reform Act 2002 s.61 and the Anti-Social
Behaviour Act 2003.
2 CDA 1998 s.1(10).
3 E. Burney, Making People Behave: Anti-Social Behaviour, Politics and People (Cullompton:
Willan Publishing, 2005), pp.89–90.
4 See S. Campbell, A Review on Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, Home Office Research Study
236 (2002).
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West Midlands Police was amongst the first to seek ASBOs against sex workers
and was quick to publicise the success of the order as an effective deterrent in
the Ladywood area of Birmingham.5 Therefore, it came as some surprise when
only two years later Birmingham City Council (the local authority area within
which West Midlands Police operate) took alternative steps to tackle sex work
in the Ladywood area; rather than issuing more ASBOs the council opted for
an alternative prohibitory tool—the public nuisance injunction (PNI).6 However,
while at first blush events in Ladywood may have appeared uncoordinated, it
was partnership work. Birmingham, an area bearing the Home Office accolade
of ‘‘trailblazer’’7 in crime prevention, had promptly established an Anti-Social
Behaviour Unit and an Inter-Agency Action Group8 which resulted in a two-
pronged approach: West Midlands Police (in consultation with Birmingham City
Council) utilised the ASBO against on-street sex workers, while Birmingham City
Council (with West Midlands Police support) issued 20 PNIs to target the same
group of offenders by virtue of their powers under s.222 of the Local Government
Act 1972.9 Equally prohibitory, and potentially just as exclusive as the ASBO, the
terms of the PNIs forbid women from soliciting for one year and from entering the
Ladywood area.10
Somewhat ironically, in 2001 Jones and Sagar raised the point that the ASBO
was not necessary to fill ‘‘a gap’’ in the law as government ministers had asserted
and that in fact several alternative legal measures including PNIs existed which
could be used to address on-street sex work.11 It was argued that the PNI was easily
capable of prohibiting on-street sex work and that breach of the civil injunction
could result in incarceration (breach of an injunction resulting in a maximum
of two years’ imprisonment). However, given that both the PNI and the ASBO
could lead to imprisonment for selling sex on-street—an activity which is a low
level criminal offence in the eyes of the law and punishable by fine only under the
Street Offences Act 195912—it was argued that the PNI was inappropriate to tackle
on-street sex work. At the time however, the authors certainly did not envisage
the decision of Birmingham City Council to use PNIs to tackle street prostitution
5 T. Orr-Munro, ‘‘Curbing Street Sex’’, Police Review, July 28, 2002. The force’s assertions
as to the ASBO’s ability to provide a long-term solution to on-street sex work generated some
debate, particularly given that the causes of on-street sex work had not been addressed; see
H. Jones and T. Sagar, ‘‘The Crime and Disorder Act 1998: Prostitution and the Anti-Social
Behaviour Order’’ [2001] Crim. L.R. 873.
6 Birmingham City Council, Legal Services Briefing Note, Crime and Disorder, Anti-Social
Behaviour 2002/2004.
7 http://www.birmingham.gov.uk [Accessed February 20, 2008].
8 Birmingham City Council, Legal Services Briefing Note, Crime and Disorder, Anti-Social
Behaviour 2002/2004, paras 3.2 and 3.4.
9 http://www.respect.gov.uk/members/article.aspx?id=7938 [Accessed March 5, 2008].
10 Birmingham City Council, Legal Services Briefing Note, Crime and Disorder, Anti-Social
Behaviour 2002/2004, para.4.11. It is worth noting that cities had previously used s.222 to oust
drug dealers and evict undesirable tenants, see Burney, Making People Behave: Anti-Social
Behaviour, Politics and People (2005), p.133.
11 Jones and Sagar, ‘‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998’’ [2001] Crim. L.R. 873.
12 The Street Offences Act 1959 having been amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1982
s.71.
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only a year or so later. Indeed, the authors reasoned, as had Addison and Lawson-
Cruttenden,13 that despite the probability that the use of PNIs to control gangs
in the United States had been the inspiration for the ASBO, and while PNIs and
ASBOs arguably shared similar potential in tackling anti-social behaviour, it was
unlikely that the ‘‘ancient’’ PNI would be resurrected; the Government would want
to put its own punitive tool (the ASBO) to good use. However, following the much
publicised work of Birmingham City Council’s legal team to address on-street sex
work in the Edgbaston/Ladywood area, both the civil ASBO and the civil PNI are
today promoted by the Government as effective measures capable of tackling street
prostitution.14
Although this use of the PNI against sex workers may be just an isolated example,
it is certainly an event which merits some exploration—not least because, as already
noted, the Government continues to promote the PNI to address on-street sex
work. Thus it is important to take a closer look at the PNI within the current
legal and policy framework. However, equally important, the use of the PNI brings
forth broader issues raised by practices of this kind: namely, the way in which the
common law of public nuisance can be used or abused, and the wider issue of
civil orders as an easier (but potentially rights-eroding) substitute for criminal law.
Whilst this phenomenon is familiar from discussions regarding ASBOs, it is also
represented by the less well-known and, arguably, even more problematic use of
PNIs. Therefore, the first section of this article attempts to shed some light on
the PNI15 which has, according to the Government, several advantages for local
authorities in their battle to combat anti-social behaviour—over and above that
of the ASBO.16 This article goes on to question the extent to which the civil law
should be utilised to provide a remedy for behaviour that Parliament has already
deemed criminal. Lastly, the utility of the PNI is assessed as it resides within today’s
extremely complex multi-agency arena and a policy framework that is supposedly
geared towards achieving a coordinated and coherent approach.
The public nuisance injunction
The purpose of this article is not to present a detailed account of the development
of the criminal law on public nuisance because this has already been done,17
although, as indicated above, it would be wrong to say that this area of law is
‘‘well trodden’’ ground. Indeed, this is an area of law that has been neglected
in contemporary discussions on sex worker control; therefore this section of the
article briefly outlines how the civil injunction came to provide a remedy to prevent
criminal activity regardless of the fact that the behaviour committed may already be
13 N. Addison and T. Lawson-Cruttenden, ‘‘Law and Disorder’’, Police Review, February
12, 1999, p.16.
14 See http://www.respect.gov.uk/members/article.aspx?id=7942 [Accessed February 19, 2008].
15 Birmingham City Council’s Legal Team recognises that very ‘‘little is known’’ about the
PNI: Birmingham City Council, Legal Services Briefing Note, Crime and Disorder: Anti-Social
Behaviour (January 2003), para.4.10. Other commentators such as Addison refer to the
‘‘ancient’’ law on public nuisance, see N. Addison, ‘‘Public Nuisances’’, Police Review, April
17, 1998, p.22.
16 http://www.respect.gov.uk/members/article.aspx?id=7938 [Accessed March 5, 2008].
17 See J.R. Spencer, ‘‘Public Nuisance - A Critical Examination’’ (1989) 48 C.L.J. 55 for
a detailed historical account.
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deemed criminal under statute. The following discussion is particularly important
because as Spencer states:
‘‘Everything in public nuisance runs contrary to modern notions of certainty
and precision in criminal law—and indeed, the civil law as well.’’18
The definition of the offence of public nuisance according to Archbold is that
a person will be guilty of public nuisance where acts or omissions ‘‘endanger
life, health, property, morals or comfort of the public’’ or ‘‘obstruct the public
in the exercise or enjoyment of rights common to all Her Majesty’s subjects’’.19
Although any person found guilty of the offence is liable to an unlimited fine and
even life imprisonment,20 the penalty applied obviously depends on the sentencing
powers of the court and the gravity of the nuisance. In most civil proceedings an
injunction will be the primary remedy sought. Spencer explains that what was once
a private action in the criminal courts developed into a public action brought by the
Attorney-General in the civil courts where injunctions were sought ‘‘to supplement
criminal proceedings rather than as a substitute for them’’.21 Injunctions proved an
effective remedy to prevent ‘‘irreparable damage’’22 by the time the offence came
to trial, and to provide ‘‘rapid justice in emergencies’’.23 According to Spencer,
by the end of the 19th century public nuisance cases had, for example, displaced
the usual means of prosecutions to deal with health hazards and obstructions and
proved very effective when tackling problems associated with sewerage systems,
sanitation and pollution. Furthermore, at the beginning of the 19th century large
corporations were considered incapable of committing criminal offences; therefore
at one time injunctions were also capable of plugging a gap in the law. It thus
became quite usual to use PNIs as preventative devices and also to provide a
remedy where it was difficult to secure a prosecution by other legal means.24 Again,
to borrow Spencer’s illustration, an injunction could prove a much more effective
remedy in prohibiting the building of a housing estate which is in contravention
of local byelaws than subsequently seeking prosecution for a statutory offence
which Parliament had classified as being punishable only by fine.25 Gradually,
however, with the development of statute law, the ‘‘gap’’ in the law was closed and
consequently the PNI became far less used than it had been.
Given the incredibly vague definition of public nuisance, it is hardly surprising
that where the PNI has been enlisted to deal with nuisance, the law in this area
has continued to develop. In particular, judicial clarification has been sought with
regard to the public/private distinction: how many people must be affected to
constitute a public nuisance? A leading modern authority on the criminal offence of
public nuisance is Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd26 where Romer J. described
public nuisance as any nuisance ‘‘which materially affects the reasonable comfort
18 Spencer, ‘‘Public Nuisance’’ (1989) 48 C.L.J. 55.
19 Archbold on Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, 2007 edn (2006), paras 31–40.
20 See Jones and Sagar, ‘‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998’’ [2001] Crim. L.R. 873 at 879.
21 Spencer, ‘‘Public Nuisance’’ (1989) 48 C.L.J. 55 at 66.
22 Spencer, ‘‘Public Nuisance’’ (1989) 48 C.L.J. 55 at 66.
23 Spencer, ‘‘Public Nuisance’’ (1989) 48 C.L.J. 55 at 67.
24 Spencer, ‘‘Public Nuisance’’ (1989) 48 C.L.J. 55 at 76–77.
25 Spencer, ‘‘Public Nuisance’’ (1989) 48 C.L.J. 55 at 72.
26 [1957] 2 Q.B. 169.
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and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty’s subjects’’.27 As regards the
‘‘class’’ of subjects which must be affected, Romer J. stated that this was a question
of fact in every case; although not every person in the class need be affected, he
considered it necessary to show that a cross-section of the class had been affected.28
Lord Denning also added:
‘‘. . . the nuisance should be so widespread in its range or so indiscriminate
in its effect that it would not be reasonable to expect one person to take
proceedings on his own responsibility to put a stop to it, but that it should be
taken on the responsibility of the community at large.’’29
Not unexpectedly, given the lack of a definitive answer from the court, subsequent
case law found that a ‘‘class’’ could range from hundreds of residents in Shorrock30
to only a handful in Johnson.31 The trend seemed to be set that the courts deemed
an offence to be a public nuisance where the interests of the community were
served—rather than where the community generally had been affected by the
conduct of the defendant. For example in Norbury32 it was found that obscene
telephone calls to 494 women who were randomly selected from a telephone
directory were a public nuisance. However, the House of Lords has recently
overruled the decisions of Johnson and Norbury and reminded us that the law on
public nuisance concerns the community as a whole rather than named individuals
within a community.33
Furthermore, the broad definition of public nuisance has resulted in a wide
variety of acts and omissions falling within its scope. Thus, for example, whereas
the PNI was used in 1914 to address highway obstructions (such as a theatre
queue),34 the breadth of the offence has enabled the PNI to be used to tackle
more contemporary undesirable behaviour such as glue sniffing on local authority
property35 and drug dealing on a housing estate.36 It is easy to understand therefore
why the civil PNI has been recently referred to as a ‘‘catch all’’37 remedy and,
given today’s community safety agenda which adopts a zero tolerance approach
to anti-social behaviour,38 it is also understandable why the PNI has enjoyed
resurgence.
27 [1957] 2 Q.B. 169 at 184.
28 [1957] 2 Q.B. 169 at 184.
29 [1957] 2 Q.B. 169 at 191.
30 [1994] Q.B. 279.
31 [1996] 2 Cr. App. R. 434.
32 [1978] Crim. L.R. 435.
33 Goldstein and Rimmington [2005] UKHL 63; [2006 1 A.C. 459 at [37].
34 Lyons v Gulliver [1914] 1 Ch. 631.
35 Sykes v Holmes [1985] Crim. L.R. 791.
36 Nottingham City Council v Zain [2001] EWCA Civ 1248; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 607.
37 A. Ashworth, commenting on Goldstein; R. v R [2004] Crim. L.R. 303 at 304.
38 See generally for discussions regarding community safety/zero tolerance: A. Crawford,
Crime Prevention and Community Safety - Politics, Policies and Practices (1998); R. Hopkins
Burke, Zero Tolerance Policing (1998); G. Hughes, The Politics of Crime and Community (2007);
M. White, ‘‘Blair’s Blitz on Crime’’, Guardian, September 29, 1998.
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Evidential advantages
The increased use of this most flexible remedy has undoubtedly been facilitated by
s.222(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 which empowers local authorities to
apply for injunctions to promote or protect the interests of the inhabitants where
the authority considers it expedient to do so. Civil rules of evidence apply.39 Just as
the ASBO is concerned with the impact of the behaviour on the community rather
than the behaviour itself,40 it is the lawfulness of the consequence of the act or
omission which gives rise to the injunction rather than the act itself. Hence in the
context of on-street sex work it is the disturbance caused to the public rather than
the act of soliciting or loitering that gives rise to the injunction. The prerequisite
knowledge for the issue of an injunction is simply that the defendant ‘‘knew or
ought to have known’’ that there was a real risk that his or her actions would create
the nuisance that in fact occurred.41
The Home Office has been quick to point out the advantages PNIs have over
ASBOs for local authorities in tackling anti-social behaviour.42 Like the ASBO,
the PNI can be tailored to the individual. Both can be used exclusively to prohibit
individuals from entering designated areas and both can contain a variety of
prohibitions to restrain the offending behaviour in question. However, unlike the
ASBO, the injunction may be perpetual43; a sex worker may be prohibited from
entering a red light area indefinitely and she may be ordered not to solicit or loiter
again.44 Also, while it is the case that breach of the ASBO and the PNI involves
a flouting of the court’s judgment and this attracts significant maximum penalties
of imprisonment (two years for the PNI and five years for the ASBO), the PNI is
arguably easier to obtain. Both orders are civil and thus hearsay evidence and past
convictions can be adduced into court (any protection afforded by s.101 of the
Criminal Justice Act 2003 is not available45) to determine whether the threshold
for making an order or an injunction has been satisfied. However with regard to
the ASBO in R. v Crown Court of Manchester Ex p. McCann46 the House of Lords
held that the evidence admitted must convince the court beyond reasonable doubt
that the order is needed. Whether or not the courts would consistently demand
a higher standard of evidence to secure an ASBO continues to be a concern for
some,47 particularly given that Lord Hutton in McCann spoke of the necessity of
hearsay evidence to:
39 http.//www.respect.gov.uk/members/article.aspx?id=7942. Also, the increased use of the PNI
can be linked to the Criminal Law Act 1977 which made the offence of public nuisance triable
either way.
40 See Jones and Sagar, ‘‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998’’ [2001] Crim. L.R. 873.
41 Shorrock [1994] Q.B. 279.
42 See http://www.respect.gov.uk [Accessed February 20, 2008].
43 See http://www.respect.gov.uk/members/article.aspx?id=7942 [Accessed March 5, 2008].
44 It should however be noted that as regards the PNI, appropriate warning letters must
have been issued first, see Birmingham City Council, Legal Services Briefing Note, Crime and
Disorder: Anti-Social Behaviour (January 2003), para.2.4.
45 For a more detailed discussion on the evidential requirements of the ASBO see Addison
and Lawson-Cruttenden, ‘‘Law and Disorder’’, Police Review, February 12, 1999 and M.
Rowen, ‘‘Anti-Social Behaviour Orders’’ (1999) 163 J.P. September 18.
46 [2002] UKHL 39; [2003] 1 A.C. 787.
47 See, e.g. G. Pearson, ‘‘Hybrid Law and Human Rights - Banning and Behaviour Orders
in the Appeal Courts’’, (2006) 27 Liverpool Law Review 125.
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‘‘ . . . strike a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of
the community . . . and the requirement of the protection of the defendant’s
rights.’’48
However, in the context of sex workers, it was held in Potter49 that the standard of
proof required to secure an ASBO was in practice a criminal standard and that the
hearsay evidence which had been adduced from ‘‘unidentified’’ people fell short
of the required threshold.50 Ultimately, this means that the quality of evidence
required to secure an ASBO against sex workers is more demanding than perhaps
the Government anticipated. However, as the Government points out, the standard
of proof to secure a PNI is a civil standard and hearsay evidence may be adduced
into court (also that witnesses may be more willing to attend court to give evidence
for serious persistent criminal behaviour such as prostitution).51 Interestingly, while
the Government promotes the PNI to tackle sex work and anti-social behaviour
generally, there is mounting concern regarding the appropriateness of the PNI to
tackle criminal/undesirable activity.
A case for abolition
Questions regarding the law on public nuisance have continued to circulate around
two main issues: first, the breadth and vagueness of the law in this area; and
secondly, the increasing use of the offence by prosecutors who opt to charge
a defendant under the law of public nuisance to secure a stiffer penalty than
that available under statute for the offence committed. In 1978 questions were
raised about the types of behaviour encompassed by public nuisance: a case
commentary on Norbury noted that the obscene telephone calls deemed to be a
public nuisance were ‘‘strikingly different from the typical case of public nuisance
which is obstruction of the highway’’.52 Furthermore, the point was made that:
‘‘. . . an offence which covered such a wide range of different matters with
no obvious boundaries are only doubtfully compatible with the principle of
legality - that no one should be punished for an act which was not declared by
law to be an offence before the act was done.’’53
48 [2002] UKHL 39; [2003] 1 A.C. 787 at [113] cited in Pearson, ‘‘Hybrid Law and
Human Rights’’ (2006) 27 Liverpool Law Review 125 at 137.
49 [2003] EWHC Admin 2272.
50 The case held that a prostitute’s conduct could be considered on its own or in conjunction
with that of other street prostitutes in establishing whether harassment, alarm or distress had
been caused. Practitioners and academics were left grappling with the ruling that a prostitute
could be subject to an ASBO by merely being present in a red light area given that the
cumulative effect of sex workers congregating in a residential area can be taken into account.
51 http://www.respect.gov.uk/members/article.aspx?id=7942 [Accessed February 19, 2008]. It
is also noteworthy that the numbers of ASBOs issued only increased significantly when they
became available on conviction via the Crime and Disorder Act 2003, see Hughes, The Politics
of Crime and Community (2007), p.124.
52 [1978] Crim. L.R. 435.
53 [1978] Crim. L.R. 435 at 436.
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A year later David Feldman’s article54 discussed similar concerns which had been
raised in the case of Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers.55 Here the House of
Lords took the opportunity to clarify the position on the role of private citizens
to enforce criminal law. In his discussion of the use of injunctions to assist the
criminal law, Lord Wilberforce stated:
‘‘. . . . . .if Parliament has imposed a sanction (e.g. a fine of £1) without an
increase in severity for repeated offences, it may seem wrong that the courts,
civil courts, should think fit, by granting injunctions, breaches of which may
attract unlimited sanctions, including imprisonment, to do what Parliament
has not done.’’56
However, Feldman reminds us that the criminal is being sent to prison not because
he has committed £1-worth of crime, but because he deliberately disobeyed a
clear order from the High Court of Justice that he should not commit that crime.
He is being sent to prison for contempt of court, not for the statutory crime.
Feldman rightly points out that while Lord Wilberforce did raise some concerns
he was certainly not saying that the courts should not have this level of power
to prohibit behaviour, whether it is backed up with criminal law or not. Instead
Lord Wilberforce accepted that the injunction has its use but he warned that ‘‘it
is a jurisdiction of great delicacy and is one to be used with caution’’.57 Clearly
Lord Wilberforce’s thinking was that injunctions are to be used exceptionally, for
example in cases of emergency. Feldman however went a step further and suggested
that injunctions with unlimited sanctions might be too serious for certain types of
offences, but he pointed out that a statutory limitation on the types of criminal
behaviour which could or should be restrained by injunction was difficult because
‘‘even a trivial act can assume great significance if publicised’’.58
Several years after Feldman’s article, Spencer sharpened the debate when he
questioned whether ‘‘public nuisance law is an archaic monster which should be
painlessly destroyed by Parliament on the advice of the Law Commission?’’59 His
argument stemmed from the fact that virtually the entire area traditionally the
province of public nuisance prosecutions had been comprehensively covered by
54 D. Feldman, ‘‘Injunctions and the Criminal Law’’ (1979) 42 M.L.R. 369.
55 [1977] 3 All E.R. 70. The case concerned a Union’s executive decision to call on
members to refuse to handle mail to South Africa as part of a week of action against
apartheid.
56 [1977] 3 All E.R. 70 at 83 cited in Feldman, ‘‘Injunctions and the Criminal Law’’ (1979)
42 M.L.R. 369 at 370.
57 [1977] 3 All E.R. 70 at 83. Although a consequence of using a public nuisance
injunction is that a person could be liable to two trials and sentences for the same act,
Feldman points to the judgment of Lord Denning M.R. in Island Records Ltd v Corkindale
[1978] Ch. 122 at 135F–G. where the court considered it to be proper practice to take
into account the sentence imposed by the earlier court. At fn. 6. However, as regards the
ASBO, it is worth noting that the Sentencing Advisory Panel has recently proposed that
sentencing on breach of an ASBO should take into account the seriousness of the offence to
be determined by an assessment of the actual intended or foreseeable harm involved and the
culpability of the offender. See Sentencing Advisory Panel, Consultation Paper on Breach of an
Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) (2007), para.47, http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/
docs/ASBO%20consultation%20paper%202007-08--8-Final.pdf [Accessed March 5, 3008].
58 Feldman, ‘‘Injunctions and the Criminal Law’’ (1979) 42 M.L.R. 369 at 371.
59 Spencer, ‘‘Public Nuisance’’ (1989) 48 C.L.J. 55 at 56.
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statute—almost everything that endangered public health and safety had become
punishable as a specific statutory offence. Logically then, Spencer argued that the
PNI should have been rendered obsolete, and that over the last 100 years the law
had been, to a certain extent. Yet, he observed that almost all the prosecutions for
public nuisance during the mid decades of the 20th century had been either where
the defendant’s behaviour amounted to a statutory offence typically punishable
with a small penalty and where the prosecutor had wanted:
‘‘. . . a bigger or extra stick to beat him with or where the behaviour is not so
obviously criminal at all and the prosecutor [could] not think of anything else
to charge him with.’’60
Spencer’s assertions certainly have some value in the context of the use of PNIs
against sex workers; it is well known that the offences of loitering and soliciting
are punishable by fine only under the Street Offences Act 195961 and thus the
legislation offers little deterrent value. However, as Ashworth questioned in his
commentary on Goldstein in the Court of Appeal,62 the law on public nuisance may
be a ‘‘useful stop gap’’ for prosecuting behaviour that is annoying to the public
and which results in a low maximum penalty, but is this course of action right?
Should the law contain this ‘‘catch all’’ offence? And, given that the offence is so
broad and vague, is it not appropriate and right that the court should be bound
by the statutory maximum for the offence committed rather than handing out
discretionary penalties in this way?63 Particularly, as Ashworth goes on to point
out, that in 1976 the Law Commission argued for greater certainty of the definition
and made the point that:
‘‘. . . if new forms of wickedness should arise, the approach most consistent
with the rule of law is for Parliament to create new offences . . .’’64
The House of Lords has recently shed light on some of the issues raised by
Ashworth. In Rimmington and Goldstein65 the House considered the essential
elements of the offence of public nuisance. As already noted, Lord Bingham in the
leading judgment considered that the public generally or an unnamed section of
it had to be affected.66 Furthermore, with regard to the appropriate use of public
nuisance law Lord Bingham stated that he was swayed by Spencer’s argument that
the expansion of statutory law had rendered the offence obsolete.67 Nevertheless,
Lord Bingham, Lord Rodger and Baroness Hale all reiterated what has been said
many times in the House of Lords, namely that the court’s purpose was not to
conduct a law reform exercise—the court did not have the power to abolish offences
or create new ones, this was a matter for Parliament.68 However, Lord Bingham
60 Spencer, ‘‘Public Nuisance’’ (1989) 48 C.L.J. 55 at 77.
61 The penalty of imprisonment being removed under s.71 of the Criminal Justice Act
1982.
62 Ashworth, [2004] Crim. L.R. 303.
63 Ashworth [2004] Crim. L.R. 303 at 304.
64 Ashworth [2004] Crim. L.R. 303, cited at 305.
65 [2005] UKHL 63; [2006 1 A.C. 459.
66 [2005] UKHL 63; [2006 1 A.C. 459 at [37].
67 [2005] UKHL 63; [2006 1 A.C. 459 at [37].
68 [2005] UKHL 63; [2006 1 A.C. 459 at [31], [54] and [58] respectively.
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reasoned that in the interim, while there may be some circumstances where the law
should resort to the crime of public nuisance, these should be limited:
‘‘. . . good practice and respect for the primacy of statute do in my judgement
require that the conduct falling within the terms of a specific statutory provision
should be prosecuted under that provision unless there is a good reason for
doing otherwise.’’69
Furthermore, Lord Rodger stated that the Crown should not devise a strategy to
avoid statute.70 However, given that the Home Office continues to encourage the
use of the civil law in the context of PNIs against sex workers, it does not appear
likely that Parliament will be taking any steps soon to make securing an injunction
more difficult or to abolish the all-encompassing offence.
Thus, of more importance perhaps, is the court’s judgment regarding whether
the law on public nuisance was so vague or ill-defined as to render its interpretation
by the courts too uncertain to satisfy Art.7(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) (no punishment without law and no heavier penalty
imposed than the one that is applicable at the time the offence is committed).
Lord Bingham reasoned that the standard demanded by Art.7(1) was that the law
should be sufficiently clear as opposed to absolutely clear, to enable the defendant
to know what conduct is forbidden before it is occurs, and in His Lordship’s
opinion, the offence of public nuisance met that standard.71 Thus despite the fact
that European law holds that certainty is needed, to the extent that the behaviour
should at least be described with reference to its effect,72 once again the offence
of public nuisance, like anti-social behaviour under the CDA, will remain intact
regardless of the fact that characteristics of conduct are not stipulated and therefore
there is no recognisable objective standard which can be applied to establish the
offence. And so, it is of little surprise that in spite of this ruling on the law of public
nuisance, and that of McCann73 with regard to ASBOs, the issuing of PNIs and
other ‘‘hybrid’’74 mechanisms of control such as banning orders75 will continue
to be a cause of concern for many commentators who are unwilling to put the
pertinent issue of compliance with Arts 6 (right to a fair trial) and 7, to bed.76
Pearson, for example, as Ashworth before him,77 has recently argued that the courts
have failed to protect our human rights; the courts have too readily accepted the
69 [2005] UKHL 63; [2006 1 A.C. 459 at [30].
70 [2005] UKHL 63; [2006 1 A.C. 459 at [54].
71 [2005] UKHL 63; [2006 1 A.C. 459 at [33].
72 See Hashman and Harrup v United Kingdom [2000] Crim. L.R. 195, cited in Ashworth,
[2004] Crim. L.R. 303 at 305.
73 [2002] UKHL 39; [2003] 1 A.C. 787.
74 See, e.g. Jones and Sagar, ‘‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998’’ [2001] Crim. L.R. 873;
Ashworth, [2004] Crim. L.R. 303 and Pearson, ‘‘Hybrid Law and Human Rights’’ (2006)
27 Liverpool Law Review 125.
75 See Pearson, ‘‘Hybrid Law and Human Rights’’ (2006) 27 Liverpool Law Review 125
for a discussion of Gough and Smith v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [2002] EWCA Civ 351;
[2002] Q.B. 1213 which concerned football banning orders.
76 e.g. Burney, Making People Behave: Anti-Social Behaviour, Politics and People (2005); A.
Ashworth, ‘‘Social Control and ‘Anti-Social Behaviour’: The Subversion of Human Rights?’’
(2004) 120 L.Q.R. 263; Pearson, ‘‘Hybrid Law and Human Rights’’ (2006) 27 Liverpool Law
Review 125.
77 Ashworth, ‘‘Social Control and ‘Anti-Social Behaviour’’’ (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 263.
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preventative aim of civil orders which, in reality, have a serious punitive effect on
the subject of the order (exclusion for example) and punitive consequences upon
breach.78 The same can be said with regard to injunctions.
The extent to which civil hybrid laws are eroding human rights in the name of
community protection remains an extremely contentious issue. Interference with
human rights requires very strong justification, and it must be proportional. In the
context of injunctions and orders that curtail the movements of sex workers on
the basis that it is necessary to protect the public from their behaviour, surely the
question for the court should be—is the behaviour so unreasonable as to curtail
an individual’s freedom of movement—for one, two, three or more years? In Percy
v DPP79 a conviction under s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986 was quashed
because it was incompatible with rights contained in Art.10 which provides for
freedom of expression. The presumption was that the appellant’s conduct was
protected by Art.10 unless and until it was established that a restriction on the
individual’s freedom of expression was strictly necessary in a democratic society.
The incompatibility of s.5 of the Public Order Act was not in question here, rather
the conviction was quashed on the grounds that the judge had erred in weighing
up the proportionality of the interference and thus the conviction was found to be
incompatible with Art.10.
The problem is, however, in determining the limited circumstances where PNIs
should be used and in determining the terms of the injunction where they are used;
in the context of on-street sex work the courts are likely to be influenced by a long
legislative history that deems on-street sex work, a self-evident public nuisance
which is injurious to members of the community.80 The ‘‘community’’ is also
78 Pearson continues to contend that ASBOs and banning orders are essentially criminal
in nature. Drawing on European case law, Pearson asserts that when deciding whether a
proceeding is criminal or civil in nature the courts should take into account the severity of the
potential penalty (Engel v Netherlands (No.1) (1976) 1 E.H.R.R. 647) and the nature of the
offence itself (Garyfallou AEBE v Greece (1997) 28 E.H.R.R. 344; Lauko v Slovakia (2001) 33
E.H.R.R. 40): Pearson, ‘‘Hybrid Law and Human Rights’’ (2006) 27 Liverpool Law Review
125 at 140.
79 [2001] EWHC Admin 1125; [2002] Crim. L.R. 835.
80 The Vagrancy Act of 1824 (as amended by the Metropolitan Police Act 1829) was
employed to tackle the idle, disorderly and loose (which included common prostitutes) but
this required either a confession or a credible witness. However, the Metropolitan Police
Act enabled a police officer to apprehend anyone disturbing the peace or acting suspiciously
without warrant but this again was dependent on the evidence of a witness. Yet, by 1847
with the introduction of the Town Police Clauses Act, a constable could take into custody,
without warrant, any person who ‘‘within his view’’ had committed such an offence (which
included under s.28 common prostitutes/nightwalkers). Thus, for well over 150 years it has
been legally accepted in England and Wales that the nuisance caused by street prostitution
is self-evident and it continues to be legally regulated as a self-evident social nuisance today.
The Street Offences Act 1959 drew on the recommendations of the Wolfenden Committee
which reported in 1957 and which considered that the visibility of prostitution was a great
cause of public concern, the sight of which affronted a ‘‘normal citizen’s’’ sense of decency:
Wolfenden, Report on the Committee of Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, 1957, Cmnd
247, paras 12 and 225–227. More recently, in Potter [2003] EWHC Admin 2272 Auld
L.J. contended that street prostitution in residential areas was clearly capable of causing or
being likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. This presumption is similarly echoed
in the Government’s current strategy where it is accepted that sex markets impact greatly
on residents and businesses; see Home Office, The Development of a Coordinated Strategy on
Prostitution, Partial Regulatory Impact Assessment (2004), para.2.1.
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increasingly demanding. Pearson directs us to the work of Brownlee who reminds
us that today’s ‘‘predatory other’’ discourse has served to increase the public’s
sense of insecurity and thus the social reaction to law-breaking has intensified.81
This in turn has increased the community’s demand for punishment and it is true
to say that as regards the use of the ASBO, Gardener et al.’s lack of faith in
the courts to prevent it from being used aggressively as a tool of intolerance was
not misplaced.82 Still, it should not be forgotten that the offence of soliciting and
loitering has been deemed in law a low grade criminal offence—and certainly there
is nothing in legislation to suggest that the behaviour of sex workers warrants the
type of exclusive prohibitions contained in the PNIs issued against sex workers in
Birmingham. Such repressive terms are arguably disproportionate to the nuisance
caused by sex work and are particularly controversial given that sex workers were
subjected to the prohibitory injunctions because the City Council has innovatively
(or some might say cunningly) made use of archaic law that is so incredibly ill-
defined. Without doubt, the debate on the rights and wrongs of civil prohibitory
injunctions and orders will go on. With specific regard to injunctions against sex
workers, the next section of this article furthers discussion in this area as it turns to
question the actual utility of the PNI to tackle on-street sex work and considers its
place within the current policy framework.
Public nuisance injunctions against sex workers—to what end?
In weighing up the extent to which an individual’s human rights should be curtailed
to protect the general interests of the community, it is important that the courts
pause to consider the impact of the injunction. According to Birmingham City
Council, the issuing of 20 injunctions resulted in the numbers of sex workers in
the Ladywood area being reduced from 50 to less than five.83 However, there is of
course a valid argument that the Edgbaston/Ladywood sex workers are likely to have
displaced to other areas to access clients, as is often the case with exclusionary crime
prevention approaches,84 and this was certainly the case after sex workers were
warned that PNIs were to be issued against them in Vancouver.85 Nevertheless,
as is often the case with initiatives to tackle on-street sex work, displacement
is synonymous with success—it is somewhat ironic that the exclusive tactics of
Street Watch in Balsall Heath (a civilian/police partnership) drove prostitutes from
the targeted area two miles into the suburbs of Edgbaston in the first place.86
81 I. Brownlee, ‘‘New Labour - New Penology? Panic Rhetoric and the Limits of
Managerialism in Criminal Justice Policy’’ (1998) 25 Journal of Law and Society 313 cited in
Pearson, ‘‘Hybrid Law and Human Rights’’ (2006) 27 Liverpool Law Review 125 at 319.
82 J. Gardner et al., ‘‘Clause 1—The Hybrid Law from Hell?’’ (1998) 31 Criminal Justice
Matters 25.
83 Birmingham City Council, Legal Services Briefing Note, Crime and Disorder, Anti-Social
Behaviour 2002/2004, para.4.13.
84 See, e.g. P. Hubbard, ‘‘Community Action and the Displacement of Street Prostitutes:
Evidence from British Cities’’ (1998) 29 Geoforum 269; T. Sagar, ‘‘StreetWatch: Concept and
Practice, Civilian Participation in Street Prostitution Control’’ (2005) 45 Brit. J. Criminol.
98.
85 J. Lowman, ‘‘Street Prostitution Control: Some Canadian Reflections on the Finsbury
Park Experience’’ (1992) 32 Brit. J. Criminol. 1.
86 T. Sanders, ‘‘The Risks of Street Prostitution: Punters, Police and Protesters’’ (2004)
41 Urban Studies 1703.
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Similarly, ASBOs have been denounced as an inappropriate solution to tackle
on-street sex work in red light areas because the orders have the potential to lead to
displacement.87 However, another important point to make when considering the
potential impact of the PNI is that contemporary crime prevention and community
safety work consists of several tiers of multi-agency partnerships which implement
a variety of multi-agency strategies, and, therefore, to what extent does the PNI
make a useful contribution within the current policy approach?
A vexing problem for many commentators is that orders and injunctions are
liable to remove sex workers (both those subject to orders and injunctions and
those who seek to avoid them) out of the reach of front-line services, offering
on-going practical, material and emotional support.88 Indeed, while Birmingham
City Council had issued warnings to the women targeted (a prerequisite of the
PNI) and invited sex workers to avoid legal proceedings via voluntary referral to
appropriate agencies,89 one in four were found to have breached the PNI,90 and if
the Council is right about the numbers of women working the area being reduced
from 50 to less than five, then many were likely to have displaced themselves.
However, while arguments such as displacement and interference with welfare-
based work have been brought to the attention of the Home Office,91 the current
government strategy92 and guidance from the Association of Chief Police Officers93
is to continue to issue ASBOs and other exclusionary orders against persistent
sex workers but link them to mechanisms of support. The shortcomings of this
approach with regard to the ability of the ASBO to work in tandem with inclusive
initiatives have been debated in detail elsewhere.94 However, it is important to
point out that in just the same way that inclusive projects have first to exist locally
if ASBOs are to be linked to them, the same is true regarding PNIs. Significant
funding is needed to implement and maintain sex worker services and expensive sex
worker initiatives will not always attract the allocation of precious local resources
within the moral community. Thus, while the current approach in England and
Wales is to encourage local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and
Community Safety Partnerships to provide services that are tailored to meet the
needs of sex workers, this will be easier said than done. In many areas, partnerships
will lack the funds and possibly the will to set up the kinds of service provision
recommended by Hester andWestmarland (drop-in centres, counselling, outreach,
87 H. Wright and T. Sagar, ‘‘Out of Sight, Out of Mind’’ (2000) 150 N.L.J. 1792. Jones
and Sagar, ‘‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998’’ [2001] Crim. L.R. 873.
88 M. Hester and N. Westmarland, Tackling Street Prostitution: Towards A Holistic Approach,
Home Office Research Study 279 (2004); T. Sagar, ‘‘Tackling On-Street Sex Work: Anti-
Social Behaviour Orders, Sex Workers and Inclusive Inter-Agency Strategies’’ (2007) 7
Criminology and Criminal Justice 153.
89 Birmingham City Council, Legal Services Briefing Note, Crime and Disorder: Anti-Social
Behaviour (January 2003), para.4.9.
90 Birmingham City Council, Legal Services Briefing Note, Crime and Disorder, Anti-Social
Behaviour 2002/2004, para.4.12.
91 Hester and Westmarland, Tackling Street Prostitution (2004).
92 Home Office, The Development of a Coordinated Strategy on Prostitution, Partial Regulatory
Impact Assessment (2004).
93 T. Brian, T. Davis and A. Phillips, Policing Prostitution: ACPO’s Policy Strategy and
Operational Guidelines for Dealing with Exploitation and Abuse through Prostitution, (ACPO,
2004).
94 Sagar, ‘‘Tackling On-Street Sex Work’’ (2007) 7 Criminology and Criminal Justice 153.
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education, etc.).95 Also, as Hughes asserts, the partnerships are under immense
pressure to focus on anti-social behaviour and to concentrate on what can be easily
counted.96
Unfortunately, the success of sex worker initiatives is not easy to measure.
Exit from sex work is a complex process; research indicates that a woman’s exit
from the street is non-linear—it can take many attempts.97 Arguably, exclusionary
approaches such as the PNI and ASBO do not make for a coherent approach
where welfare and health-based services struggle to assist a group of women who
are ‘‘hard to reach’’ and who have diverse needs.98 The threat of injunctions and
orders, or the issuing of injunctions and orders in any targeted area will arguably
serve to undermine the work that is being carried out at grass roots level. Thus,
while the Government and ACPO appear to recognise that there is a problem
on the ground in that inclusive and exclusionary initiatives can work against each
other, the strategy which aims to circumvent potential problems on the ground
by linking the orders to support services tackling issues such as drug and alcohol
misuse remains questionable. Not least because non-conformists face punishment
if they refuse to adhere to the terms of their injunction or order—the coercive
nature of the current approach has not gone unnoticed or without criticism.99 The
outcome of what has been termed an inherently contradictory strategy100 remains
to be seen.
Nevertheless, further measures to compel sex workers into rehabilitation are
contained in cll.71–73 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 2007. Clause 71
proposes that ‘‘persons’’101 (not common prostitutes) should only face prosecution
if they loiter or solicit for the purposes of prostitution102 ‘‘persistently’’.103 It is
also proposed that persistent offenders should not be fined but rather ordered to
meet a supervisor (appointed by the court) on three occasions within a six-month
period to address the conduct constituting the offence and to identify ways of
preventing engagement in such future conduct.104 If offenders fail to meet with the
appointed supervisor then they will be deemed not to have become rehabilitated in
95 Hester and Westmarland, Tackling Street Prostitution (2004).
96 Hughes, The Politics of Crime and Community (2007), p.124.
97 E. McLeod, ‘‘Working with Prostitutes: Probation Officer’s Aims and Strategies’’ (1979)
9 British Journal of Social Work 453; H. Ward and S. Day, ‘‘Health Care and Regulation: New
Perspectives’’ in G. Scambler and A. Scambler (eds), Rethinking Prostitution: Purchasing Sex
in the 1990s (1997), pp.139–163; Hester and Westmarland, Tackling Street Prostitution (2004)
and J. Pitcher, ‘‘Support Services for Women Working in the Sex Industry’’ in R. Campbell
and M. O’Neill (eds), Sex Work Now (2006).
98 See Pitcher, ‘‘Support Services for Women Working in the Sex Industry’’ (2006), p.235.
99 e.g. B. Brooks-Gordon, The Price of Sex (2006) and J. Phoenix, ‘‘Regulating Prostitution:
Different Problems, Different Solutions, Same Old Story’’ (2007) 6 Community Safety Journal
7; M. Melrose, ‘‘The Government’s New Prostitution Strategy: A Cheap Fix for Drug-Using
Sex Workers?’’ (2007) 6 Community Safety Journal 18.
100 Phoenix points out that the strategy which aims to assist women will actually end up
punishing women: Phoenix, ‘‘Regulating Prostitution’’ (2007) 6 Community Safety Journal 7.
101 Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 2007 cl.71.
102 Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 2007 cl.71.
103 Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 2007 cl.71. Conduct is deemed persistent where
a person loiters or solicits for the purposes of offering services as a prostitute on two or more
occasions within a three-month period.
104 Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 2007 cl.72.
 SWEET & MAXWELL
Crim. L.R. Public Nuisance Injunctions Against On-Street 367
respect of the conviction.105 Since the introduction of the Bill, Ministers have also
proposed that any prostitute who breaches the court order should be detained in
prison for 72 hours.106 However, arguably, imprisonment for missing meetings is a
punitive step. To borrow the words of Will Higham of the Prison Reform Trust, the
measure ‘‘. . . fails utterly to understand that vulnerable people with chaotic lives
can’t be asked to walk a tightrope’’.107 Whilst an in-depth exploration of the issues
surrounding enforced rehabilitation to tackle drug and alcohol abuse is beyond
the remit of this article, as already noted, there are some who firmly believe that
compulsory rehabilitation is futile.108 Indeed, there is no guarantee that compulsory
rehabilitation will have the desired effect and reduce the numbers of sex workers on
the streets and thus assist in the protection of the communities which are adversely
affected. However, if the proposals do enter the statute book, undoubtedly the law
will (at least initially) become much more attractive—particularly to tackle repeat
offenders where history has shown that fines (currently imposed under the Street
Offences Act) are meaningless. Nevertheless, given the lack of certainty as to the
success of the measures, it is important to note that the ASBO is not classified at
law as a criminal penalty, and therefore rehabilitation orders may still be supported
by an ASBO, for example on prosecution. As for the potential for the PNI to be
used against sex workers in the future, again, the PNI is not a criminal penalty and
thus a sex worker could be the subject of a rehabilitation order and an injunction
simultaneously.
A final point to make is that the tiers of multi-agency partnerships introduced
under New Labour and the devolved nature of crime prevention which makes for
localised definitions of what is a public nuisance or indeed anti-social behaviour,
arguably renders the certainty of law problematic. The current state of affairs is
that sex workers may find themselves the subject of a PNI in one area and excluded
from entering a city centre for several years and, in another, may merely face a small
fine under the Street Offences Act 1959, or in the future become subjected to a
rehabilitation order. Unfortunately, the measures contained in the Criminal Justice
and Immigration Bill 2007 may do little to address the lack of national consistency
as to how sex workers are dealt with in practice in the long term. Particularly
in the context of the future of the PNI, it is worth remembering that it is the
local authority which is the applicant, and the decision to make an application will
vary according to the local authority agenda. For example, injunctions may still be
issued against sex workers where a local community is particularly vociferous109 or
where an authority aims to ‘‘clean up’’ a public space or redevelop it.110 Indeed, this
105 Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill 2007 cl.73.
106 J. Doward, ‘‘Prostitutes Face Jail Under Tougher Law’’, Observer, August 12, 2007,
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/politics/story/0,,2147225,00.html [Accessed February 19, 2008].
107 Doward, ‘‘Prostitutes Face Jail Under Tougher Law’’, Observer, August 12, 2007.
108 See, e.g. Phoenix, ‘‘Regulating Prostitution’’ (2007) 6 Community Safety Journal 7 and
Melrose, ‘‘The Government’s New Prostitution Strategy’’ (2007) 6 Community Safety Journal
18.
109 Or at least how vociferous some members of the community are. In the author’s research
area of Cardiff it could not be said that the majority, or even a significant proportion of the
community were concerned with on-street sex work, but the members who were upset by the
on-street activity were so concerned that they took to the streets in Street Watch Patrols to
oust women out of the area, see Sagar, ‘‘Street Watch’’ (2005) 45 Brit. J. Criminol. 98.
110 P. Hubbard, ‘‘Cleansing the Metropolis: Sex Work and the Politics of Zero Tolerance’’
(2004) 41 Urban Studies 1687.
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kind of independent action is set to become more likely given that the Government
proposes greater community empowerment and greater local authority control in
matters of community safety.
The Government’s White Paper Strong and Prosperous Communities aims to
give local people and local communities more power to improve their lives.111
Councillors are set to become ‘‘champions’’ of community interests,112 and to
ensure that local priorities are acted on councillors will be placed under a duty
to consider and respond to all community issues that are raised before them.113
Furthermore, the local priorities that appear in the Local Area Agreement will be
mirrored in the local Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy.114 Nevertheless,
steering all the different agencies that are involved in so many partnerships
makes even achieving local consistency problematic. However, more importantly,
even where consistency at the local level is achieved, it might be questioned
whether community empowerment and greater local authority input will make for
more exclusionary policies against sex workers. Communities are bombarded with
rhetoric from central government regarding the need for members of the public
to ‘‘take back’’ their communities and they are told that they do not have to
tolerate undesirable behaviour,115 and of course, as this article has highlighted,
local authorities are adopting an expanding policing role116 which appears to lean
towards policies of zero tolerance and the exclusion of sex workers. If this is so, it
is argued that when implementing strategies of zero tolerance at the local level it
is not enough that the local authority recognises (as the Government’s supposedly
coordinated strategy recognises, and the proposals in the Criminal Justice and
Immigration Bill purport to recognise) that support mechanisms for sex workers
are crucial, because tools of zero tolerance such as PNIs will always make it more
difficult for grass roots services to reach out to sex workers and thus deliver the
necessary levels of support.117 Basically, there has to be some recognition that PNIs
and other mechanisms such as ASBOs do not make for a coherent and consistent
approach.
Concluding remarks
If the judgment of the House of Lords in Rimmington and Goldstein were to result
in the PNI being used for the sort of behaviour that was originally intended,
or moreover if the law on public nuisance was abolished, this would hardly be
debilitating for local authorities where they wish to clean up areas or act on behalf
of local communities to reduce the social disturbances associated with on-street
111 Department for Communities and Local Government, Strong and Prosperous
Communities. TSO, 2006. Cm 6939-I, Cm 6939-II.
112 Cm 6929-1, section 2.
113 Cm 6929-1, section 2.
114 Cm 6939-I, para.5.11; Cm 6929-II, paras A15 and A20. It is proposed that all local
authorities be under a statutory duty to prepare Local Area Agreements which will involve
input from the Local Strategic Partnership, having regard to the Sustainable Community
Strategy and other statutory partnerships.
115 e.g. http://www.respect.gov.uk [Accessed February 20, 2008].
116 For a more detailed discussion see T. Sagar and J. Croxall, Local Authorities, Communities
and Sex Workers (forthcoming).
117 Pitcher, ‘‘Support Services for Women Working in the Sex Industry’’ (2006), p.254.
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sex work. Local authorities can still use their powers under s.222 of the Local
Government Act 1972 to stop the individual from committing a particular offence
where criminal proceedings proved inadequate to bring the problem to an end.
However, the crime targeted could not be one of public nuisance if the crime
did not exist, nor could an injunction be used to stop a non-existent offence.
Accordingly, local authorities would have to revert to using the many statutory laws
which are more defined, for which a criminal standard of proof is required, and to
which the stick to beat the offender has been adjudged appropriate by Parliament.
Without doubt civil remedies can offer a range of advantages that the criminal law
cannot match in either scope or flexibility. It is not surprising therefore that there
is no indication to date that local authorities will refrain from using, or threatening
to use the PNI against sex workers.118 By utilising the civil law, punishments can
be meted out to offenders while bypassing the criminal law’s cumbersome and
time-consuming constraints. Yet, of course, the criminal law’s cumbersomeness
and time constraints are there to serve a purpose. As Ashworth contends, human
rights have little significance where they are ‘‘simply . . . ‘weighed’ against the
public interest and then discarded, and also because it implies that the defendants
are ‘outside’ the community’’.119 However, the rights of the community have always
‘‘trumped’’ the rights of the sex worker—the outsider. Nevertheless, arguably, as
long as it is the visibility of sex workers that is at issue for local authorities rather
than sex worker welfare, on-street sex work will continue in the Ladywood area
of Birmingham—an area that in the run up to the issuing of the PNIs against sex
workers appeared on the list of the top 10 poorest parliamentary constituencies.120
Strategies of zero tolerance may oust sex workers from a targeted area for a time but
they do not provide a long-term solution.121 More often than not, as the breaches
of a quarter of the injunctions issued against sex workers in Ladywood and the
breaches of ASBOs in that same area indicate,122 such strategies stand to return
sex workers to the clutches of the criminal justice system.
118 There is no wording to this effect either on Birmingham City Council’s website or
indeed the many Home Office/Government sites such as Respect, http://www.respect.gov.uk
[Accessed February 20, 2008]. In fact, the very opposite is true, the use of PNIs to tackle
street sex work is very much encouraged.
119 Ashworth, ‘‘Social Control and ‘Anti-Social Behaviour’’’ (2004) 120 L.Q.R. 263 at
290–291.
120 ‘‘Report Reveals Britain’s 10 Most Poor Areas’’, Society Guardian, February 18, 2002,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2002/feb/18/socialexclusion [Accessed February 19, 2008].
121 The work of Street Watch in Balsall Heath was held up as a success, see M.
Lean, ‘‘The Red Lights go Green in Birmingham’’’ (1996) For a Change Magazine,
http://www.forachange.net/browse/1504.html [Accessed March 5, 2008]. However, as already
noted, the actions of Street Watch led to the displacement of sex workers into
Edgbaston/Ladywood, Sanders, ‘‘The Risks of Street Prostitution’’ (2004) 41 Urban Studies
1703. Several years later the deployment of ASBOs in the Ladywood area were thought to
be ‘‘the’’ effective deterrent; see Orr-Munro, ‘‘Curbing Street Sex’’, Police Review, July 28,
2002, but still, the City Council had to issue PNIs little more than a year later.
122 With regard to PNIs see Birmingham City Council, Legal Services Briefing Note,
(2004), para.4.12; Jones and Sagar, ‘‘Crime and Disorder Act 1998’’ [2001] Crim. L.R. 873,
which highlighted breaches of ASBOs by sex workers in Birmingham.
 SWEET & MAXWELL
370 Criminal Law Review [2008]
‘‘Up-Skirts’’ and ‘‘Down-Blouses’’:
Voyeurism and the Law
Alisdair A. Gillespie
Reader in Law, De Montfort University
Indecent photographs of children; Outraging public decency; Video
recordings; Voyeurism
Summary: The criminal courts have increasingly been called upon to consider the legal
position where a person covertly films up women’s skirts in order to obtain images of
their underwear, genitals or upper-thigh area. The criminalisation of such activity is
not straightforward and a number of issues arise from how the courts have treated this
behaviour, including whether this is an area where legislative amendment is required.
Up-skirts and down-blouses: an emerging issue
In recent years a small, but growing, number of people have been caught trying to
film up the skirts of women and girls. This kind of behaviour is colloquially known
as ‘‘up-skirt’’ or ‘‘down-blouse’’ photographing which is a simple descriptor of the
behaviour. An ‘‘up-skirt’’ picture is a picture taken by a man1 using a covert camera
directed up a female’s skirt. ‘‘Down-blouse’’ photography is where a man similarly
uses a covert camera to photograph females from above, with the camera focusing
on the female’s blouse in the hope of taking an image of the bra, cleavage or indeed
breasts.
Technology has altered the way in which this behaviour can be performed. There
have, in the past, been reported instances of men trying to look up skirts using
low-tech devices such as mirrors.2 However the behaviour would appear to have
become more prominent as technology has developed. It is, of course, not known
whether the behaviour became more common or whether it was just simply noticed
more often, but cases across the world increasingly involved hiding a video camera
in a bag positioned in such a way to ensure that an image could be taken.3 Although
inexpensive personal video cameras have been in existence since the 1980s, it has
1 In this article the masculine will be used to refer to the perpetrator and the feminine to
indicate the victim since research appears to show that the vast majority of voyeurs are male
(see J.M. Metzl, ‘‘From scopophilia to Survivor: a brief history of voyeurism’’ (2004) 18
Textual Practice 415 at 416).
2 Metzl, ‘‘From scopophilia to Survivor’’ (2004) 18 Textual Practice 415 at 426.
3 L.E. Rothenberg, ‘‘Re-thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs and the Failure
of Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Public Space’’ (2000)
39 American University Law Review 1127 at 1129–1130.
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been argued by one commentator that this did not mark the ignition point for the
outbreak of such behaviour but rather the internet did.4
On one level there would appear to be some truth in this, with another
commentator noting that in 2004 a search for voyeurism led to 730,000 hits
on Google5 (today the figure has reached in excess of 2 million hits6) but it is
submitted that the evidence is not conclusive. Whilst the growth in the number
of internet sites demonstrates that there is a demand for voyeuristic material it
does not automatically mean that the voyeuristic behaviour is increasing. Whilst
we know that the internet has revolutionised the way that deviant sexual behaviour
is conducted,7 we do not know, as yet, how it has impacted on this behaviour.
Many of the images on the internet appear to be staged. This is not unusual,
with many adult-entertainment sites using ‘‘creative licence’’ in their products so
that professional films are, for example, passed off as amateur films or ‘‘chance
encounters’’ are, in fact, carefully staged.8 Similarly many images on sites hosting
voyeuristic material would appear to be of too high-quality for them to have been
taken in truly voyeuristic circumstances.
Leaving aside the place of the internet in propagating such behaviour it is
clear that technology has certainly allowed the behaviour to develop. High-quality
devices have become increasingly sophisticated and smaller, allowing for more
opportunities to take such images. Perhaps the most notable piece of technology
in this area is the camera-equipped mobile telephone. A person holding a mobile
telephone will not often trigger any suspicions (in part because, for example, a
person standing above others in a shopping mall may look as though he is texting
rather than taking a photograph) and yet the technology on mobile telephones
means it is quick and simple to take and distribute such images. A person could,
from his telephone, email an image to himself and then delete all traces of the
image and distribution so that if asked to account for his behaviour by a security
guard it would appear as though nothing untoward has happened.
The use of mobile telephones to take surreptitious photographs was most
notable in Japan where it caused considerable disquiet and scandal but it has also
featured heavily in other countries, including the United Kingdom, where it is now
becoming increasingly common for organisations to prohibit mobile telephones on
their premises.9
What does this behaviour amount to? It has been traditionally argued that such
behaviour was a nuisance10 but psychologists consider it to be much more than this.
4 D. Kremenetsky, ‘‘Insatiable ‘Up-Skirt’ Voyeurs Force California Lawmakers to Expand
Privacy Protection in Public Places’’ (2000) 31 McGeorge Law Review 285 at 287.
5 J.M. Metzl, ‘‘Voyeur Nation? Changing Definitions of Voyeurism, 1950-2004’’ (2004)
12 Harvard Review of Psychiatry 127.
6 Of course not every ‘‘hit’’ is necessarily a website devoted to voyeurism since it would
include scholarly articles and certain media reports discussing the phenomenon. That said,
a significant proportion of them do appear to be websites purporting to host voyeuristic
material.
7 Perhaps most notably child pornography: see E. Quayle and M. Taylor, ‘‘Paedophiles,
pornography and the Internet’’ [2002] British Journal of Social Work 863–875.
8 See, e.g. D. Bennett, ‘‘Pornography-dot-com: Eroticising privacy on the Internet’’ (2001)
23 The Review of Education/Pedagogy/Cultural Studies 381 at 388.
9 See, e.g. G. Parry, ‘‘Camera/video phones in schools’’ (2005) 17 E. & L. 73.
10 Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences—volume 1. Home Office. 2001,
para.8.3.
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It is considered to be a form of paraphilia, a term meaning ‘‘sexual perversion or
deviation’’.11 There are several examples of paraphilias but DSM-IV12 recognises
one, voyeurism, that appears to be related. Voyeurism is defined as:
‘‘. . . intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges or behaviours involving
the act of observing an unsuspecting person who is naked, in the process of
disrobing or engaging in sexual activity.’’13
Of course the behaviour discussed above does not fit neatly into this definition of
voyeurism in that up-skirt pictures do not involve a person being naked, disrobing
or engaging in sexual activity. However the rest of the definition holds true and it
has been gradually recognised that this clinical definition may need widening, with
some suggesting:
‘‘[Voyeurism] can also be defined as an overwhelming desire to observe a
person of the preferred gender and age in some stage of undress . . . or in
similar intimate or private situations.’’14
This perhaps reflects the fact that voyeurism covers a broad range of behaviour
and indeed some are arguing that the term should be considered an overarching
behavioural definition covering a variety of distinct behaviours.15 In terms of the
behaviour discussed in this article this becomes relevant because up-skirt pictures
relate to a very specific form of behaviour. Indeed some have argued that it
should have its own label, with some suggesting ‘‘paraphilic scopophilia’’ would
be appropriate, although this is somewhat controversial since many texts do not
differentiate between ‘‘scopophilia’’ and ‘‘voyeurism’’, something which receives
support from the dictionary.16
For our purposes, it is necessary to use a term other than ‘‘voyeurism’’ since this
now bears a definition in law17 which, as will be seen, arguably does not cover the
behaviour discussed in this article. Since scopophilia is a controversial label for this
behaviour it is suggested that the phrase ‘‘up-skirt’’ which has achieved colloquial
recognition should be used instead.
Initial legal response
Within England and Wales the principal legal response has been to use the
common-law offence of outraging public decency. It was not until 2007 that
someone expressly challenged the applicability of outraging public decency to
11 Oxford English Dictionary, online edition.
12 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Version 4). Produced by the
American Psychiatric Association this is arguably the most authoritative classification of
psychiatric conditions.
13 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, para.302.82
14 K. Freund, ‘‘Courtship Disorder’’ in W.K. Marshall, D.R. Laws and H.E. Barbaree
(eds), Handbook of Sexual Assault (1990), p.196.
15 See Metzl, ‘‘Voyeur Nation?’’ (2004) 12 Harvard Review of Psychiatry 127 at 128–129.
16 See Oxford English Dictionary (online edition) which suggests that voyeurism is another
term for scopophilia.
17 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.67.
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this behaviour18 although the courts had previously implicitly approved its use.19
Thomas L.J., giving the judgment in Hamilton, spent a considerable period of time
rehearsing the history of the offence and, whilst it is undoubtedly interesting and
relevant to legal historians, it is submitted that much of the immediate history is
not directly relevant to this discussion. The key issue that arose from this detailed
rehearsal of the offence was whether there was a requirement that two people saw
the act that amounted to public indecency.
It has been clear for some time that the requirement for at least two people to
see the act was meant to demonstrate that the act had occurred in public and,
therefore, could be capable of outraging the public rather than a single victim.20
More than this, it is necessary for the act to take place in an area to which the
public has access, so that an act before two people in a private dwelling would not
meet the criteria.21 However it is also clear that it does not matter whether the
people who saw the act were actually outraged.22 This is particularly relevant in the
context of up-skirt photographs where people may see the act as ‘‘a laugh’’.23
The real issue of substance in Hamilton was whether it is necessary for two
people to see the act of photographing or be capable of seeing the act. This again is
important in respect of up-skirt pictures where the conduct is often covert, indeed
some psychologists argue that the secrecy of the activity is a fundamental part of
the sexual arousal.24 The appellant had submitted that the historic cases show that
at least one person must see the act and it must be in circumstances where others
were capable of seeing the act even if in fact they did not.25
Although the Court of Appeal accepted that the historical cases had so far all
involved at least one person seeing the act, it held that this was an evidential
point rather than a rule of substantive law. The court held that the purpose of
the ‘‘two-man rule’’ was simply to ensure that the act took place in circumstances
where members of the public could be outraged and it was not necessary for anyone
to witness the act.26 The court then went on to state that the decision of the jury in
Hamilton was that it was possible that people could have witnessed the act.
Is it possible to reconcile this ratio with earlier contemporary cases, perhaps most
notably the decision in R. (on the application of Rose) v DPP?27 Here the applicant
was acquitted of an offence of outraging public decency, the circumstances being
that he and his girlfriend had oral sex in the foyer of a bank at 01.00. The only
person to witness the act did so the next morning when viewing CCTV footage.
Stanley Burnton J. held that the conviction could not be sustained as the public
element must be satisfied at the time of the act and not subsequently.28
18 Hamilton [2007] EWCA Crim 2062.
19 See, e.g. Tinsley [2003] EWCA Crim 3505 which was an appeal against sentence imposed
for outraging public decency after taking up-skirt images.
20 Halsbury’s Laws, para.764.
21 P. Rook and R. Ward, Sexual Offences: Law and Practice, 3rd edn (2004), p.412.
22 D.C. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, 11th edn (2005), p.966.
23 e.g. it is known that a considerable amount of up-skirt pictures are taken in nightclubs.
A group of boys may find this amusing but this would be irrelevant.
24 G.C. Davison, J.M. Neale and A.M. Kring, Abnormal Psychology, 9th edn (2004).
25 Hamilton [2007] EWCA Crim 2062 at [35].
26 Hamilton [2007] EWCA Crim 2062 at [39].
27 [2006] EWHC Admin 852; [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2626.
28 [2006] EWHC Admin 852; [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2626 at [29].
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It was accepted in Rose that it was possible that people walking past the foyer
would be capable of seeing the act29 but it was held that there was no proof that
anyone was actually passing the foyer at that time of the night. It is perhaps this that
allows the two cases to be reconciled since in Hamilton the Court of Appeal stated
that whether it was possible for an act to be seen was a matter of fact for the jury30
and it held that the video demonstrated that there were people around who may
have seen the appellant. Presumably the logic of Rose was that the District Judge31
was not satisfied that there were people capable of seeing the act. Precisely how,
in circumstances such as Rose, it will be possible to prove this to the prosecution
standard is perhaps more open to question.
A slightly different point, but one that is expressly raised in Hamilton, is that the
test is not merely that the perpetrator is seen but that the perpetrator is seen doing
the relevant act. In our context this means that it must be possible that people
will see that the perpetrator is actually trying to film up someone’s skirt. Given
that this is a covert activity this may be somewhat difficult, especially when it is
remembered that technological advancements are making it easier to disguise the
activity. The court in Hamilton made reference to the facts of Tinsley where the
contents of a bag spilled out as an example of how such evidence may be gathered,
or that a security guard may see him manoeuvring the bag. Where, however, does
this leave situations where the bag is secured or where technological solutions such
as detachable lenses, etc. are used? Presumably if the prosecution cannot prove
that at least two people could see the offender actually filming up-skirt pictures
then a conviction could not be sustained even though the recording proves what
the offender has been doing.
There are other problems with the use of this offence. It is commonly accepted
that to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights offences must be
defined with sufficient clarity to ensure that a person knows the limits of the law. It
has been suggested that the offence of outraging public decency does not meet this
test32 but in S and G v United Kingdom33 the European Commission on Human
Rights refused an application to challenge this offence. It is somewhat surprising
that a challenge to this offence has not been successful although this may be as a
result of the particular facts of the case. It is unlikely that an application in respect of
up-skirt images would be successful either with the courts undoubtedly suggesting
that a person should be aware that such an activity is criminal. However this does
not alter the fact that many of the circumstances surrounding the detail of this
offence are largely unknown, something evident by the discussion about whether
people must be capable of being outraged at the time of the act. It is submitted that
it would be more appropriate for the law to adopt a clearer method of tackling this
behaviour.
The way in which the offence is punishable is also problematic. As a common-law
offence, and one that covers a broad range of activity, it has never been brought
29 [2006] EWHC Admin 852; [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2626 at [11].
30 Hamilton [2007] EWCA Crim 2062 at [40].
31 In Rose the matter was heard summarily so the District Judge (Magistrates’ Court) would
be the tribunal of fact.
32 Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law (2005), p.967.
33 Application 17634/91.
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within the protective environment created by statute34 and indeed the scope of
its sentence has never been fully defined. As an offence that is broadly based
upon the premise that it is a nuisance, any sentence imposed tends to ignore
the psychological issues it presents. It will be remembered that DSM-IV classifies
voyeurism, including up-skirt pictures, as a deviant sexual behaviour. It has been
remarked that an issue with this form of behaviour is its ‘‘recurrent and insistently
and involuntarily and repetitive nature’’.35 In other words the behaviour is likely
to reoccur and this raises issues of treatment and control. The issue of treatment
has long been controversial in sexual offending36 but it is clear that some assistance
needs to be given. This does raise issues in terms of the sentence imposed. A
common judicial reaction in these circumstances appears to be the imposition of a
short custodial sentence and yet it is known that this is of little or no benefit to a
sex offender in need of treatment. 37
Prison sex offender programmes are reserved for those serving medium-to-long
sentences. A short custodial sentence is unlikely to lead to a community sex
offender programme either for similar reasons of resource. Perhaps the better
solution would be the imposition of a community sentence or suspended sentence
of imprisonment where, in both cases, conditions can be imposed in respect of
a treatment programme.38 In this way an offender has some chance of receiving
treatment that may help address his deviant behaviour but whilst it is charged as an
offence of outraging public decency it is unlikely that this position will be reached.
In terms of controlling repeat offending the fact that it is not a sexual offence
for the purposes of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 means that it is not possible
to impose a sexual offences prevention order (SOPO). A similar effect could be
achieved through the use of an anti-social behaviour order (ASBO39) since up-skirt
behaviour must, it is submitted, come within the definition of anti-social behaviour.
However an ASBO and SOPO are not identical in effect and certainly the latter
would ordinarily involve more attention by a multi-agency public protection panel
which may be useful in addressing the offender’s behaviour. Without addressing
the causes of the offending behaviour there is a danger that all an ASBO would do
is return an offender to court more speedily.40
Voyeurism
In Hamilton, one of the submissions challenged whether the acts were covered by
the offence of voyeurism.41 The court specifically declined to decide on this point
because it was considered that it was not relevant.42 The reasoning of the court
34 e.g. it is not a ‘‘sexual offence’’ within the meaning of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 nor
does it come within the ‘‘dangerousness’’ provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
35 Metzl, ‘‘From scopophilia to Survivor’’ (2004) 18 Textual Practice 415 at 424.
36 See generally W.L. Marshall (ed.), Sexual offender treatment: controversial issues (John
Wiley & Sons, 2006).
37 A point discussed in the Court of Appeal in Tinsley [2003] EWCA Crim 3505, when
quashing a sentence of imprisonment.
38 Criminal Justice Act 2003 ss.177(1), 189(1) and 190.
39 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 ss.1 and 1C.
40 A typical ASBO requirement could be the restriction of operating recording equipment
in a shopping centre, or the carrying of a covert camera in a bag, etc.
41 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.67.
42 Hamilton [2007] EWCA Crim 2062 at [28].
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was based on the premise that the actions took place before the commencement
of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. However the submission, that it is within the
remit of voyeurism, is of interest as it does have implications for offences after its
commencement.
The legal definition of voyeurism does not necessarily encompass all of the
psychological definition discussed in the preceding sections of this article. Section
67 actually creates a number of distinct offences relating to voyeuristic activity but
each has common elements, namely that the voyeurism is for the purposes of sexual
gratification and involves observing,43 recording,44 operating equipment allowing
another person to observe45 or installing equipment or adapting a structure to
allow a person to observe46 a person doing a private act without their consent.
For the context of this article the most relevant are s.67(1)—observing—and
s.67(3)—recording—a person.
However voyeurism would only apply if observing or taking the up-skirt pictures
involved a person doing a private act. The Act defines a ‘‘private act’’ as:
‘‘. . . a person is doing a private act if the person is in a place which, in the
circumstances, would reasonably be expected to provide privacy, and-
(a) the person’s genitals, buttocks or breasts are exposed or covered
only with underwear,
(b) the person is using a lavatory, or
(c) the person is doing a sexual act that is not of a kind ordinarily done
in public.’’47
Leaving aside the issue of lavatories—although it is known that some offenders
have sought either to install equipment in a lavatory or indeed to hide in a
lavatory48—there are other difficulties with the use of voyeurism in the context of
up-skirt pictures. The syntax of s.68(1), which is most relevant for us, says ‘‘a
person is in a place . . . and the person’s genitals, buttocks or breasts are exposed
or covered only in underwear’’. This suggests that the person’s genitals, etc. are
either exposed in this place or are covered only in underwear. If we take the typical
example of someone seeking up-skirt pictures then this would involve manipulating
a camera when a person is in a public space, such as a shopping centre. In
that place—the shopping centre—the person’s genital, buttocks or breasts are not
exposed or covered only in underwear, the victim is likely to be wearing a skirt or
blouse too.
Quite clearly where a person is seeking to observe people in, for example, shop
changing rooms or whilst on a sunbed49 then the offence would apply. It less clear
that it would apply where people are simply standing on an escalator or walking up
stairs. In those circumstances it cannot be said that the people are in a place where
their genitals, etc. are covered only in underwear.
43 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.67(1).
44 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.67(3).
45 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.67(2).
46 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.67(4).
47 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.68(1).
48 Henderson [2006] EWCA Crim 3264.
49 See, e.g. Turner [2006] EWCA Crim 63; [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 51.
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Even assuming that the courts will interpret this provision in a wider fashion,
deciding that it suffices if the offender is in a place where a person observes or
records the victim’s genitals, buttocks or breasts or covered only in underwear—and
certainly there appears to be some evidence that courts of first-instance have taken
this approach—the next issue to decide is what is meant by ‘‘reasonably expected
to provide privacy’’?
If people are walking in a public area can it be said that they are in a place
where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy? Some commentators, whilst
not addressing this specific point, have suggested the answer is ‘‘no’’, arguing that
where the public have general access then this is a public rather than private place.50
It is less clear that this is what the Act requires. The Act talks about circumstances
where there is a reasonable expectation to privacy and not necessarily simply a
place. It could be argued that a victim, even in a public place, does not expect
someone to look up her skirt or down her blouse. Is that an expectation of privacy?
Certainly it has been argued that:
‘‘In Western society, one of the most fundamental and universal expectations
of privacy involves the ability to control exposure of one’s body.’’51
This is undoubtedly true and the issue of exposure has been a controversial issue
through the years. It could be argued convincingly that privacy is an issue but even
if the stretched logic covers a person in a public place there is one other barrier:
s.67 talks about doing a private act. Whilst it would be possible to construe privacy
to include personal exposure, and it may be possible to stretch ‘‘place’’ to cover
public places, it would be difficult to argue that the act—in the example above,
shopping—is a private act, it is a public act. It may be that a person should have
a right to privacy whilst doing this public act but that is not what s.67 appears
to require. It is submitted that bringing up-skirt behaviour within the offence of
voyeurism is stretching things too far.
A new offence
Whilst it appears that voyeurism is unlikely to be effective for criminalising up-skirt
pictures, it is clear from the first part of this article that the offence of outraging
public decency could be used. However it was also noted that there are some
significant difficulties in its use, especially where it is not possible to identify
whether at least two people were capable of seeing the offender taking the up-skirt
pictures. It should be noted that the premise of this section of the article is that it
is appropriate for this matter to be the subject of criminal sanction. It is submitted
that this is more than just a nuisance and that a victim does suffer consequences of
the crime.52
Several countries have begun to consider their response to these issues and many
have responded with new legislation to combat up-skirt photographs.53 In some
50 Rook and Ward, Sexual Offences: Law and Practice (2004), pp.401–402.
51 Rothenberg, ‘‘Re-thinking Privacy’’ (2000) 39 American University Law Review 1127 at
1135.
52 K.J. Burton, Voyage forward for Queensland: Unauthorised taking of photographs and making
of film and its subsequent publication on the Internet (2005), p.3, http://eprints.qut.edu.au/archive/
00004179 [Accessed February 19, 2008].
53 Burton, Voyage forward for Queensland (2005), pp.7 et seq.
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countries, for example New Zealand, they have introduced specific legislation to
tackle up-skirt images54 and in others it has formed part of a wider voyeurism
offence.55
It is perhaps this latter form that is the most appropriate for England and Wales
to adopt. It is suggested that the intention of the Government with the voyeurism
offence was to criminalise peeping56 and that this should include up-skirt pictures,
yet the preceding section of this article suggested that, in fact, this may not have
occurred. For the reasons set out above it would be preferable for this activity to
have the certainty of a statutory offence and it would seem easiest to amend the
voyeurism offence. Interestingly the New Zealand model can act as a model for
the change. The statute (amending the penal code57) was obviously influenced
(somewhat ironically) by the UK provision because the first part of their offence
mirrors in close terms the (UK) voyeurism offence.58 However the New Zealand
legislature recognised the difficulty that ‘‘private act’’ imposed and a second offence
was introduced which criminalises recordings of:
‘‘. . . a person’s naked or undergarment-clothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks
or female breasts which is made—
(i) from beneath or under a person’s clothing, or
(ii) through a person’s outer clothing in circumstances where it is
unreasonable to do so.’’59
Leaving aside the slightly problematic subpara.(ii),60 this does appear an appropriate
way of tackling the menace of up-skirt photography. The offence requires an absence
of consent but there is no requirement for a person to be in a private place, nor
indeed is there any reference to privacy.61 This carries distinct advantages: it
recognises the inherent right of people to limit exposure of their person whilst
at the same time avoiding debates as to the nature of the clothing worn.62 It is
submitted that this can be justified because of the intrusion that is involved in
covertly recording up-skirt pictures. The mens rea requirement for recording such
images is intention or recklessness.63 The use of recklessness may be somewhat
controversial and it is more likely that an offence in this jurisdiction would be
restricted to intentional recording or observation—especially since there appears
to be little evidence to suggest this problem is caused by anyone other than those
deliberately seeking the images—although, in common with other offences in the
54 See Crimes (Intimate Covert Filming) Amendment Act 2006.
55 See the position in New South Wales (Australia) in Burton, Voyage forward for Queensland
(2005), p.11.
56 Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences—volume 1. Home Office. 2001,
para.8.3.
57 Crimes Act 1961.
58 Crimes Act 1961 s.216G(1)(a).
59 Crimes Act 1961 s.216G(1)(b).
60 As it may be difficult to define the circumstances when this would apply.
61 Which is restricted to the para.(a) offence.
62 An issue highlighted by Kremenetsky, ‘‘Insatiable ‘Up-Skirt’ Voyeurs’’ (2000) 31
McGeorge Law Review 285 at 291, when he considers the disadvantages of basing an
action on privacy.
63 Crimes Act 1961 s.216H.
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Sexual Offences Act 2003 it is likely a case could be made that recklessness would
suffice as to the absence of consent.
New Zealand also provides an offence on the distribution of such images.64
This is an interesting issue because it is likely that the harm caused by up-skirt
photography is enhanced where the images are distributed, at least where the
victim is identifiable by others. A comparison could be drawn with the area of
child pornography where research has shown that psychological harm is caused to
victims who are aware that images of themselves are being used to stimulate sexual
fantasies across the world and that they can never be sure as to who has seen the
images.65
The current voyeurism offence in the United Kingdom does not tackle the
distribution of such images and yet it was noted above that there are a significant
number of websites that are now dedicated to such material.66 One possible
argument is that the distribution of such images is criminalised under existing
legislation67 but it is likely that it would be neater to introduce a specific offence
relating to their dissemination by their creator.
Child victims
The final issue to consider is that of indecent photographs of children. One of
the photographs in Hamilton related to a child and it was decided before trial to
amend the indictment to include a charge of taking an indecent photograph of a
child.68 Although convicted of this charge the question arises whether an up-skirt
photograph of a child automatically qualifies as an indecent photograph of a child
within the meaning of the Protection of Children Act 1978.
At the heart of this issue is the question as to what ‘‘indecent’’ means. The term
is not defined in the Protection of Children Act 1978 and the definition adopted
by the courts has been quite controversial. In Stamford69 it was held that indecency
and obscenity were at different points on the same scale, and that they were to be
measured according to contemporary standards of decency. In Graham-Kerr70 the
court held that context was irrelevant: the jury must simply look at the photograph
itself and decide whether it is decent or indecent.71 It has been noted that this
can cause difficulty in respect of ‘‘legitimate’’ photographs where a family taking
photographs of their child in a bath have to rely on an obiter statement that it
would not be in the public interest to prosecute in these circumstances.72
64 Crimes Act 1961 s.216J.
65 e.g. a victim who is now a student attending university will be caused anxiety sitting in
the lecture theatre wondering if anyone has seen the images: T. Palmer, Just one click (2004).
66 See p.371 above.
67 e.g. Communications Act 2003 s.127 (sending an indecent or obscene communication)
or even the Obscene Publications Act 1959 although this would require a tribunal of fact to
decide that each image the subject of a charge is obscene. This is certainly not guaranteed in
every case.
68 Hamilton [2007] EWCA Crim 2062 at [1].
69 [1972] 2 Q.B. 391.
70 (1988) 88 Cr. App. R. 302.
71 This approach had earlier been adopted in respect of the Post Office Act 1953 (Kosmos
Publications v DPP [1975] Crim. L.R. 345) and it was later confirmed that the passing of the
Human Rights Act 1998 did not alter this approach (Smethurst [2002] 1 Cr. App. R. 6).
72 See D.C. Ormerod’s comment on Smethurst at [2001] Crim. L.R. 657 at 658.
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None of this, it is submitted, adequately sets out what indecent means. We know
that it is in the eye of the jury but are there any limits as to their discretion? In
Oliver73 the Court of Appeal, for the purposes of sentencing, accepted that it would
be useful to use a modified COPINE typology of indecent photographs to classify
their seriousness. The original scale74 had 10 points within it but the Court of
Appeal stated that the first three levels would not be included because:
‘‘. . . it seems to us, neither nakedness in a legitimate setting, nor the
surreptitious procuring of an image, gives rise by itself, to a pornographic
image.’’75
The original COPINE scale included, at level three, ‘‘surreptitious photographs
of children . . . showing either underwear or varying degree of nakedness’’76 and
this was under the label ‘‘erotica’’. In Hamilton one of the charges related to an
up-skirt picture of a 14-year-old schoolgirl and this led to a charge being made of
taking an indecent photograph of a child.77 The court was silent as to the propriety
of this and simply referred to it in passing, perhaps because the court had, on an
earlier occasion, specifically considered this issue. In Henderson78 the appellant was
convicted, inter alia, of taking an indecent image of a child in that he had taken
an up-skirt picture of a child also aged 14. The court, in that case, described the
photograph as showing ‘‘the upper thighs from below’’.79 The issue of relevance
during that appeal was whether an up-skirt image could properly be categorised as
indecent. In Henderson the court stated it could because it was for a jury to decide
what was indecent, but can it truly be said that a surreptitious photograph showing
the upper thighs of a schoolgirl is an indecent photograph of a child?
Some have argued that a distinction needs to be drawn between child
pornography (‘‘the sexually explicit reproduction of a child’’) and child erotica
(‘‘any material, relating to children, that serves as a sexual purpose for a given
individual’’).80 It is notable that COPINE level three is classified as ‘‘erotica’’81
and the original authors note that it is not unusual for the law to draw a distinction
between indicative, indecent and obscene images, with indicative images being
classed as ‘‘material depicting clothed children, which suggests a sexual interest in
children’’.82 This must cover up-skirt images and it would seem to fall squarely
within the comments of the Court of Appeal in Oliver, i.e. it is not indecent.
However this is not the first time that the courts have caused confusion in
this area. In O’Carroll83 the appellant, a prominent paedophile campaigner, was
73 [2002] EWCA Crim 2766; [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 28.
74 M. Taylor, G. Holland and E. Quayle, ‘‘Typology of Paedophile Picture Collections’’
(2001) 74 Police Journal 97.
75 Oliver [2002] EWCA Crim 2766; [2003] 1 Cr. App. R. 28 at [10].
76 Taylor et al., ‘‘Typology of Paedophile Picture Collections’’ (2001) 74 Police Journal 97
at 102.
77 Contrary to Protection of Children Act 1978 s.1(1)(a).
78 [2006] EWCA Crim 3264.
79 [2006] EWCA Crim 3264 at [7].
80 K. Lanning, Child Molesters: A Behavioural Analysis (1992), pp.24–25.
81 Taylor et al., ‘‘Typology of Paedophile Picture Collections’’ (2001) 74 Police Journal 97
at 102.
82 Taylor et al., ‘‘Typology of Paedophile Picture Collections’’ (2001) 74 Police Journal 97.
83 [2003] EWCA Crim 2338.
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convicted of importing indecent photographs into the country.84 The images were
described by the court as showing ‘‘young naked children engaging in naked
outdoor activity such as playing on a beach’’85 and it was his submission that
they were not indecent. Reference to the original COPINE scale would place this
either at level two (‘‘pictures of naked or semi-naked children in appropriate nudist
settings’’) or level three (‘‘surreptitiously taken photographs of children in play
areas . . .’’) depending on who took the photographs. In either situation they would
appear to lie within the proposition put forward by the Court of Appeal in Oliver.
However the Court of Appeal rejected this argument, stating it was solely for the
jury to decide whether an image was indecent, noting:
‘‘A dictum of a judge in one case in this court as to what constitutes a
‘pornographic image’ cannot bind a jury as to what in another case is indecent
material . . .’’86
Whilst from a strict point of stare decisis this is correct,87 it does not of course
follow that the dictum was wrong. It is perhaps surprising that nobody other than
O’Carroll has sought to challenge a conviction on the basis of the obiter comments
in Oliver. The Court of Appeal continues to create a degree of confusion in this
area since in Carr88 the appellant was convicted of offences relating to the taking of
indecent images of children, including several thousand up-skirt images. The Court
of Appeal quashed the (concurrent) sentence imposed in respect of the up-skirt
pictures and imposed no separate penalty. It did not quash the conviction, which
could cause confusion since the court is accepting that it amounts to an offence89
but one that should not be punished because it is outside of the scale created in
Oliver.
It is suggested that the obiter comments in Oliver are correct and that an
image within COPINE levels one to three is indicative (and thus relevant to
psychological assessment of the offender’s behaviour) but not pornographic and
should, therefore, not be considered an indecent photograph of a child. Law
enforcement, quite correctly, dislikes the term ‘‘child pornography’’, preferring the
term ‘‘abusive images of children’’90 and this perhaps shows the true purpose of the
1978 legislation. That is not to say, of course, that this behaviour should not be the
subject of criminal sanction, it should. The preceding sections of this article have
demonstrated that the criminal law does, and should, tackle those who seek to take
up-skirt images, but is the behaviour any different when the victim is under or over
18? It is submitted that it is not, and that in both cases it is clearly the paraphilia
of scopophilia or voyeurism and that it should be tackled in this way. The courts
could easily differentiate between victims under a certain age through sentencing
and it is submitted that this would be more appropriate.
84 Contrary to Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 s.170(2)(b).
85 O’Carroll [2003] EWCA Crim 2338 at [2].
86 O’Carroll [2003] EWCA Crim 2338 at [17].
87 These were appeals against sentence and not against conviction.
88 [2003] EWCA Crim 2416.
89 Although it should be noted that the appeal was against sentence so there is some
question as to whether the court could, in any event, have quashed the conviction.
90 M. Taylor and E. Quayle, Child Pornography: An Internet Crime (2003), pp.2–7.
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Conclusion
Technology has allowed deviant behaviours to become more noticeable and
arguably intensifies the number of people involved in the activity. There has
been concern for many years that up-skirt pictures were being facilitated by
the technological revolution, most notably through the proliferation of camera-
equipped mobile telephones and cheap digital cameras.
England and Wales, as a common-law jurisdiction without a penal code, is
able to react to technological changes by relying on stretching the definitions of
common-law crimes, for example outraging public decency, to cope with emerging
behaviours. However, stretching the law in this way brings several problems, not
least the fact that it can cloud the certainty of law. Common law crimes rarely
capture specific behaviour in an appropriate manner and issues of punishment are
often unaddressed. The decision in Hamilton is welcome to the extent only that it
ensures that this behaviour is caught by the criminal law since it is submitted it is
not a petty nuisance.
However this analysis has demonstrated that the offence of outraging public
decency has limits and may not apply to all offenders who take up-skirt pictures.
It is submitted that the voyeurism offence contained within s.67 of the Sexual
Offences Act 2003 should be amended to take account of this behaviour. The New
Zealand model acts as a starting point for this amendment and demonstrates how
the law could seek to tackle those who deliberately take such images without the
consent of others. This law should also apply to those who seek to take up-skirt
images of children. Currently these are dealt with under the Protection of Children
Act 1978 but it must be doubted whether this is the most appropriate legal remedy
taking account of what is known about this deviant behaviour.
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Case and Comment
Editor: Professor David Ormerod, LL.B.
Commentaries by Professor David Ormerod, LL.B., Professor Andrew Ashworth,
Q.C., D.C.L., F.B.A., Andrew J. Roberts, LL.B., M.Phil., N. W. Taylor, LL.B,
M.Phil., B.J. Fitzpatrick, B.A., Neil Kibble, LL.B., LL.M.
Sentencing Cases and Commentaries by D. A. Thomas, Q.C., LL.D.
Code C of Codes of Practice to PACE
Whether requirement for written record to be made of comments made by defendant outside
context of interview where statements made during commission of public order offence
Causing harassment alarm or distress; Exclusionary discretion; PACE codes
of practice; Police interviews; Police records; Statements; Unfair evidence
DPP v Lawrence
Divisional Court: Auld L.J. and Collins J.: July 16, 2007; [2007] EWHC 2154
(Admin).
Police officers stopped a car containing the appellant and others. The officers,
on speaking to them, formed the opinion that they had grounds to search them for
drugs. The appellant allegedly then became aggressive and abusive and repeatedly
told the police officers to ‘‘fuck off’’. The officers allegedly warned him about his
behaviour, and told him that they would arrest him if he did not stop it. He did not
stop it, and they arrested him and took him to the police station. It was not clear
whether the appellant said anything when charged with an offence of disorderly
conduct contrary to s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986 other than that he denied the
charge. It was common ground that he was not interviewed before or after being
charged. In due course, as a result of informal advance prosecution disclosure, the
appellant was notified before trial of the police officers’ proposed evidence in the
form of copies of their witness statements, and had an opportunity at the hearing,
if he wished to take it, to contradict it. However, at the close of the prosecution
opening, the justices, having been informed that the appellant’s advocate intended
to apply under s.78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) to
exclude evidence from the officers as to what the appellant had said at the scene,
decided to determine that issue without first hearing any evidence from the police
officers or Lawrence. The issue for the justices turned on PACE Code C Pt 11,
which was headed ‘‘Code of practice for the detention, treatment and questioning
of persons’’, and more particularly, para.11.13. Part 11 of Code C, of which
para.11.13 formed a part, was directed at the stage at which a person detained by
the police was interviewed about the offence he was alleged to have committed, or
at the stage when there was or might have been an exchange between such a person
and a police officer about that alleged offence. He argued that there had been a
breach of the ‘‘verbal’’ provisions of Pt 11.13 with the consequence that for the
justices to admit evidence of what the appellant had allegedly said to the officers at
the scene would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that
the justices should, in the exercise of their power under s.78, exclude it. Secondly,
it was maintained that it was unfair of the police not to interview the appellant
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so as to give him an opportunity to deny, which he did, the language attributed
to him, or not to offer him any other opportunity to show him their notebooks
and invite him to adopt the same procedure. The justices were of the opinion
that the appellant’s words, part of his alleged conduct in committing the offence,
were caught by para.11.13 because, in the absence of an interview, he had had no
opportunity at an early stage before trial to comment on the words attributed to
him. They accordingly decided they should exclude the evidence as unfair under
s.78. The prosecution offered no evidence and the justices dismissed the charge.
The prosecution appealed by way of case stated. On appeal the prosecution argued
that Pt 11 of Code C applied to statements not themselves constituting an offence
or part of it, but made subsequently by a person suspected of it to a police officer
on or during arrest, after arrest, en route to a police station or whilst in detention
in police custody.
Held, allowing the appeal, there was no basis as a matter of interpretation for
extending para.11.13 of Code C beyond its confines of protecting a suspect against
fabrication by a police officer of self-incriminatory statements after the alleged
commission of the offence and not as part of it. The provisions of Code C Pt
11, were not directed at what a suspect was alleged to have said as part of his
conduct constituting the offence, but at what he was alleged to have said of a
self-incriminatory nature on or after arrest for it. Otherwise, all offences of a public
order nature in which words spoken were a necessary or possible constituent of the
offence, in whole or in part, would engage Pt 11 of Code C, quite independently
of and before any possibility of an interview, or ‘‘unsolicited comments outside an
interview’’ could arise. Those offences would include the public order offences to
be found in ss.1–5 of the 1986 Act, and those involving the stirring-up of racial
hatred in ss.17–22 of the Act. In the instant case, the respondent had had the
opportunity when charged to contradict what was alleged against him. He had seen
the witness statements of the officers in good time before the hearing, and would
have had an opportunity at trial to challenge their evidence if the justices had given
him an opportunity to do so. The case would be remitted to the justices.
[Reported by Dilys Tausz, Barrister]
Talbir Singh for the claimant.
R. de Mello and D. Bazini for the defendant.
Commentary. As Auld L.J. notes, the purpose of Pt 11 of Code C is to
militate against ‘‘verballing’’, the manufacture of self-incriminating statements and
their attribution to an accused. This purpose is to be realised by the keeping of
appropriate records of a suspect’s relevant actions and words. The significance of
proper record-keeping is illustrated by a variety of decisions, including Keenan [1990]
2 Q.B. 54, Canale [1990] Crim. L.R. 329, and Delaney (1988) 88 Cr. App. R. 338. In
Keenan, Hodgson J. (at 69–70) suggested that where an appropriately serious breach
of the Codes in relation to verballing took place, it would often be appropriate to
exclude the evidence in question. He noted (at 70):
‘‘If the rest of the evidence is strong, then it may make no difference to the
eventual result if [the judge] excludes the evidence. In cases where the rest of the
evidence is weak or non-existent, that is just the situation where the temptation
to do what the provisions are aimed to prevent is greatest, and the protection of
the rules is most needed.’’
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However, the present case makes clear that the protections against verballing are
to apply principally to the stage at which a suspect is interviewed (an interview itself
is defined in Code C para.11.1A as ‘‘the questioning of a person regarding their
involvement or suspected involvement in a criminal offence or offences . . .’’) and also
to other exchanges between the suspect and the police about that alleged offence
which may not take place in the formal parameters of an interview (Code C para.11.13
refers to ‘‘. . . unsolicited comments, which are outside the context of an interview
but which might be relevant to the offence’’). Where the contentious utterances of the
suspect form part of the offence, as in the present case, Pt 11 of Code C does not
apply.
If the decision were different, the result would be that in the context of any offence
which one might loosely refer to as a ‘‘speech crime’’—more specifically, where
particular words constituted an element of the offence charged—suspects would
be entitled to the various protections offered by Pt 11 of Code C, including the
opportunity to scrutinise the police’s written account of what was said, and to record
their own agreement or disagreement as appropriate. Auld L.J. also notes that if
words constituting an offence would give rise to these entitlements for a suspect,
then acts constituting an offence ought to give rise to similar entitlements. Neither of
these outcomes can have been the legislative intention. There are various offences of
which words may constitute an element. Auld L.J. mentions the offences in ss.1–5 of
the Public Order Act 1986; the offences involving stirring up racial hatred in ss.17–22
of the 1986 Act; and sedition. There are many others, for example making threats
to kill under s.16 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, or indeed assault
or any offence constructed on the commission of an assault, presumably including
manslaughter (see the rejection by the House of Lords in Ireland [1998] A.C. 147
of the suggestion in Meade and Belt (1823) 1 Lew. 184 that words alone could not
constitute an assault).
An aspect of the defendant’s case was that he had not had the opportunity to
contradict the allegations against him in the manner that would have obtained if he had
been presented with the record of an interview or analogous exchange in accordance
with Pt 11 of Code C. However, as Code C did not apply, there was no entitlement of
this nature. Moreover, the court notes the defendant’s opportunity to respond to the
allegations at the point of charge, and that he had access to the statements of the
police officers in a timely manner and could have sought to rebut the prosecution’s
evidence at trial. This might indeed have necessitated him giving testimony on his
own behalf. However, there would be no problem such as that in Keenan [1990] 2
Q.B. 54, in which K’s giving evidence could not cure the defect of an earlier breach
of Code C caused by improper record-keeping. The improper record-keeping in such
circumstances would have led to K, in essence, being required to forego his right to
silence in order to conduct a meaningful defence. In the present case there was simply
no defect, because there was no requirement to make a record in the first place.
The court concludes with a sensible observation relating to situations where there
is a s.78 challenge to evidence of statements of an accused, and magistrates have
heard the evidence and pursued the issue of its unfairness to the point of choosing
to exclude it. Such a bench should, the court suggests, seek the views of the parties
and consider whether any consequential substantive hearing ought to be taken by a
differently constituted bench.
[B.F.]
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Firearms
Possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life—whether conditional intent to use in
lawful self-defence was a defence—where person in possession not in immediate danger of
attack—where possessed with intent to pursue some lawful purpose other than self-defence,
but conditional intent to use in self-defence
Intention; Possession of firearms with intent; Self-defence
R. v Salih (Guner)
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Hooper L.J., Pitchford and Dobbs JJ.:
November 21, 2007; [2007] EWCA Crim 2750.
S was convicted of possession of a pistol and ammunition with intent to endanger
life, contrary to the Firearms Act 1968 s.16. The gun was found in his pocket
at a police station. The Crown case was that he was involved in dealing in guns
and carried the pistol for protection. The defence case was that he had effectively
inherited the weapon when he took over the running of a shop from a relative and
that his only intent was to hand it in under a gun amnesty.
On appeal, it was argued that the judge should have directed the jury that they
should acquit if they concluded that the only reason why S had been in possession
of the pistol may have been that he intended to use it if necessary for lawful
self-defence, on the basis of Georgiades (1989) 89 Cr. App. R. 206. In support
of this submission, counsel argued that, given that it was said in Bentham (1972)
56 Cr. App. R. 618 that it was not necessary to show an intention immediately
to endanger life; and that the section did not require an unconditional intention,
then if the primary submission was not correct, a person lawfully in possession of
a shotgun who accepted that he might use it should armed raiders attack his house
would be guilty of the offence.
Held, dismissing the appeal, (1) Georgiades made it plain that it would only be
in rare cases that self-defence would provide a defence to a charge under s.16.
In Stubbs and Thomas [2007] EWCA Crim 1714 (a refused renewed application
for leave to appeal) the court stated that the trial judge had been right to hold
that the defence was available only if the risk of serious harm was imminent. The
effectiveness of legislation designed to prevent the carrying of firearms (or offensive
weapons) would be seriously impaired if anyone who reasonably feared that he or
she might at some time be unlawfully attacked was allowed to carry a weapon.
If at the moment at which the defendant was alleged to be in possession of a
firearm, he or she anticipated an imminent attack and was carrying the weapon
for defence against a specific danger, that may be different. Georgiades established
that if a defendant was acting in self-defence at the moment when he was alleged
to be in possession of a firearm, then he would not be guilty. But if the possession
with intent to endanger life was alleged to have occurred at some time before that
moment and at a time when he or she was not in immediate fear of attack, then, in
accordance with Stubbs and Thomas, Georgiades did not apply.
(2) The answer to counsel’s argument based on conditional intent was provided
by Malnik v DPP [1989] Crim. L.R. 451 (a case not cited in argument). In that
(offensive weapon) case, Bingham L.J., as he then was, drew a distinction between
individuals who armed themselves with an offensive weapon and those concerned
with security and law enforcement. By analogy, the public policy reasons which
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prohibited a person from possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life (or an
offensive weapon) even though he or she might only use the firearm in lawful
self-defence did not apply to a person in lawful possession of a firearm whose intent
was to use the firearm for purposes other than to endanger life, albeit he or she
might have the conditional intention adverted to in Bentham.
Cases considered: Georgiades (1989) 89 Cr. App. R. 206; Bentham (1972) 56 Cr.
App. R. 618; Stubbs and Thomas [2007] EWCA Crim 1714; Malnik v DPP [1989]
Crim. L.R. 451.
[Reported by Richard Percival, Barrister]
Christopher Blaxland, Q.C. for the Crown.
Mark Gadsden for the appellant.
Commentary. The court takes what is, it is submitted, on policy grounds an
entirely predictable interpretation of the section. Section 16 provides:
‘‘It is an offence for a person to have in his possession any firearm or ammunition
with intent by means thereof to endanger life . . . or to enable another person by
means thereof to endanger life . . . whether any injury . . . has been caused or
not.’’
The mischief at which the section is aimed, as Archbold, para.1738 puts it:
‘‘[I]s that of a person possessing a firearm ready for use, if and when occasion
arises, in a manner which endangers life. The prosecution are not required to
prove an immediate or unconditional intention to endanger life.’’
The court is right, it is submitted, to reject the appellant’s argument that the jury
need to be directed that they should not convict if the only reason why the defendant
is in possession of the pistol may be for self-defence. First, that places too much
emphasis on the potential unlawful use of the weapon. The primary purpose of s.16
is not to protect against causing unlawful injury or life endangerment; it is an offence
designed to protect against the harm posed by people carrying guns, being prepared
to use them. If a defence of possession for self-defence were to be allowed it is
highly likely that it would be pleaded in many if not most trials. The purpose of the
section would be entirely frustrated because more people would be carrying guns
to protect themselves in self-defence, so they would say, against all these people
who were now carrying guns, who would also claim to be carrying the weapons only
to protect themselves, being aware that there were more people who were carrying
guns, etc.
What Georgiades recognises is a very limited exception to the offence. If the
defendant is already under attack or is facing an imminent attack, he is allowed
to defend himself, and that must include being allowed to arm himself to do
so. If necessary, that would include a firearm. He would then be not guilty
of unlawful possession of the firearm. However, the trigger (no pun intended)
for the justified non-criminal possession is the fact that he is there and then
engaged in defending himself or others or preparing to meet an imminent attack.
The plea of self-defence which the defendant would be raising would justify his
act of possession, as well as any reasonable force he uses, but until the
circumstances warrant acts of self-defence (i.e. actual or imminent attack), the
defendant cannot rely on the prospect of possible future attacks. The Court of Appeal
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has reiterated on numerous occasions how rarely the exceptional Georgiades defence
will apply.
[D.C.O.]
Infanticide
Whether mens rea of infanticide consists of an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily
harm—Infanticide Act 1938 s.1(1)
Infanticide; Intention; Mens rea
R. v Gore
Court of Appeal: Hallett L.J., Silber and Wilkie JJ.: July 4, 2007; [2007] EWCA
Crim 2789.
The appellant pleaded guilty to an offence of infanticide contrary to s.1(1) of
the Infanticide Act 1938. The body of the deceased child had been found in sand
dunes near to the appellant’s home some hours after she had given birth without
assistance. Expert evidence was to the effect that the child had died from neonatal
anoxia, which may have arisen due to lack of attention following delivery. On that
basis, the particulars of the indictment had alleged that the appellant had caused
the death by wilfully omitting to attend to the child or to seek medical attention
following birth. Whilst the appellant had been advised that there was a potential
defence available to her based on her mental state, she expressed her wish to plead
guilty and was fully aware of the implications of her ultimate and informed decision
to do so.
The Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the case to the Court of
Appeal on the basis that it was satisfied (inter alia) that the appellant’s defence had
been prejudiced by the drafting of the indictment, which had made no reference
to any intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm; and that this had had a
consequential impact on the advice which the appellant had received. Central to the
reference was a submission that s.1 of the 1938 Act should be narrowly construed,
so that a woman might only be guilty of infanticide if all the ingredients of murder
were proved, particularly an intention to kill or cause really serious bodily harm.
Held, dismissing the appeal, that given the appellant’s repeated and expressed
desire and intention to plead guilty to the offence, whatever advice she received,
inclusion of the words ‘‘with the intention of killing or causing grievous bodily
harm to the child’’ (if such was required as a matter of law) in the indictment would
have made no difference to her. However narrowly or broadly defined the mens rea
of the offence of infanticide should be, she had rejected the possibility of a defence
on the grounds of her mental state; and there being no reason to suppose that she
would have taken any other course had the indictment been drafted differently, she
could not have been prejudiced by any alleged defect.
Obiter dictum: There was no requirement that all the ingredients of an offence
of murder be proved before a defendant could be convicted of infanticide contrary
to s.1(1) of the 1938 Act. Parliament had intended to create a new offence
of infanticide which covered situations much wider than offences that would
otherwise amount to murder. The mens rea of the offence was contained expressly
in the first few words of s.1(1), namely a requirement of proof that the act or
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omission was wilful. There was no reference to any intention to kill or cause serious
bodily harm; and if there was such a requirement, then use of the word ‘‘wilful’’
would be superfluous. Further, the section created an offence in subs.(1) and it also
provided a partial defence and possible alternative verdict to murder in subs.(2).
If s.1(1) had been intended to be used only where the mental element for murder
was proved, then s.1(2) would be superfluous since the offence created by s.1(1)
could always have been left open to the jury as an alternative charge to murder.
Furthermore, the consequence of the wider interpretation of s.1 was that infanticide
covered a wider range of cases. A distressed young mother in a similar position to
the appellant in the present case was not forced to confront the stark truth that,
for whatever reason, however disturbed she may have been at the time, she killed
her child intending to kill or cause really serious harm. Nor would such a young
woman, if she did not accept that she had such an intention, have to face a murder
trial. No useful purpose would therefore be served by restricting the ambit of the
offence.
[Reported by Stephen Leake, Barrister]
Alistair Webster, Q.C. and Paul Turner for the appellant.
Paul Reid, Q.C. for the respondent.
Commentary. The scope of infanticide has been the subject of much debate in
recent decades, with claims that its medical basis is ill-founded, or that it unfairly
medicalises some women, or that the restriction to killing children under 12 months
should be loosened, or that it that it should be merged with diminished responsibility,
and so forth. But there has been hardly any discussion of the principal point raised by
this reference: whether the offence of infanticide only applies where the mens rea of
murder was present.
Historical research suggests that when the two Infanticide Acts were passed, in
1922 and 1938, Parliament’s concern was solely to ensure that offences of child-killing
by women that would otherwise be murder could now be treated as infanticide, either
by returning this verdict on an indictment for murder or by charging it in the first
place. The history indicates that the preoccupation of reformers was to avoid the long-
standing dilemma for juries and judges in these cases, of having to choose between
a murder verdict and a verdict that would be a distortion of the law: see the classic
article by D. Seaborne-Davies, ‘‘Child-killing in English Law’’ (1937) 1 M.L.R. 203 at
276. Glanville Williams, who took a special interest in this corner of the criminal law,
discussed infanticide solely in the context of murder: Textbook of Criminal Law, 1st
edn (1978), pp.631–632. There appears to have been no discussion of the position
of a woman whose killing of the child would only have been manslaughter (by unlawful
act).
However, Hallett L.J. demonstrates (at [34]) that it is possible to interpret s.1(1) of
the 1938 Act as extending to such cases. First, the prosecution need only prove that
the woman caused the death ‘‘by any wilful act or omission’’: this does not require
an intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm, but simply an intentional act (or
omission) of some kind. Secondly, although s.1(1) goes on to state that the woman
is guilty of infanticide ‘‘notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but
for this Act the offence would have amounted to murder’’, the proper reading of the
word ‘‘notwithstanding’’ is that there can be a conviction for infanticide even if the
offence otherwise amounted to murder, and not only in circumstances in which the
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offence would otherwise amount to murder. Thirdly, if s.1(1) were to be interpreted
as meaning that the offence of infanticide could only be committed where the crime
would otherwise have been murder, there would be no need for s.1(2), which provides
that a jury may return a verdict of infanticide where the offence would otherwise have
been murder.
Logical as these points appear to be, there seems to be an element of strain in the
court’s reasoning. The possibility of reducing manslaughter to infanticide has not been
canvassed in the leading textbooks, and it might be thought rather late, some 70 years
after the 1938 Act, to give it this expansive meaning. Reporting on his research into
infanticide and other child-killing cases in the early 1980s, Professor Mackay noted:
‘‘In the fifth case D asphyxiated her seven-week-old child by stuffing tissue paper
into its throat. A psychiatric report stated that D suffered from a manic illness
that would fall within both infanticide and diminished responsibility. However,
the D.P.P. decided not to charge infanticide as he considered this to be
available only in cases where the alleged actions, in the absence of any mental
disturbance caused by birth, would amount to murder. In his opinion the lack of
evidence of any evidence of intent precluded an infanticide charge so D pleaded
guilty to manslaughter and received three years’ probation.’’ R.D. Mackay, ‘‘The
Consequences of Killing Very Young Children’’ [1993] Crim. L.R. 21 at 28.
Perhaps the DPP was wrong, in the early 1980s, but this seems to have been the
prevailing view in the profession for many years. It should be added (a) that Hallett
L.J. appears to misunderstand the thrust of Professor Mackay’s research at para.23
(only his case D is relevant); and (b) that Professor Mackay’s more recent research for
the Law Commission reveals no cases of manslaughter being reduced to infanticide:
Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, Law Com. No.304 (2006), Appendix D.
The Court of Appeal’s reinterpretation is, however, a benevolent one. It is desirable
that infanticide (assuming its continued existence) should be capable of being charged
both in cases where the offence might otherwise have amounted to murder and
in cases where the offence would only have been manslaughter. A proposal to
change the law in this direction has been made in recent years but, again, only by
a kind of side-wind. The Criminal Law Revision Committee was, following a public
consultation, exercised by the problem of a woman who merely attempted to kill
her young child soon after the birth and who might therefore find herself charged
with attempted murder. Their solution was to recommend attempted infanticide ‘‘as
an alternative verdict to attempted murder or attempted manslaughter’’ (CLRC, 14th
Report, Offences against the Person (1980), para.113). This appears to be the first
mention of reducing a manslaughter offence to infanticide, and it then found its
way into the Committee’s recommendations more generally: ‘‘the act or omission
is such as would otherwise amount to murder or manslaughter’’ (para.19(b)). This
recommendation was incorporated into the draft criminal code of 1989, cl.64(1) of
which begins:
‘‘A woman who, but for this section, would be guilty of murder or manslaughter
of her child is not guilty of murder or manslaughter, but is guilty of infanticide, if
her act ...’’
This was not a major issue in the latest homicide reform proposals from the Law
Commission, but it was discussed. In Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, Law Com.
No.304 (2006), the Commission recommends ‘‘that the offence/defence of infanticide
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should apply to both first degree murder and second degree murder’’ (para.8.42).
This is proposed on the ground that otherwise there would be an ‘‘unjust anomaly’’ if
a woman whose offence was second degree murder were convicted of that offence,
whereas a mother whose offence was otherwise first degree murder had her offence
reduced to infanticide. But does not the same argument apply to manslaughter, as
the CLRC evidently thought (but did not fully spell out)? Why should the mother whose
offence would otherwise be unlawful act manslaughter not have the benefit of the
infanticide offence? This matter might fruitfully be addressed in the Ministry of Justice’s
consultation on homicide law reform. In the meantime, the Court of Appeal appears to
have moved the law in this direction by judicial interpretation.
[A.J.A.]
Privilege
Evidence—privilege—incrimination—defendant pleading guilty to offence of terrorism—
plea entered on basis of prosecution opening note—defendant giving evidence on behalf of
co-accused—defendant refusing to answer questions relating to offence to which he had
pleaded guilty—judge finding defendant in contempt of court—invocation of protection of
privilege—whether protection available where compulsion to answer questions creating no
material increase to risk of incrimination
Co-defendants; Criminal proceedings; Foreign proceedings; Guilty pleas;
Privilege against self-incrimination; Witnesses
R. v Khan
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Moses L.J., Pitchers and Treacy JJ.:
October 16, 2007; [2007] EWCA Crim 2331.
The defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to enter into or become involved
in an arrangement as a result of which money or other property would be made
available for the purposes of terrorism. The prosecution case was that he had been
in influential member of an organisation which was involved in terrorist activities
aimed at securing an Islamic state in Kashmir. The count to which he had pleaded
guilty concerned his activities on behalf of the organisation in the United Kingdom,
Canada and the United States of America. He faced parallel proceedings in the
United States, where he had been indicted on similar, but not identical, charges.
His plea of guilty had been entered on the basis that he accepted all the allegations
made against him in the prosecution case as set out in the opening note and position
statement, and took no issue with the prosecution on any issue of fact relevant to
sentencing. His co-accused, S, pleaded not guilty and was tried before a jury. The
defendant gave evidence for S. The thrust of the evidence he gave on behalf of S
was that he alone had been responsible for the actions which the prosecution had
sought to impute both to him and S jointly. However, during his evidence-in-chief,
he claimed privilege in response to certain questions. The judge accepted the claim
in relation to those questions, provided that it was relied upon to avoid having
to make further admissions of criminality. The prosecution stated that it would
dispute any claim to privilege. The judge responded:
‘‘. . . [I]f any of the matters covered by the indictment to which he has pleaded
guilty forms the subject matter of questions that he refuses to answer questions
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about, you will have the clearest direction from me that that will constitute a
contempt of court.’’
The judge reiterated his original warning during cross-examination and drew a
distinction between those matters which the defendant had already admitted by
virtue of his guilty plea and the basis of that plea contained in the position
statement, and those matters which fell outside the scope of his plea of guilty and
that position statement. Notwithstanding those warnings, the defendant refused to
answer questions about matters which were plainly the subject-matter of his plea
of guilty when understood in the context of the position statement. The judge
found the defendant to be in contempt of court. He ruled that the defendant
had already incriminated himself as to the issues raised in cross-examination by
his own guilty plea and he was therefore not entitled to rely on the protection
against self-incrimination. He noted that he had no doubt that the defendant had
chosen to answer some questions which were undoubtedly covered by the possible
proceedings in the United States, whilst refusing to answer questions on others for
wholly opportunistic and cynical reasons. The defendant appealed.
The issue arose as to the extent to which the defendant could rely on privilege in
refusing to answer questions during the course of evidence he gave on behalf of a
co-defendant.
Held, dismissing the appeal, the privilege was designed to provide protection for
a person from being compelled by the state to convict himself out of his ownmouth.
The protection was afforded to one who had a reasonable ground for apprehending
a real and appreciable danger of incrimination. It followed that protection could not
be invoked where the compulsion to answer questions created no material increase
to an existing risk of incrimination. If the compulsion to answer questions did not
increase the risk of incrimination or strengthen the case against a defendant, there
was no basis for affording that defendant protection against the questioning. The
privilege was designed to provide protection in relation to questions which might
incriminate. If the danger of incrimination had already arisen and was independent
of any questions which a person was required to answer, it was not possible to see
why that person should be entitled to any protection at all. If his position was made
no worse by answering a question, then there could be no basis for him to invoke
the privilege.
In the instant case, it was impossible to see how, had the defendant answered
the questions asked of him, his position would have been worse than it already
was in relation to potential criminal proceedings in the United States. He had not
only admitted his guilt on the relevant count but had also admitted all those facts
set out against him in the prosecution opening note. In those circumstances, to
answer questions about whether his plea of guilty was truthful or not or about the
subject-matter of the opening note made no difference whatever to the position
he had himself voluntarily created. Any future case would flow entirely from his
confession and the terms in which it was made. It would be absurd if the defendant
could resist any attempt to test his evidence in favour of S by seeking protection
against a danger which he had already created before he was asked any questions
at all, either on behalf of S or by the prosecution. It would have been quite wrong
to permit the defendant to manipulate the court process by claiming protection
against a danger which he had already created for himself. When he had been
required to answer questions about those matters which he had already admitted,
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he was not being placed under any compulsion to incriminate himself—he had
done that already.
Per curiam: It is dangerous to assess the strength of the claim to privilege on
the basis of the motive of the person seeking to invoke it. There will be many
cases where it will be ‘‘convenient’’ for a defendant to rely upon the privilege.
Often his motives will be mixed. But even if the motives are mixed that is no basis
for refusing the protection against self-incrimination. The court should not refuse
protection merely because it suspects the good faith of the person seeking to deploy
the privilege. After all, the principle applies to one who wishes to avoid conviction
as much as to the innocent who wishes to avoid the inconvenience of a prosecution.
Khan v Khan [1982] 1 W.L.R. 513; R. (on the application of the Crown Prosecution
Service) v Bolton Magistrates’ Court [2003] EWHC 2697 (Admin); [2004] 1W.L.R.
835 applied. Den Norske Bank ASA v Antonatos [1999] Q.B. 271 distinguished.
[Reported by Vanessa Higgins, Barrister]
Lawrence McNulty for the defendant.
Andrew Edis, Q.C. and Annabel Darlow for the Crown.
Commentary. The court’s judgment, on a relatively straightforward matter, is
surprisingly muddled. Although the concepts of legal professional privilege and
privilege against self-incrimination are distinguishable (see Phipson on Evidence,
16th edn (2005), para.23-15), they are used interchangeably throughout. What was, in
fact, at issue was the appellant’s privilege against self-incrimination; the immunity that
he was claiming did not relate to any communication with a legal adviser. The appellant
had entered a guilty plea and the issue of his privilege against self-incrimination arose
in the context of his evidence as a witness for his co-defendant. Although a witness
may be compelled to answer questions put to him in cross-examination, this is subject
to the privilege against self-incrimination. The classic statement on the extent of the
privilege (to which the court made no reference) is provided in Boyes (1861) 1 B. & S.
311. There it was said that the privilege exists where there is a ‘‘reasonable ground
to apprehend danger to the witness from his being called to answer’’. In other words,
the appellant could only claim privilege in relation to any risk that answering questions
might reasonably have left him open to further charges or punishment.
The judgment contains little by way of illustration of the matters on which the
appellant was cross-examined. However, the law is clear and if the trial judge properly
concluded that the matters on which he was questioned fell within the scope of his
position statement, the appellant could not claim the privilege. However, against the
backdrop of a relatively brief position statement relating to a guilty plea, whether
or not the matters on which the appellant is questioned go beyond the confines of
that statement may generally involve fine judgments. In circumstances such as those
found in the present case, it may, as a matter of good practice, be preferable to deal
with sentencing before a defendant is permitted to proffer testimony for or against
a co-accused. Where a defendant gives evidence against a co-accused the fact that
there is no possibility of a reduced sentence may help to ensure that the evidence he
gives is reliable. On the other hand, where he gives evidence for a co-accused, until
sentence is determined, the defendant might have a legitimate claim to privilege on
the basis that information that he provides under cross-examination might adversely
affect the sentence that is handed down. To this extent, requiring him to answer
questions put to him in cross-examination might expose him to the risk of a degree of
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punishment which he would not otherwise have faced had he been able to rely on the
privilege.
[A.J.R.]
Rape
Fresh evidence—evidence of complainant making numerous false complaints—effect on
credibility—whether conviction unsafe
Admissibility; Credibility; Cross-examination; False statements; Fresh
evidence; Rape; Victims
R. v C
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Sir Igor Judge P., Pitchford J. and Sir
Richard Curtis: October 16, 2007; [2007] EWCA Crim 2551.
The complainants, K and L, were sisters. They made allegations against the
defendant of rape and indecent assault. At the defendant’s trial, K was cross-
examined about a number of false allegations, including allegations of sexual
offences, which she had made against other people. The allegations made by
L were very similar. In cross-examination, L confirmed that she had wanted to
stay with her sister and that she had been aware that K wanted to leave their
father’s house. She denied that K had told her what she should say when she
was interviewed or that she and K had made up the allegations so that they
could leave home together. The essence of the defendant’s defence was that
the evidence given against him represented a complete fabrication. In 2000, the
defendant was convicted of two counts of rape and indecent assault in respect of
both complainants. In 2002, the Criminal Cases Review Commission was invited
to consider the safety of the convictions on the basis that K had made a false
allegation of rape against her brother in 2001. At that stage, there was no evidence
to suggest that the allegation was false. Accordingly, the Commission decided that
there was no basis upon which to refer the case to the Court of Appeal. However,
in 2006, the defendant again invited the Commission to conduct a review of
his conviction on the basis that K had been cautioned for wasting police time
following allegations of sexual abuse that she had made against her stepfather. An
investigation undertaken by the Commission demonstrated that K had a proved
tendency to make false allegations that she was a victim of sexual crime. Such
allegations included reports that she had been raped by her brother, a customer at
her place of work, a boyfriend and her stepfather. The Commission referred the
defendant’s case to the Court of Appeal, pursuant to s.9 of the Criminal Appeal
Act 1995. Even after the defendant’s convictions were referred, K made a false
allegation of rape against a former boyfriend.
Held, allowing the appeal, a moment’s glance at the facts would demonstrate
that the new material would severely undermine any confidence that any jury could
have had in K’s evidence; the credibility of K was damaged beyond repair. The
defendant’s conviction for rape and indecent assault on K were flawed. They had
to be quashed. Moreover, the fresh evidence would have had a direct impact not
only on the jury’s judgment of the allegation made by K, but also those made
by L, simply because of their close relationship and the desire she had expressed
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to stay with K ahead of any consideration. There was also a telling similarity in
the accounts which they had given. In the circumstances of the present case, the
convictions relating to L could not safely be upheld and so too would be quashed.
Per curiam: Rape is a repulsive crime. It requires substantial punishment. No one
doubts that the victims of rape should be treated with every possible consideration
by the criminal justice system. On the other hand, just because rape is a repulsive
crime, a false allegation can have dreadful consequences, obviously and immediately
for an innocent man who has not perpetrated the crime; but also, and this is not
to be overlooked, because every occasion of a proved false allegation has an
insidious effect on public confidence in the truth of genuine complaints, sometimes
allowing doubt to creep in where none should, in truth, exist. There cannot be
very many cases, although the present case may be one of them, where the offence
of attempting to pervert the course of justice, on the basis of a false allegation of
rape, certainly one which is set out in detailed formal statement or pursued to the
door of the court, should not be prosecuted for what it is. It is only in the rarest
of cases that a police caution sufficiently addresses either the criminality of a false
allegation of serious crime or (and this is no less important) the possibility of the
need for appropriate treatment which will address the problems which have led the
complainant to fabricate the allegation she has made.
[Reported by Vanessa Higgins, Barrister]
Jonathan Cooper for the defendant.
Warwick Tatford for the Crown.
Commentary. The case is a stark and troubling reminder of the potentially appalling
impact of false allegations of serious sexual offences. A series of detailed allegations
that convinced police officers were shown by the CCRC to have been fabricated,
leading to C’s convictions being quashed.
There can be no doubting the importance of evidence of prior false allegations,
particularly, as Sir Igor Judge P. observed, where the allegation has been made
formally and in detail or has been pursued to the door of the court. As C. Fishman,
Jones on Evidence: Civil and Criminal, 7th edn (1992), p.803 has noted:
‘‘A false rape accusation reveals a flaw in character of a particular, and particularly
dangerous, kind. Its relevance, in a case where the key question is whether the
complainant is lying about rape this time, is palpable.’’
Evidence of prior false allegations is especially important where the case effectively
rests on the credibility of the complainant and defendant. As Epstein argues:
‘‘A witness’s willingness to falsely accuse someone, thereby engaging the legal
system, is confirmatory of a disregard for that system’s requirement of truthful
testimony and a willingness to abuse that same system.’’ J. Epstein, ‘‘True Lies:
The Constitutional and Evidentiary Bases for Admitting Prior False Accusation
Evidence in Sexual Assault Prosecutions’’ (2006) 24 Quinnipiac Law Review 609
at 656.
The principles underlying the admissibility of evidence of prior false allegations under
the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 are clear, having been laid down
in T and H [2001] EWCA Crim 1877; [2002] 1 W.L.R. 632. The defendant sought
leave to cross-examine the victim in order to establish that the victim had made
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false statements in the past about both sexual and non-sexual matters. The trial
judge wrongly concluded that the questions were questions about the victim’s sexual
behaviour within s.42(1)(c), and inadmissible under s.41(4). On appeal, Keene L.J.
cautioned that where necessary courts would need to adopt a restrictive interpretation
of s.41(4) if it would otherwise lead to the exclusion of relevant and significant evidence.
The Court of Appeal emphasised that even if s.41(4) applied, it was necessary to
decide whether the questions were about any sexual behaviour of the complainant. It
was observed that:
‘‘. . . [N]ormally questions or evidence about false statements in the past by a
complainant about sexual assaults . . .are not ones ‘about’ any sexual behaviour
of the complainant. They relate not to her sexual behaviour but to her statements
in the past . . . the questions sought to be asked in both the present cases were
not automatically excluded by s.41, even if they are seen as going principally to
credibility.’’ ([2001] EWCA Crim 1877 at [33] and [34])
Establishing the earlier allegations were false. Acknowledging the potential dan-
gers, the court in T indicated that it was open to a judge to guard against abuse of the
system, laying down a principle that has since been followed in this area. The defence
need to seek a ruling from the judge that s.41 does not exclude the questions about
false allegations. The defence must also have a proper evidential basis for asserting
that any such previous statement was (a) made and (b) untrue. What constitutes a
proper evidential basis is a difficult issue, and several judges have expressed real
concerns about the danger of disputes on collateral matters. For example, in E (Den-
nis Andrew) [2004] EWCA Crim 1313; [2005] Crim L.R. 227, E was denied leave to
cross-examine victims, aged six and four, about allegations they had made 15 months
after the trial. Victim 1 had alleged abuse against a number of people, including her
mother, an aunt and uncle, and another aunt and her son as well as physical abuse
by an aunt and two others. Victim 2 alleged physical abuse on the part of some of
the people mentioned by Victim 1 and by others. E’s argument was that it was wholly
implausible that the children would have been abused by so many people and that the
allegations were therefore almost certainly a fabrication or a fantasy. The Court of
Appeal concluded that the evidential foundation had not been laid because none of the
later allegations had been investigated. Compare Garaxo [2005] EWCA Crim 1170;
[2005] Crim. L.R. 883 (refusal to assist police and reference by victim to getting a
crime reference number for the ‘‘Social’’ capable of implying an improper motive for
making the earlier allegation). Some commentators have argued that this decision
is unduly permissive. In her comment on the case [2005] Crim. L.R. 883 at 884,
Louise Ellison questioned the decision, doubting whether an inference of falsehood
can safely be drawn from the mere fact of complainant withdrawal. It is probably the
case that Garaxo marks the high point of admissibility. However, it can be argued that
there was more in the case than a mere unwillingness to proceed. The requirement
to provide an evidential foundation does not necessitate that all alternative inferences
be eliminated, so that the only inference possible is that the allegation is false, merely
that falsity is a reasonable inference to draw. In V [2006] EWCA Crim 1901, which
involved the admissibility of three allegations of a sexual and non-sexual nature, the
Court of Appeal regarded Garaxo as decided on its particular facts, and that ‘‘a failure
to cooperate [with the police] may or may not justify a conclusion that an allegation is
false, depending on the circumstances’’.
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In their Home Office Online Report 20/2006, Section 41: An Evaluation of
New Legislation Limiting Sexual History Evidence in Rape Trials, Temkin and
Kelly recommend that only ‘‘demonstrably false accusations’’ should be admissible.
According to the Report, attempts to introduce evidence of previous false allegations
constituted one of the most common ways in which sexual history evidence was
admitted. The Report stated that defence barristers sought to introduce such evidence
to undermine the complainant’s credibility and that insufficient attention appeared to
be paid to whether the previous allegations were demonstrably false. The Report also
noted that it was very easy to allege that the complainant had made false or unproven
complaints of rape in the past, and that there was some evidence that barristers and
police officers were keen to find out whether previous complaints had been made to
the police or others and to raise this matter in court. Within the profession there is
some recognition that admissibility of false allegations may sometimes be sought too
readily. In Sexual Offences: Law and Practice (2004) Rook and Ward acknowledge
that:
‘‘. . . [I]t is commonplace for the defence to suggest that a complaint is false if
the matter has not proceeded to trial, even though there may have been many
reasons why the case has been dropped, and the falsity of the complaint has not
been established. In such circumstances, the jury may unfairly draw an adverse
inference against the complainant.’’
However, in noting that the falsity of the complaint ‘‘has not been established’’ they
overstate the requirement.
Lessons from America. Ellison suggested in commenting on Garaxo that US courts
impose a more stringent requirement: that there should be a strong factual foundation
for concluding that the prior complaint is false. In fact, the US position is unclear:
‘‘Notwithstanding the uniformity with which the cases require a preliminary
determination of falsity, courts have varied widely with respect to the standard
of proof required.’’ State of Ohio v Boggs (1992) 588 N.E.2d 813.
For example, in State of Wisconsin v DeSantis (1990) 456 N.W. 2d 600, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin held that the defendant should produce evidence at the pre-trial
hearing sufficient to support a reasonable person’s finding that the complainant made
prior untruthful allegations. The court concluded that the ‘‘reasonableness standard
strikes the appropriate balance’’ between the competing policies and interests of the
defendant and sexual complainants and is consistent with legislative intent.
Criminal Cases Review Commission. The present case underlines the importance
of the work done by the Commission. It is not the first such case. See also Warren
[2005] EWCA Crim 659 where the investigative work of the CCRC revealed significant
evidence in relation to two false allegations in particular that had not been available
to the defence at the time of the trial as a result of non-disclosure by the Crown.
While the police incident report no-criming one of the earlier incidents in which the
victim’s complaint was demonstrably false was disclosed to the defence, there was
no disclosure of the complainant’s admission that she had fabricated the allegation.
Consequently the defence made no application under s.41 in relation to the incident.
The Court of Appeal concluded that had the evidence of the allegations been before
the jury they might well have arrived at a different verdict and quashed the conviction.
Of course, not all evidence of prior false allegations is as unequivocal or as reliable
as was the evidence in the present case and in Warren. Compare Stephenson [2006]
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EWCA Crim 2325, where the defendant’s argument was that he was not permitted to
develop through cross-examination the contention that as a result of her miserable
and exploited upbringing the complainant was inclined to make accusations of sexual
abuse against all adult males with whom she came into contact. In the words of the
defence case statement:
‘‘Since that time [her childhood] the complainant has accused every adult male,
with whom she had any significant contact, with sexually abusing her.’’
The Court of Appeal stressed that if there was a proper basis for suggesting that
that is what had happened, the law allowed it to be explored before the jury. On the
facts, however, the Court of Appeal observed that both of the allegations in respect of
which applications had been made were ultimately accepted as true by the defence.
Furthermore, the two ‘‘allegations’’ in respect of which applications had not been
made, failed even to amount to allegations, let alone false allegations.
Satellite issues. Judges are understandably reluctant to open up disputed satellite
issues that may distract the jury’s attention from the central issue in the case, but it
is important to recall Henry J.’s agreement, in Funderburk (1990) 90 Cr. App. R. 466,
with the editors of Cross on Evidence that:
‘‘. . . [W]here the disputed issue is a sexual one between two persons in private
the difference between questions going to credit and questions going to the
issue is reduced to vanishing point.’’
The recommendation that only demonstrably false allegations be admissible should
be rejected on the grounds that it would impose an unfair burden on the defence and
exclude potentially crucial evidence. However, the present case would also suggest
that fuller investigation of allegedly false allegations prior to trial might reduce the
number of cases in which the CCRC is obliged to carry out such an investigation
after conviction and imprisonment. Such investigations have to consider not only the
possibility that an allegation may have been made falsely, but also that an admission
of fabrication may itself be false.
[N.T.K.]
Sentencing
Suspended sentence order—breach of community requirement of order—powers of Crown
Court
Activation; Breach; Custodial sentences; Drug rehabilitation requirements;
Sentencing powers; Supervision requirements; Suspended sentence orders;
Unlawful sentences
R. v Phipps
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Hallett L.J., King J. and Judge Warwick
McKinnon: November 7, 2007; [2007] EWCA Crim 2923.
The appellant pleaded guilty before the Crown Court to one count of burglary
and asked for 14 further offences of burglary to be taken into consideration.
The appellant was sentenced to a term of 12 months’ imprisonment, with a
suspended sentence order with a supervision requirement and a drug rehabilitation
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requirement, for two years. The appellant had numerous previous convictions for
burglary and was liable to a minimum sentence of three years’ imprisonment under
the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.111(2), unless the court
was of the opinion that there were particular circumstances which would make it
unjust to impose such a sentence in the circumstances. The sentencing judge found
such circumstances to exist. The appellant left the drug rehabilitation centre which
he was required to attend without permission and was eventually brought back
before another judge of the Crown Court for a breach of the requirement of the
order. The second judge stated that the appellant had thrown away the opportunity
that he had been given. He revoked the suspended sentence order and sentenced
the appellant to three and a half years’ imprisonment.
Held, it was submitted that in revoking the suspended sentence order and
resentencing the appellant, the judge erred in law. The Criminal Justice Act 2003
Sch.12 para.8 dealt with the powers of the court where there had been a breach of
a community requirement attached to a suspended sentence order. It empowered
the court to deal with an offender by ordering the suspended sentence to take effect
with the original term unaltered or with a lesser term. Alternatively the court might
amend the order by imposing more onerous community requirements, extending
the supervision period or extending the operational period. Those provisions were
to be compared with the powers of the court when dealing with a breach of
a requirement of a community order as opposed to a community requirement
attached to a suspended sentence order. This was governed by para.10 of Sch.8 to
the 2003 Act, which empowered the court to deal with the offender ‘‘in any way in
which he could have been dealt with for the offence by the court which made the
order if the order had not been made’’.
The result was that the wholly deserved sentence passed by the second judge
was not a lawful sentence. The court would quash the sentence of three and a
half years’ imprisonment and activate the original suspended sentence. The lesson
of the case was that where a judge felt able to take a merciful course and not
impose an immediate and substantial custodial sentence, which but for exceptional
circumstances would have been merited, it is better to pass a community order,
spelling out to the offender the consequences of a breach, rather than a suspended
sentence artificially low in its terms, limited to a maximum period of 12 months,
so that if there was a breach, the court’s powers would not be limited as they had
been in the case before the court.
E. Blackman for the appellant.
S. Vallaile for the Crown.
Commentary. This decision provides a useful illustration of the point made at the
end of the judgment. A suspended sentence order with a community requirement
(which is always obligatory) sounds more onerous than a simple community order, but
its bark may often be worse than its bite. Breach of a suspended sentence order may
be more likely to lead to the imposition of a custodial sentence, in view of Sch.12
para.8(3), which requires the court to activate the sentence in full unless it would be
unjust to do so, but the custodial sentence can never exceed the term of the sentence
which was originally suspended. Breach of a community order does not carry any
statutory presumption that a custodial sentence will follow, but if the court decides
to impose a custodial sentence following a breach of a community order, it is not
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restricted in any way in respect of the length of the sentence imposed. The result
seems to be that if the offence itself is one which would not in any event attract a
sentence of more than 12 months (the maximum term which may be suspended) a
suspended sentence order with the appropriate community requirements may convey
to the offender the consequences of a possible breach; but if the appropriate custodial
sentence for the offence would be greater than 12 months, it is better for the court to
impose a simple community order, leaving the question of the length of any custodial
sentence to be imposed on the breach of the order to be decided, in the event that a
breach does occur, by the court which deals with the breach.
[D.A.T.]
Confiscation order—amount that may be realised—agreement between prosecution and
defence as to amount to be paid—whether agreement consistent with statute
Agreements; Certificates of inadequacy;Confiscation orders; Drug trafficking;
Proceeds of crime; Realisable property
Telli v Revenue and Customs Prosecution Office
Court of Appeal (Civil Division):Ward,Moore-Bick andMoses L.JJ.: December
21, 2007; [2007] EWCA Civ 1385.
In 1996 a confiscation order was made against the appellant under the Drug
Trafficking Act 1994 in the amount of £3,458,806, with a term of 10 years’
imprisonment in default, subsequently reduced on appeal to eight, and further
reduced to 5.6 years following the payment of a portion of the sum ordered.
The appellant applied for a certificate of inadequacy in accordance with the
Drug Trafficking Act 1994 s.17, on the basis that a statue which formed part
of the property found to be available to meet any confiscation order had been
repatriated by the Turkish Government as a stolen antiquity. In the absence of
any possibility of realising the value of the statue, the appellant contended that
his realisable property was inadequate for the payment of the amount outstanding.
The outstanding balance at the time of the application was approximately £1.9
million. The application was refused by a judge of the High Court. The appellant
appealed against the refusal of a certificate of inadequacy.
Held, (Moses L.J.) the confiscation order was made in 1996 as a result of an
agreement between the Crown and the appellant. It was contended for the Crown
that the appellant had agreed to pay the sum of £3,458,806 without any agreement
as to the assets which he held. On the basis of the agreement, the application for
a certificate of inadequacy was refused on the ground that the original order was
based on a compromise made on the understanding that the appellant accepted
that he would find £3,458,806. The language of the judge refusing the certificate of
inadequacy used the language of compromise, as if the agreement could be regarded
as analogous to the compromise of a civil action. The appeal raised the question
whether that analogy could be drawn in the context of the statutory scheme under
which the confiscation order was made. The 1994 Act had now been repealed and
replaced by the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The 1994 Act required the Crown
Court to determine, first, whether the defendant had benefited fromdrug trafficking.
If the court was satisfied that the defendant had benefited, the court was required
to quantify the amount of the benefit in accordance with s.4. Certain assumptions
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were to be made. The process by which the court assessed a defendant’s proceeds of
drug trafficking was to be distinguished from the process for assessing the amount
to be recovered under a confiscation order by virtue of s.5. Section 5 provided
that the amount to be recovered under a confiscation order should be the amount
the Crown Court assessed to be the value of the defendant’s proceeds of drug
trafficking, unless the court was satisfied that the amount that might be realised at
the time the confiscation order was made was less than that amount. In that event,
the amount of the confiscation order should be the amount appearing to the court to
be the amount that might be realised or a nominal amount. The amount that might
be realised at the time a confiscation order was made was the total value of all the
realisable property held by the defendant. The effect of the provisions was that prima
facie the court was required to award recovery of the full value of the defendant’s
proceeds of drug trafficking. The court had no power to make an order for any lesser
sum unless it was satisfied that the total of the value at the time the confiscation
order was made of all property held by the defendant was less than the value of the
proceeds as assessed according to s.4. If a defendant failed to satisfy the court of the
value of that realisable property, the court was bound to make a confiscation order
in the full value of his proceeds. A defendant should not, if the statutory scheme
was properly followed, be able to avoid an order recovering the full value of his
proceeds unless he identified the realisable property he held. If he refused to do so,
the court had no option but to order the full amount. It was not open to the Crown
or the defendant to reach an agreement which purported to confer on the Crown
Court an authority inconsistent with the court’s obligations imposed by s.5. That
was not to say that the Crown and the defendant could not reach an agreement
as to the matters which formed the foundation of a confiscation order. It would be
disastrous if it were otherwise. Throughout the period of the operation of the 1994
Act, agreements had been reached between prosecuting authorities and defendants
without which proceedings in the Crown Court would grind to a halt.
It was important to emphasise that any agreement must be within the framework
of the statutory scheme and not inconsistent with it. When the original confiscation
order was made, the court issued a certificate in accordance with s.5 to the effect
that the value of the defendant’s proceeds of drug trafficking was £6 million and
that the amount that might be realised at the time of the making of the order was
£3,458,806. The certificate stated that relevant information regarding the amounts
would be obtained from an officer of HM Customs and Excise. The only source
of information at the time the order was made was a statement made by the officer
under s.11; this was the only source consistent with the statute for determining
the property which formed the basis of the valuation. The statement dealt with the
proceeds received by the defendant and the value of his realisable property. This
led to confusion. The essential function of the prosecutor’s s.11 statement was to
determine whether the defendant had benefited from drug trafficking and to assess
the value of his proceeds. It was not part of the prosecutorial function to quantify
the value of realisable property. That was because it was for the defendant to satisfy
the court that the total value of the realisable property held by him (including gifts
he had made) was less than the total value of his proceeds. For that reason, the
prosecutor’s statement need do no more than assess the full value of the proceeds,
leaving the defendant to persuade the court that his realisable property was to be
valued at a lower figure. The fact that a prosecutor’s statement condescended to
identify property held by the defendant and quantify its value did not in any way
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alleviate the burden placed by the statute on the defendant to satisfy a court that the
value of the realisable property was less than the proceeds of his drug trafficking.
The confusion arose because the prosecution would generally seek to identify
property held by the defendant at any time since conviction for the purposes of
the required assumption under s.4(3). Although the property identified for that
purpose was likely to be identical to the property identified for the purpose of
assessing the value of realisable property on this s.6, the two purposes were distinct.
The prosecutor’s statement contained many details of assets, including bank
accounts and other property, which were identified with a view to establishing the
value of the appellant’s proceeds of drug trafficking. The statement concluded on
this basis that the appellant had benefited at least to the amount of £3,458,806,
but concluded that the appellant had various other assets available for realisation
which could not be identified. The statement concluded with a request for the court
to make a confiscation order in the sum that was assessed to be the appellant’s
proceeds from drug trafficking. It appeared that the officer preparing the statement
did not accept that the realisable amount was less than the proceeds of drug
trafficking for the purposes of s.5(3). The appellant identified 16 assets of various
kinds which were valued at a total of £3,737,241, which included a statue valued
at £2.2 million. It was contended that the total valuation of the realisable property
for the purposes of the 1994 Act was £3,737,241, based on a valuation of assets
which had been identified in the prosecutor’s statement. That submission was not
accepted. There was uncertainty about the valuation of the statue, and it was clear
that the officer preparing the statement did not accept that the realisable assets
were only those he had managed to identify; he took the view that the appellant had
hidden assets either in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. The officer’s conclusion
that the appellant had hidden realisable assets was significant. The extent of a
defendant’s realisable assets at the time of conviction was likely to be peculiarly
within his own knowledge. The statute required a defendant, if he could, to prove
for the purpose of s.5(3) that the amount which might be realised at the time the
confiscation order was made was less than the amount to be assessed to be the
value of his proceeds of drug trafficking. Accordingly, if the defendant was found
not to have disclosed the nature and extent of his realisable assets, a correct view
of the statutory scheme was that he could not satisfy the court that the total value
of all of his realisable property was less than the value of the proceeds of his drug
trafficking. The court ought not therefore issue any certificate under s.5(3). If the
Crown Court had accepted the information given by the officer in the prosecutor’s
statement, it ought not to have issued a certificate certifying that the amount which
might be realised was less than the amount of the benefit. It was plain that that
had been the Crown Court’s conclusion. In the absence of any appeal against
that conclusion, it could not be overturned and the court must now proceed on
the basis that the total value of the appellant’s realisable property was less than
the value of the proceeds of his drug trafficking. However, the application for a
certificate of inadequacy was to be considered in the context that the total value at
the time of conviction of the appellant’s realisable property included not only the
assets which the officer had identified but those which the appellant had managed
to conceal. The judgment of the court below on the application for the certificate
of inadequacy was founded on the conclusion that the prosecution and defence had
reached an agreement as to the amount which the appellant would pay without any
identification of the assets whose valuation formed the total value at the time of all
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the realisable property. The statutory scheme did not permit such a conclusion. In
the absence of the identification of all the realisable property held by the defendant,
a defendant would normally be unable to satisfy the court that the amount that
might be realised at the time the confiscation order was made was less than the
amount assessed to be the proceeds of his drug trafficking. Assets which he had
hidden from the investigating officers might be equal to or in excess of the value of
his proceeds of drug trafficking. No court could be satisfied that they were to be
quantified at a lesser amount. The court suspected that, for many years agreements,
had been reached according to which a judge had assessed the value of realisable
assets as less than the benefit of drug trafficking without proper identification of
the assets which formed part of that valuation. R. (on the application of Customs and
Excise) v L [2007] EWHC 1191 (Admin) was an example. By the time a High
Court judge was called upon to consider a certificate of inadequacy, he was bound
by the conclusion of the Crown Court, even though it might have been based on
an impermissible agreement; impermissible because the realisable assets had not
been identified. The objection arose only where the realisable assets were agreed
to be less than the value of the proceeds, without proper identification of those
assets. In the instant case, the court was bound by the terms of the certificate
granted by the Crown Court when the confiscation order was made. In dealing
with the application for a certificate of inadequacy, it was incumbent on the court
to assess the current value of the realisable property in order to determine whether
it was inadequate to meet the outstanding sum. Once it was appreciated that the
property held by the defendant included unidentified assets forming part of the
total value of the realisable property at the time of the order, it was impossible for
the appellant to establish that the realisable property was inadequate now to meet
the payment of the outstanding order made in 1996. If the defendant failed to
identify all the assets he held, no one would know their true value and by the time of
the application for a certificate of inadequacy, the value of the assets which had not
been identified might have increased. In the absence of a consideration of current
value, no court could be satisfied that the realisable property was inadequate. If
the assets remain unidentified, no conclusion could be reached as to their current
value. The application would fail because the appellant was not able to establish
the current value of all his realisable assets as he chose not to identify all of them.
The appeal would be dismissed.
N. Johnson, Q.C. for the appellant.
B. Stancombe and R. Jones for the Revenue and Customs Prosecution Office.
Commentary: Although this decision was made under the terms of the Drug
Trafficking Act 1994 in the context of an application for a certificate of inadequacy, it
is plainly equally important in relation to confiscation orders made under the Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002. Although there are many differences of detail between the two
statutes, the essential scheme is the same. If the court is proceeding under the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 s.6, it must decide whether the defendant has benefited
from his criminal conduct. If the defendant has a criminal lifestyle, the court must
normally make the assumptions provided by s.10 and calculate the benefit derived
from his general criminal conduct. If the defendant does not have a criminal lifestyle, it
must decide whether he has benefited from his particular criminal conduct. The court
must then make a confiscation order in an amount equal to the defendant’s benefit
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from the conduct concerned, whether general or particular, unless the defendant
shows that the available amount is less than the amount of the benefit. It is for the
court to decide on the available amount (s.7(5)). Although the language is slightly
different, the principle is the same; once the court has determined the defendant’s
benefit, the confiscation order must be made in that amount unless the defendant
can persuade the court that his available assets and the value of any ‘‘tainted gifts’’
together amount to a lesser figure.
The court in this judgment points to the possible confusion arising from the details
which may be set out in what is now called a ‘‘statement of information’’ made in
accordance with s.16. The statement may well include a detailed account of those
assets of the defendant which the prosecution have been able to identify. As the court
points out in the judgment, the main purpose of including these details is to bring into
operation the assumptions which the court is normally required to make in a ‘‘criminal
lifestyle’’ case under s.10. The secondary purpose of setting out the details of the
established assets of the defendant is to rebut any claim made by the defendant that
his assets are less than the value of his benefit. Notwithstanding any details set out
in the statement of information, it remains the position that the burden of persuasion
that the defendant’s available assets are less than his benefit rests on the defendant
and it is not the prosecution’s task to prove what they are. If the defendant fails to
persuade the court that his assets are less than his benefit, the confiscation order
must be made in the amount of his benefit.
The point made in the judgment is that confiscation proceedings are not civil
proceedings and therefore it is not open to the prosecution to agree to settle
confiscation proceedings by the payment by the defendant of an agreed amount.
Agreements are not necessarily inconsistent with the statute, but the limit of the
scope for agreements is that the prosecution may agree that it does not dispute
the defendant’s assertion that all his assets have been disclosed and that he does
not have any further hidden assets. On the basis of such an agreement, it is open
to the court to make the statutory finding that the available amount is less than the
amount of the defendant’s benefit. In the case with which the court was concerned,
this did not happen. The prosecution’s position, as evidenced by the prosecutor’s
statement, was that there had not been full disclosure of the defendant’s assets but
that the prosecution would nevertheless accept payment of the agreed amount. The
effect of the decision is that the prosecution are not entitled to compromise and
accept a payment of an amount less than the defendant’s assessed benefit in these
circumstances. The defendant has failed to discharge the burden of proving that the
available amount is less than the value of his benefit and the order must be for the full
value of his benefit.
[D.A.T.]
Trial
Professional embarrassment—defendant’s counsel withdrawing from trial—fresh represen-
tatives seeking adjournment to prepare case—judge granting short adjournment—fresh
representatives withdrawing from trial—defendant remaining unrepresented—cab-rank
principle
Adjournment; Cab rank rule; Defence counsel; Representation orders;
Solicitors; Time for preparation of defence; Transfer; Withdrawal
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R. v Ulcay
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division); Sir Igor Judge P., Pitchers and Openshaw
JJ.; October 19, 2007; [2007] EWCA Crim 2379.
The defendant was charged with conspiracy to facilitate the commission of
breaches of immigration law by individuals who were not citizens of the European
Union. At the close of the prosecution case, his solicitors and counsel withdrew
from the case on the ground of professional embarrassment, arising out the
complete change in the defendant’s instructions. Fresh counsel was granted a
representation order under reg.16(2)(a) of the Criminal Defence Service (General)
(No.2) Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1437). However, the judge refused to permit
an extended adjournment, concluding that a shorter time was sufficient to allow
counsel properly to prepare the case. Counsel withdrew. Fresh representatives
similarly withdrew on failing to secure an extended adjournment. The defendant
was convicted. He appealed.
Consideration was given, inter alia, to reg.16 of the regulations and to in what
circumstances counsel and solicitors instructed immediately before the beginning
or during the course of the trial might refuse to accept instructions on behalf of the
defendant because of difficulties created by judicial case management, in particular
in relation to adjournments.
Held, dismissing the appeal, (1) where a defendant completely changed his
instructions, counsel would be presented with an impossible situation. If he could
properly do so, of course he had to continue to represent his client, but there were
occasions when he could not do so. It was for counsel to decide whether, consistent
with his obligations to his client, and the court, and the rules of his profession,
he was so professionally embarrassed that he could not continue with the case. If
so, again consistent with his duty to the court, but without contravening the legal
privilege which underpinned his professional relationship with his client, he should
inform the court of his situation, providing such explanation as he could, to enable
the judge to decide how to proceed. In the extremely unlikely event that a judge
had grounds for believing that counsel or solicitors were not acting in good faith,
and in accordance with the obligation owed to the court, their conduct should be
referred to the Bar Council or Law Society.
(2) In an application for a transfer of representation in the Crown Court, the
grounds of the application and full particulars needed to be specified by the existing
representatives. Next, the substantial compelling reason under reg.16(2)(a)(iv), if
relied on, needed to be specified so that it could be identified. It would not generally
be sufficient to allege a lack of care or competence of existing representatives. Only
in extremely rare cases, and where full particulars were given in the application,
would a general ground of loss of confidence or incompetence be entertained. It
would not be sufficient simply to say that there was a breakdown in the relationship
between solicitor and client. Many breakdowns were imagined rather than real
or as a result of proper advice. The court could not oblige lawyers to continue
to act when they had made a professional judgment that they were obliged, for
compelling reasons, to withdraw from the case. That approach was consistent with
the provisions of the regulations. One of the consistent requirements of reg.16 was
that legal representatives should provide details of the nature of the duty which they
believed required them to withdraw from the case, or the nature of the breakdown
in the relationship between the representative and the client. Requirements such
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as those could not impinge on the obligation of confidentiality between lawyer and
client. Lawyers would do their best to comply with the requirement within the
limits of the rules governing legal professional privilege, with the result that the
court might be less well informed of the pressures on lawyers to withdraw from the
defence or explain the nature of the breakdown. The purpose of the regulations
was to ensure that the client did not manipulate the system. Claims of a breakdown
in the professional relationship between lawyer and client were frequently made
by defendants. If judges intended to reject an application for a change of legal
representative they might well explain to the defendant that the consequence might
be that the case would continue without him being represented at public expense.
If defendants terminated their lawyer’s retainer for improper motives, the court was
not bound to agree to an application for a change of representation. The ultimate
decision for the court was case and fact specific, and it did not follow from the
repeated indication of the mantra ‘‘loss of confidence’’ that an application would
be granted.
(3) Judges should seek to find a common-sense solution to the kind of problems
to which the withdrawal of counsel or a change of instructions could give rise,
clearing up possible misunderstandings and, as best they can, introducing the calm
and balance which sometimes can evaporate in the forensic process. However, it
would rarely be right for trial judges, midway through a trial, to be required to
engage in a personal discussion with defendants about their defence, and whether
it was changing, or the state of the professional relationship with their lawyers, and
certainly not if satisfied that a defendant was attempting to manipulate the process.
Where barristers or solicitors were invited to take on a defence case at a very late
stage or halfway through a long trial, the starting point was that trial judges had to
decide whether, and if so for how long, they were prepared to adjourn a trial to
accommodate new counsel. The responsibility was vested exclusively in the judge.
If the judge’s decision produced an injustice or deprived the defendant of the fair
trial to which he was entitled, the remedy was to be found in the Court of Appeal.
The rules of the legal professions had to defer to and be consistent with those
principles.
(4) The cab-rank rule, and the rationale which supported it, applied whenever,
and however late, the barrister was instructed. The absence of what the barrister
would regard as sufficient time for the purpose of preparation did not constitute an
exception. Paragraph 701(b)(ii) of the Code of Conduct directed that a barrister
should not undertake any task for which ‘‘he does not have adequate time and
opportunity to prepare for and perform’’. It did not constitute an exception to
the cab-rank rule. Paragraph 701(b)(ii) was concerned to prevent barristers from
accepting work over and above their existing commitments which they would
not be able adequately to prepare and deal with in a professionally competent
manner. The barrister faced with the problem which arose in the present trial
was professionally required to soldier on and do the best she could. The process
would normally encompass discussions with former counsel, taking stock generally,
analysis of the issues likely to arise thereafter, and sensible applications to the
trial judge for adjournment as and when the need arose. Rule 2.01 of the Law
Society Rules was not directed to and the solicitor was not prevented from acting
nor required to cease to act where an order of the court created difficulties and
made it that much harder for him to discharge his professional obligations to his
client. Such difficulties arose because of the judge’s ruling, not the absence of
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appropriate resources or necessary competence. The ruling, however, was binding
on the solicitor, as it was on the barrister, and indeed everyone else involved in
the conduct of the case. In the context of the conduct of criminal litigation, the
solicitor was an officer of the court. He had an obligation to the court to comply
with its orders, and to do his best for his client in the light of those orders. Neither
barristers nor solicitors in such circumstances would be in breach of the rules of
their profession, nor acting improperly or negligently, if the worse that could be
said was that they were doing their best to comply with orders of the court which
made it impossible or difficult to look after the client’s interests to the standard
which, without those difficulties, they would normally be expected to achieve. In
the present case, the decisions of the new teams of barristers and solicitors were
wrong. However, in all the circumstances of the present case, and in the light of
the strength of the prosecution case, the conviction was not unsafe.
Cases considered: Jones [2002] UKHL 5; [2002] 2 Cr. App. R. 9; G [2004]
EWCA Crim 1368; [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 37; Al Zubeidi [1999] Crim. L.R. 906.
[Reported by Vanessa Higgins, Barrister]
Benjamin Aina for the defendant.
Charles Garside, Q.C. and Roger Smart for the Crown.
Timothy Cray for the General Council of the Bar.
Bruce Holder, Q.C. for the Law Society.
Commentary. Article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights speaks
of an accused’s right to defend himself in person or through a legal representative
of his choosing. However, the danger of a defendant rejecting counsel on spurious
grounds in an attempt to prolong and frustrate the trial cannot be ignored. To prevent
a trial being derailed may, on occasion, demand fairly robust control by the trial judge
but that may be necessary to ensure fairness to all parties in the proceedings including,
in this case, other defendants. There may be occasions such as the present one when
defendants completely change their instructions to counsel at a late stage in the trial,
placing counsel in a very difficult position. Whether counsel choose to continue to
represent the defendant or feel that they are so professionally embarrassed that they
cannot continue with the case must be a decision for counsel to take. This has been
recognised as such in numerous cases, including G and B [2004] EWCA Crim 1368;
[2004] 2 Cr. App. R. 37; Jones (No.2) (1972) 56 Cr. App. R. 413; Shaw (1980) 70
Cr. App. R. 313. Given that counsel will invariably be better informed than the judge
and that there may well be considerations that counsel is unable to reveal, it is difficult
to envisage a scenario in which the judge would direct counsel to continue or refuse
permission to withdraw (for the provision of legal representation at public expense
and the grounds for an application for a change of representative, see the Criminal
Defence Service (General) (No.2) Regulations 2001, reg.16). If defendants do seek to
change their legal representative then the judge should ensure they are clear in the
decision and that any adverse consequences of such a change are minimised for all
involved in the trial, for example through an appropriate adjournment. However, the
judge should not engage in an investigation of the decision which would, for example,
involve personal discussions with defendants as the potential for bias in this approach
is all too apparent.
In most circumstances when defendants seek to change their representative the
court will permit this, however, each case inevitably turns on its own facts though a
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defendant’s ‘‘loss of confidence’’ in the representative is often not sufficient of itself.
Loss of confidence will often be a natural result of clients not receiving the advice they
wish to hear.
If there is to be a change of representative then clearly it is the responsibility
of the court to determine the appropriate adjournment to ensure that the new
representatives are prepared for their task, and that the trial is not derailed. The Bar
Standards Board Code of Conduct para.701(b)(ii) directs that a barrister should not
undertake any task for which ‘‘he does not have adequate time and opportunity to
prepare for and perform’’. It is suggested however that this refers to the workloads of
individual barristers and the amount of work they choose to undertake. New counsel
will inevitably face problems when stepping into an ongoing trial but this has to be
weighed against the overall fairness of the trial to all parties and to the public. As
discussed above, the trial judge should seek to alleviate any potential disadvantage to
the defendant but ultimately, should it be felt that the defendant suffered an injustice,
the solution should lie in the hands of the Court of Appeal.
It was suggested that the rules of the Solicitors’ Code of Conduct were not
compatible with this position in that solicitors were entitled to decide which client to
take on and were not subject to the ‘‘cab-rank rule’’. As such, though barristers might
have to pursue a case despite not having the preparation time they might feel is
appropriate, this is not the position for the solicitor. Should solicitors take on a case
without what they would consider to be adequate preparation time, that decision might
fall foul of r.2.01 which states that:
‘‘You are generally free to decide whether or not to take on a particular
client. However, you must refuse to act or cease acting for a client in the
following circumstances . . . (b) Where you have insufficient resources or lack
the competence to deal with the matter.’’
However, in cases such as this the problem of preparation time arises not through the
absence of appropriate resources but because of a judge’s ruling. Both barrister and
solicitor owe a duty to the court and that duty is not different in its application. Indeed,
r.1.01 of the Solicitors’ Code states that ‘‘[y]ou have obligations not only to clients
but also to the court and to third parties’’. Ultimately, if there is a lack of preparation
time it is likely to be the defendant who is disadvantaged but this potential problem
can only be appropriately tackled by a case-specific determination of what secures
fairness for the process as a whole. It is submitted that this view of the Solicitors’
Code must be correct. To hold otherwise would be to frustrate the judge’s ruling and
potentially jeopardise the fairness of the proceedings. Given that counsel would be
expected to have ‘‘soldiered on’’ it would be anomalous not to be expect the solicitor
to do likewise.
[N.W.T.]
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Video Reconstruction—Jury Directions—Australia
Mahmood v State of Western Australia [2008] HCA 1
Australia; Judicial comment; Jury directions; Murder; Re-enactments; Video
evidence
The appellant had been convicted of the murder of his wife. In a police interview
he claimed to have become suspicious when she failed to return from the toilet at
the restaurant which they ran. He explained that when he went to see where she
was, he found her body at the rear of the premises. Her throat had been cut. One
week after being interviewed by the police, the appellant agreed to re-enact the
events surrounding the discovery of the body. He accompanied the police to the
restaurant and ‘‘walked through’’ the events of the day and described the position
in which he had found the body and the manner in which he had handled it.
The prosecution’s case against the appellant was circumstantial: no murder
weapon had been found; the appellant had suspected his wife of having an affair
and had hired a private detective to investigate matters; there was evidence that
raised voices had been heard in the restaurant on the morning of the murder.
Expert witnesses were called to give evidence regarding the location of blood at the
premises.
The defence relied on a six-minute sequence of the video recorded re-enactment
in which the appellant explained how he had held his wife’s body. Although defence
counsel indicated a willingness to tender the whole of the video, the prosecution
did not consent to such a course. However, in his closing address to the jury,
prosecution counsel drew attention to the appellant’s demeanour during the six-
minute video sequence played at trial. The jury were invited to consider whether
the appellant had shown any emotion when he was asked about the blood and
were invited to infer that his demeanour was that of someone who had committed
a cold-blooded and clinical murder. In light of this, defence counsel applied to
reopen the case for the defence so that the jury could be shown the recording in
its entirety. This application was refused and the trial judge dealt with the issue
in her summing-up in which she subsequently suggested to the jury that that it
would be ‘‘unwise’’ to draw any adverse inferences against the accused because of
his demeanour during the video recording.
On appeal against conviction, it was common ground that the appellant had
displayed distress and appeared to have been emotionally upset when talking about
his wife at several points in the parts of the video recording which had not been
shown to the jury. The High Court, allowing the appeal, concluded that in order
to overcome the prejudicial effects of the prosecutors remarks it would have been
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necessary for the trial judge in her summing-up to have denied the implication that
the parts of the video recording that they had seen was evidence of the appellant’s
emotional state. In order to distance the evidence from the purpose suggested by
the prosecution, a suitably framed direction was required.
There was a distinction to be drawn between a direction and a comment. This
reflected the fundamental division of functions in a criminal trial between judge and
jury. Telling a jury that they may attach particular significance to a fact or suggesting
that evidence may be considered of greater weight, is comment. Comment may
properly be ignored by a jury. A direction will contain warnings about either the
degree of care needed in assessing some evidence, or the use to which it may be
put. A direction is something that the law requires the judge to issue and the jury
to heed.
In the present case the judge’s statements were no more than comment. The
evidence available to the jury was only part of the video recording and it was
necessary for the jury to be directed in unequivocal terms that they could not safely
draw the inference that the prosecutor had invited them to draw, and that they
should ignore the remarks. The trial judge’s statements were directed to the reasons
why they might give the evidence lesser weight that other more contemporaneous
evidence. However, they failed to deny its evidentiary effect and the misdirection
amounted to an error of law.
Criminal Liability of Drivers who Fall Asleep Causing Death—Australia
Tasmania Law Reform Institute, Issues Paper No.12: Criminal Liability of Drivers
Who Fall Asleep Causing Motor Vehicle Crashes Resulting in Death or Other Serious
Injury (Jiminez: 2007)
Causing death by dangerous driving; Criminal liability; Fitness to drive;
Tasmania
The Tasmania Law Reform Institute has published an issues paper dealing with the
criminal liability of drivers who cause death and serious injury as a result of falling
asleep at the wheel. The paper considers the implications and practical difficulties
caused by the decision of the High Court of Australia in Jiminez v The Queen (1992)
173 C.L.R. 572. In that case it was held that the actions of a sleeping driver were
not conscious or voluntary, which meant that he or she could not be criminally
responsible for driving the car in a dangerous manner. Where a driver has fallen
asleep the focus of the inquiry to determine criminal liability is, therefore, on the
driving which preceded the moment when the driver fell asleep. The prosecution
is required to prove that the driver was ‘‘affected by tiredness to an extent that, in
the circumstances, his driving was objectively dangerous’’.
The Institute notes the perception that the decision in Jiminez has made it more
difficult to secure convictions where drivers have fallen asleep. Among the options
for reform of the relevant Tasmanian legislation is the introduction of a legislative
provision reflecting Jiminez. This would specify that if there is an appreciable risk
of falling asleep, driving while sleepy may constitute negligence or dangerousness
in circumstances in which the driver falls asleep and causes death or grievous
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bodily harm. An alternative proposal is to introduce provisions which establish a
rebuttable presumption that a person who has fallen asleep at the wheel did, in fact,
have a prior awareness that they were at risk of falling asleep. The presumption
could be rebutted by drivers who could establish on the balance of probability
that they had no prior warning of sleepiness. The Institute acknowledges that
while research suggests that healthy drivers do have prior warning that they are
sleepy, some drivers are not good at predicting how close to falling asleep they
are. Moreover, what research exists is based on a small number of healthy drivers
and has been conducted in artificial conditions. Nonetheless, such a presumption
would overcome the evidentiary difficulties that prosecutors currently encounter in
establishing that a driver knew he was at risk of falling asleep. In a final option,
the Institute suggests that road traffic legislation could be amended specifically to
exclude falling asleep at the wheel from being relied upon by an accused in relation
to driving offences.
The paper is available on the Institute’s website: http://www.law.utas.edu.au/
reform/jiminez issues paper A4-PDFfinal 4 Sept 07.pdf [Accessed February 19,
2008].
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activation of suspended sentences
unlawful sentences, 398–400
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Dangerous driving,
grievous bodily harm
maximum sentences, 238–241
Dangerous offenders,
see also Detention for public
protection; Imprisonment for
public protection
dangerousness
previous convictions for unrelated
offences, 66–68
Date of offence,
continuing offences
validity of indictments, 214–216
Deception,
rape
consent, 144–147
Defence counsel,
withdrawal
time for preparation of defence,
404–408
Defences,
defence of others
possession for terrorist purposes,
72–79
duress
murder by child acting under
parental influence, 138–141
insanity
knowledge of right and wrong,
132–134
Deportation,
fear of persecution
reasonable excuse for withholding
information, 229–231
Detention for public protection,
causing death by dangerous driving
risk of reoffending, 314–318
Dictatorships,
terrorist information
reasonable excuse, 160–165
Discretionary life imprisonment,
attempted murder
mentally disordered offenders,
236–238
Doli incapax,
mental impairment
stay of proceedings, 165–171
Due process,
conduct of judges
case management, 299–300
Duress,
murder
children acting under parental
influence, 138–141
Electronic documents,
possession for terrorist purposes
statutory interpretation, 71–81
Escaping,
release on temporary licence
failure to return to custody,
301–302
Evidence,
codification
New Zealand, 85–87
Exclusionary discretion,
words constituting offence
causing harassment, alarm or
distress, 383–385
Extended sentences,
young offenders
public protection, 314–318
Extraterritoriality,
police interviews
overseas interrogation of own
nationals, 121–131
Eyewitnesses,
reliability
jury directions, 172–173
False statements,
rape allegations
credibility, 394–398
Fitness to drive,
causing death by driving
sleeping at the wheel, 410–411
Fitness to plead,
young offenders
mental impairment, 165–171
Foreign governments,
terrorist information
activities directed against
dictatorships, 160–165
Fresh evidence,
identification
grounds for appeal, 57–59
Grievous bodily harm,
dangerous driving
maximum sentences, 238–241
Grounds for appeal,
fresh evidence
identification, 57–59
Guilty pleas,
privilege against self-incrimination
evidence against co-defendants,
391–394
Handling stolen goods,
confiscation orders
benefit from criminal conduct,
231–233
Homicide,
see also specific offences
Australia
reform proposals, 336
Hospital orders,
attempted murder
public protection, 236–238
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Human rights,
see No punishment without law;
Right to fair trial
Identification,
eyewitnesses
jury directions on reliability,
172–173
fresh evidence
grounds for appeal, 57–59
Immigration offences,
reasonable excuse
fear of persecution on deportation,
229–231
Imprisonment for public protection,
consecutive sentences
minimum term, 68–71
dangerousness
previous convictions for unrelated
offences, 66–68
indecent photographs of children
risk of reoffending, 320–326
indication of sentence
findings of dangerousness after
indication, 311–314
Indecent assault,
appeals against conviction
Court of Appeal approach to ‘‘old’’
cases, 50–54
Indecent photographs of children,
imprisonment for public protection
risk of reoffending, 320–326
‘‘up-skirting’’/‘‘down-blousing’’
legal approach, 370–382
Indication of sentence,
imprisonment for public protection
findings of dangerousness after
indication, 311–314
Indictments,
date of offence
continuing offences, 214–216
Infanticide,
mens rea
intention to kill or cause serious
bodily harm, 388–391
Injunctions,
public nuisance
prostitution, 353–369
Insanity,
M’Naghten rules
knowledge of right and wrong,
132–134
Intention,
infanticide
mens rea, 388–391
murder
children acting under parental
influence, 138–141
possession of firearms with intent
self-defence, 386–388
Intermediaries,
vulnerable and intimidated witnesses
evaluation of scheme, 91–104
Intervening events,
joint enterprise
causation, 218–222
Investigations,
see Criminal investigations
Joint enterprise,
criminal liability
generally, 3–18
Law Commission proposals, 19–31
withdrawal
causation, 218–222
JSB specimen directions,
reform proposals, 337–338
Judges,
conduct
due process, 299–300
Judicial comment,
video re-enactments
Australia, 409–410
Judicial review,
Law Commission consultation paper,
175–176
Juries,
bias
Crown prosecutors/police officers,
134–138
Jurisdiction,
extraterritoriality
overseas interrogation of own
nationals, 121–131
Jury directions,
causing death of children or
vulnerable adults
risk of significant harm, 54–57
identification
reliability of eyewitnesses, 172–173
JSB specimen directions
reform proposals, 337–338
video re-enactments
Australia, 409–410
Keeping brothels,
continuing offences
validity of indictments, 214–216
Knowledge,
insanity
withdrawal of insanity verdict from
jury, 132–134
possession of prohibited firearms
strict liability, 327–330
M’Naghten rules,
knowledge of right and wrong
withdrawal of insanity verdict from
jury, 132–134
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Manslaughter,
causation
supply of drugs for
self-administration, 222–225
withdrawal from joint enterprise,
218–222
Maximum sentences,
dangerous driving
grievous bodily harm, 238–241
Mentally disordered offenders,
attempted murder
suitability of life imprisonment,
236–238
young offenders
capacity, 165–171
Military law,
Court Martial
right to independent and impartial
tribunal, 191–203
Minimum term,
imprisonment for public protection
consecutive sentences, 68–71
Mistake of fact,
possession of prohibited firearms
strict liability, 327–330
Mitigation,
impact of sentencing
judicial decision-making, 105–120
sentencing guidelines, 264–276
Money laundering,
confiscation orders
benefit from criminal conduct,
62–64
Mortgage fraud,
confiscation orders
court’s duty to make order, 59–61
Mortgages,
benefit from criminal conduct
confiscation orders, 62–64
Murder,
attempts
mentally disordered offenders,
236–238
duress
children acting under parental
influence, 138–141
New Zealand,
bad character
reform proposals, 249
evidence
codification, 85–87
provocation
reform proposals, 173
sentencing guidelines
reform, 287–298
No punishment without law,
sexual offences
sentencing guidelines,
234–236
Outraging public decency,
‘‘up-skirting’’
actus reus, 225–229
generally, 370–382
PACE codes of practice,
contemporaneous record of
statements
words constituting offence,
383–385
Persecution,
reasonable excuse
immigration offences, 229–231
Police detention,
advice on charging from CPS
lawfulness of detention, 141–143
Police interviews,
intermediaries
evaluation of scheme, 91–104
overseas interrogation of own
nationals
extraterritoriality, 121–131
Police records,
contemporaneous record of
statements
words constituting offence,
383–385
Pornography,
child pornography
requirements of possession,
334–335
Possession for terrorist purposes,
relationship with s.58 offence
statutory interpretation, 71–81
Possession of firearms,
prohibited firearms
strict liability, 327–330
Possession of firearms with intent,
self-defence
conditional intent, 386–388
Precedent,
per incuriam decisions
terrorism offences, 72–81
Preparatory hearings,
rulings
precedent, 80–81
Presumption of innocence,
strict liability
possession of prohibited firearms,
327–330
Presumptions,
possession for terrorist purposes
burden of proof, 72–79
rape
consent, 144–147
Previous convictions,
bad character
propensity, 303–306
dangerousness
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convictions for unrelated offences,
66–68
prosecution witnesses
credibility, 306–308
Prisoners,
credit for time served
imprisonment for public
protection, 68–71
escaping
release on temporary licence,
301–302
Privilege against self-incrimination,
confessions
Canada, 248–249
guilty pleas
evidence against co-defendants,
391–394
Prohibited firearms,
see Possession of firearms
Prohibited names,
confiscation orders
benefit from criminal conduct,
64–66
Propensity,
previous convictions
relevance to credibility, 303–306
Prosecution witnesses,
previous convictions
credibility, 306–308
Prostitution,
public nuisance
injunctions, 353–369
Provocation,
New Zealand
reform proposals, 173
Public nuisance,
prostitution
injunctions, 353–369
Public protection,
see also Detention for public
protection; Imprisonment for
public protection
mentally disordered offenders
attempted murder, 236–238
Punishment,
impact
mitigation, 105–120
Rape,
consent
children, 155–160
deception, 144–147
history of false allegations
credibility, 394–398
Realisable property,
agreements with prosecution
consistency with statute, 400–404
Reasonable belief,
age
rape, 155–160
Reasonable excuse,
immigration offences
fear of persecution on deportation,
229–231
terrorist information
activities directed against
dictatorships, 160–165
Reduction of sentence,
assisting investigations
sentencing guidelines, 147–155
Re-enactments,
jury directions
Australia, 409–410
Release on temporary licence,
escaping
failure to return to custody,
301–302
Representation orders,
transfer
time for preparation of defence,
404–408
Review of sentence,
assisting investigations
sentencing guidelines, 147–155
Right to fair trial,
independent and impartial tribunal
Court Martial, 191–203
strict liability
possession of prohibited firearms,
327–330
Right to silence,
confessions
Canada, 248–249
Risk,
causing death of children or
vulnerable adults
statutory interpretation, 54–57
Risk of reoffending,
detention for public protection
appropriateness, 314–318
imprisonment for public protection
indecent photographs of children,
320–326
previous convictions for unrelated
offences, 66–68
Self-defence,
possession of firearms with intent
conditional intent, 386–388
Sentencing,
see also specific sentences and orders
impact
mitigation, 105–120
road traffic homicide offences
culpability, 339–352
terrorism offences
relationship between s.57 and s.58
offences, 72–79
Sentencing guidelines,
aggravating features, 264–276
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comparative law
aggravating and mitigating factors,
264–276
generally, 253–263
New Zealand, 287–298
cultivation of cannabis
commercial cultivation, 318–320
effectiveness, 253–263
mitigation, 264–276
New Zealand, 287–298
practical perspective, 277–286
reduction/review of sentence
assisting investigations, 147–155
sexual offences
no punishment without law,
234–236
Sentencing powers,
activation of suspended sentences
custodial sentences, 398–400
imprisonment for public protection
consecutive sentences, 68–71
Sexual offences,
see also specific offences
sentencing guidelines
no punishment without law,
234–236
Sexual offences prevention orders,
indecent photographs of children
risk of reoffending, 320–326
Special measures,
intermediaries
evaluation of scheme, 91–104
Statutory interpretation,
causing death of children or
vulnerable adults
risk of significant harm, 54–57
terrorism offences
relationship between s.57 and s.58,
71–81
Stay of proceedings,
abuse of process
mental impairment, 165–171
Strict liability,
possession of prohibited firearms
mistake of fact, 327–330
Supply of drugs,
manslaughter
self-administration of supplied
drugs, 222–225
Suspended sentences,
activation
credit for time served, 241–244
unlawful sentences, 398–400
Temporary release,
see Release on temporary licence
Terrorist information,
reasonable excuse
activities directed against
dictatorships, 160–165
relationship with s.57 offence
statutory interpretation, 71–81
Time for preparation of defence,
transfer of representation orders
refusal of adjournment, 404–408
Time spent in custody,
see Credit for time served
Totality of sentence,
consecutive sentences
imprisonment for public
protection, 68–71
Treasure,
‘‘time crime’’
comparative law, 204–213
Undue leniency,
rape
children, 155–160
Unfair evidence,
words constituting offence
causing harassment, alarm or
distress, 383–385
United States,
‘‘time crime’’
comparative law, 204–213
Unlawful sentences,
suspended sentence orders
activation, 398–400
Vagrancy,
being in enclosed yard for unlawful
purposes
statutory interpretation,
216–218
Video evidence,
re-enactments
Australia, 409–410
Video recordings,
‘‘up-skirting’’/‘‘down-blousing’’
legal approach, 370–382
Voyeurism,
‘‘up-skirting’’/‘‘down-blousing’’
legal approach,
370–382
Vulnerable and intimidated witnesses,
intermediaries
evaluation of scheme,
91–104
Withdrawal,
defence counsel
time for preparation of defence,
404–408
joint enterprise
causation, 218–222
Withholding information,
immigration offences
fear of persecution as reasonable
excuse, 229–231
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Young offenders,
detention for public protection
causing death by dangerous
driving, 314–318
early intervention
initial decision-making, 177–190
mental impairment
capacity, 165–171
murder
acting under parental influence,
138–141
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